BREAKING: Armed Fulani Militants Kill Three Farmers in Deadly Attack on Benue Mining Community

(Makurdi), Three farmers have been confirmed dead following a brutal attack by armed Fulani militants on Nzaav-Div village, a mining community in Jato Aka of Kwande Local Government Area, Benue State, on September 4.

The deadly assault, which occurred at approximately 4:00 PM local time and master more than 2 hours, saw dozens of heavily armed attackers storm the community and open fire indiscriminately on residents. The incident has once again highlighted the escalating security challenges facing Nigeria’s Middle Belt region, particularly communities engaged in farming and mining activities.

According to James, a local resident who witnessed the horrific events, the militants’ primary target was the bustling mining field where hundreds of people work daily. However, farmers who spotted the approaching attackers raised the alarm, enabling most miners to flee the area before the assault intensified.

“Their target was the mines, hundreds of people work there but the farmers who saw them first ran to inform the people and the miners ran away,” James told Middle Belt Times.

“Three people were killed, two were injured and two are still missing, we don’t know their whereabout.”

The victims have been identified as Igba Mfeseer, Achia Tartenger, and Aondofa Taav Zangwa, who was popularly known as “City man” in the community.

The attack has left families devastated, with Mr. Igba’s first son, who also served as his driver, among the missing persons. Mama Mbasen Nyitar Bigila Bur is also reported missing following the assault.

The incident has exposed serious gaps in the security apparatus meant to protect vulnerable communities. Despite the presence of both police and military personnel stationed in the area, residents have expressed frustration over the delayed response to emergency situations.

“We have a police station and also soldiers in the community but they don’t respond on time whenever there is an attack. It could take them up to two hours to be at the scenes of attacks,” James lamented, highlighting a recurring problem that has cost countless lives in similar incidents across the region.

This delayed response time has become a critical concern for residents who find themselves at the mercy of well-armed militants while security forces struggle to provide timely intervention.

The attack on Nzaav-Div village is part of a disturbing pattern of violence that has plagued Nigeria’s Middle Belt region for over two decades. Farming and mining communities have borne the brunt of these attacks, with residents living in constant fear of assault.

Security analysts and local observers believe these attacks are intrinsically linked to the region’s abundant mineral wealth. The Middle Belt’s rich deposits of various minerals, including tin, columbite, Lithium and gold, have made mining communities attractive targets for criminal elements seeking to control or extort these valuable resources.

The frequency and intensity of these attacks have created a climate of fear that threatens to undermine economic activities in the region, potentially displacing communities and disrupting livelihoods that depend on both agriculture and mining.

In response to the escalating security challenges and concerns over mining operations, Benue State Governor Rev. Fr. Hyacinth Alia took decisive action in March 2024, suspending all mining activities throughout the state. The suspension was implemented citing mounting security concerns and the proliferation of illegal mining operations that have attracted criminal elements to previously peaceful communities.

This drastic measure underscores the gravity of the security situation and the difficult balance between economic development and public safety that state governments across the Middle Belt are grappling with.

As the community of Nzaav-Div mourns its dead and searches for the missing, the latest attack serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for comprehensive security reforms in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. The incident highlights the vulnerability of rural communities and the critical importance of improving response times and protective measures for areas engaged in mining and agricultural activities.

The families of the victims and the broader community now await justice while hoping for enhanced security measures that could prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Security Forces Capture Boko Haram Founder’s Teenage Son, Ansaru Leaders

In coordinated security operations, Chadian forces apprehended an 18-year-old believed to be the youngest son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf. The young man, identified as Muslim Mohammed Yusuf, was reportedly leading a small jihadist cell in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, when he was arrested alongside five other suspected insurgents. Meanwhile, Nigerian authorities captured two internationally wanted Ansaru leaders, Mahmud Muhammad Usman (Abu Bara’a) and Mahmud al-Nigeri (Mallam Mamuda), in operations conducted between May and July 2025. These arrests target terrorist networks operating in the Lake Chad region, an area that includes parts of Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where communities have long suffered violence from Boko Haram, ISWAP, and Fulani ethnic militants.

The arrests, recently made public, have generated cautious optimism among security experts and local residents. According to a Nigerian intelligence officer operating in the Lake Chad area, Muslim Yusuf was leading a six-man cell linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter group that broke away from Boko Haram due to ideological differences. “The team was headed by Muslim, the youngest son of the late Boko Haram founder,” the source told AFP, adding that the group was planning operations that could have further destabilized the region.

Ansaru Leadership Captured

Nigerian National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu announced the capture of the two Ansaru leaders during a months-long, intelligence-driven operation. Abu Bara’a, described as the “Emir of Ansaru,” was the overall coordinator of the group’s sleeper cells across Nigeria and mastermind of several kidnappings and terrorist financing operations. His deputy, Mamuda, headed the notorious “Mahmudawa” faction based in and around Kainji National Park and trained in Libya under foreign jihadist instructors.

The two men were responsible for major attacks including the 2022 Kuje prison break in Abuja, the 2013 abduction of French engineer Francis Collomp in Katsina, the 2019 kidnapping of Alhaji Musa Umar Uba, Magajin Garin Daura, the abduction of the Emir of Wawa, and attacks on a Niger uranium facility. “These two men have been on Nigeria’s most-wanted list for years and are also internationally sought terrorists,” Ribadu said. “Their capture marks one of the most decisive blows against Ansaru since its emergence in 2012.”

Meanwhile, Chadian police confirmed the arrest of six undocumented individuals, described as “bandits operating in the city,” but declined to verify whether one of them was indeed Yusuf’s son. “They are members of Boko Haram,” police spokesman Paul Manga told reporters in N’Djamena, emphasizing ongoing efforts to curb insurgent activities. Photos circulating in the media show a young, slender man in a blue tracksuit bearing a striking resemblance to the late Mohammed Yusuf, standing alongside older suspects.

Multi-Faceted Threat in Middle Belt

For residents of Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where Boko Haram, ISWAP, and Fulani ethnic militants have operated for over a decade, these arrests carry particular significance. The region has faced violence from multiple sources, with Fulani herders increasingly militarized and often coordinating with established jihadist groups to target farming communities. The arrests recall 2009, when Mohammed Yusuf was killed during a military crackdown in Maiduguri that left over 800 people dead. At that time, Muslim Yusuf was just an infant. His father’s death marked a turning point, escalating the insurgency into a campaign that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced millions across Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

The Middle Belt’s diverse communities have faced attacks from multiple militant groups. Boko Haram and ISWAP have targeted villages, while Fulani ethnic militants have systematically attacked Christian farming communities, destroying farmlands, burning churches, and displacing families. This multi-pronged threat has created an ongoing humanitarian crisis.

A former Boko Haram lieutenant who has renounced the group confirmed Muslim Yusuf’s arrest, stating, “He and the team were arrested by Chadian security. They are six in number.” This underscores ongoing regional efforts to dismantle terrorist networks, particularly through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which has reported progress against Boko Haram, ISWAP, and associated militant groups. However, the insurgency remains active. Recent attacks, including one on Chad’s presidential palace, highlight the groups’ continued operational capacity, while Borno and Yobe states face regular assaults from various militant factions.

Intelligence and Operational Impact

Ribadu said the arrest of the Ansaru leaders has effectively dismantled the terrorist group’s central command. Caches of materials and digital evidence recovered during the operation are undergoing forensic analysis and are expected to yield intelligence on the group’s networks in Nigeria and the wider Sahel.

The arrests may provide critical intelligence about jihadist operations and potentially disrupt activities across the Lake Chad Basin. They may also offer insights into coordination between traditional jihadist groups and ethnic militant factions like the Fulani militants operating throughout Nigeria’s Middle Belt.

For Middle Belt communities that have experienced violence from multiple militant groups, the arrests represent both progress and a reminder of ongoing challenges. “The fall of Ansaru’s leadership signals the beginning of the end of impunity for terrorist leaders in Nigeria,” Ribadu declared. “We will continue to pursue extremists with precision, resolve, and unwavering determination.”

The coordinated nature of these arrests, spanning from Chad to Nigeria and targeting different terrorist networks—reflects increased regional cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. However, the persistence of multiple militant groups across the region suggests that while these captures represent tactical victories, the broader security challenge remains complex and ongoing.

Sources: Adapted from AFP and regional security network

INVESTIGATION: Military Commander’s Delay and the Army Bullet That Killed Riyom Youth Leader During July 15 Massacre

Part Two of Two-Part Investigation

By Middle Belt Times Investigative Team

The Suspicious Timing: Military Movements Under Scrutiny

The most damaging allegations against the Nigerian military emerged from eyewitness accounts of the attackers’ precise knowledge of military schedules. Rev. Davou Musa’s testimony to Middle Belt Times (MBT) revealed that the militants demonstrated an intimate understanding of when soldiers would arrive, information that raises serious questions about intelligence leaks or direct collaboration.

“There were 10 other people, mostly women, in the main building we ran out from,” Rev. Musa recounted, his voice heavy with the weight of survival guilt. “They slaughtered 9 people to death in the house; the 10th survived with serious injuries. When it was 5 am, they spoke in Fulfulde that ‘it is 5am, soldiers,’ meaning they knew exactly when the soldiers were going to show up in our community. And indeed, few minutes later the soldiers came in after over two hours of killings.”

Even more disturbing were reports from neighboring communities along the road who witnessed what appeared to be military facilitation of the attackers’ escape. Another resident of the community who pleaded anonymity told MBT that “some residents of neighboring communities on the road saw how the soldiers provided safe passage for the terrorists who had a truck to help them convey the items they looted from the community. They looted valuables such as mattresses, palm oil, Maggi cubes, goats, and other items.”

You can read part one of the investigation here.

Lt. Col. Thomas Paave: A Commander Under Fire

At the center of these allegations stands Lt. Col. Thomas Paave, commander of Sector 6 of Operation Safe Haven Joint Task Force in Riyom Local Government Area. Paave’s deployment to Riyom came after residents of attacked communities in Bokkos LGA complained about his “unprofessionalism” in the face of consistent attacks by armed Fulani militants, a pattern that would tragically repeat itself in Bindi.

The sector command headquarters, strategically positioned less than 4 miles from Bindi, should have enabled rapid response to the community’s distress. Instead, residents describe an inexplicable delay that cost lives. “The sector command headquarters is just nearby here in Riyom town, but they never showed up since they left our community around 7 pm, 8 hours before the July 15 attack,” Jambol Daniel, Bindi Youth Secretary, told MBT.

Daniel’s frustration was palpable as he continued: “Even if they were to walk on foot, it should not have taken them 20 minutes to get here, but the attack went on for over 2 hours before the soldiers from Sector 6 got here. We believe there was complicity on the part of the soldiers and their commander, who we later heard said that the attackers stopped the soldiers from coming to defend us during the attack.”

Soldiers of Operation Safe Heaven on Patrol in Riyom. Credit: MBT

Allegations of Military Involvement in Civilian Death

The Berom Youth Moulders-Association, in a statement issued on 25th July 2025, alleged that a soldier shot and killed the youth leader of Bindi during the July 15 attack. MBT investigation revealed that Bindi’s youth leader, Mr. Bitrus Garba, was shot and killed from behind while the attackers were still in the community.

A source in the community who pleaded anonymity told MBT: “They shot our youth leader, Bitrus through the back, he was facing the direction of the pastor’s house, he was backing the Abuja highway and some soldiers were standing there. We strongly believe that the shot that killed him came from the soldiers.”

“We found the expended bullet, and it reads the Nigerian army, how do you explain that? It is either the terrorists had weapons obtained from the military or the soldiers took part in killing our people.”

MBT could not independently verify this claim as efforts to have access to the recovered bullet shell which is said to be in Jos, proved abortive.

The Divided Response: Gallantry vs. Complicity

New evidence from the Berom Youth Moulders-Association (BYM) reveals a troubling contradiction in military response during the attack. While eyewitnesses commended the Unit Commander of Operation Safe Haven stationed at Sopp for their “gallantry role demonstrated in repelling the attackers from one end,” they simultaneously registered “loss of confidence in the reinforcement team” that positioned itself by the roadside where the massacre was perpetrated.

According to the BYM statement, this reinforcement team’s conduct was particularly damning: they “shot only 3 gunshots and nothing more during and after the Jebu massacre,” raising serious questions about their commitment to protecting civilian lives. The stark contrast between units, one fighting to protect civilians, another seemingly indifferent to their plight, suggests either catastrophic breakdown in command structure or deliberate sabotage.

The Implausible Excuse: Soldiers “Stopped” by Attackers

The claim that attackers could prevent Nigerian military personnel from responding to a distress call stretches credibility to its breaking point. For a well-equipped military force to be “stopped” by the same militants terrorizing a defenseless farming community raises fundamental questions about either military competence or complicity.

“The sector commander, Lt. Col Thomas said that the Fulani attackers prevented his soldiers from gaining access to protect us during the attack says Rev. Musa.

The two-hour window during which the attackers operated with apparent impunity, systematically destroying homes with explosives, killing 27 people, and looting community resources, suggests either a catastrophic failure of military protocol or deliberate negligence. The precise timing of the military’s eventual arrival, moments after the attackers had completed their mission and begun speaking about soldiers’ approach, points toward the latter.

Pre-Attack Intelligence: The Failure to Act

Multiple sources confirm that security agencies possessed prior intelligence about the planned attack, yet failed to prevent the massacre. Governor Mutfwang’s admission during his condolence visit that “intelligence reports about the impending attack had been received beforehand, yet no preventive action was taken” aligns with BYM’s more detailed account.

The youth association revealed that “security agents had prior knowledge of the planned attack as the Fulani and their cohorts, who are believed to be the hundreds hired bandits were seen moving in the midst of thousands Cows grazed on farmlands at Jebbu and neighbouring villages.” This intelligence failure becomes even more egregious given that a military checkpoint was positioned “not up to a kilometre away from Jebu.”

Cattle grazing in Bangai, Bachit district, a mile from Bindi. Credit: MBT

The Proximity Problem: Military Assets Unused

The BYM statement exposes a critical security failure that compounds allegations of complicity. The attack occurred in Bindi/Jebu village, which “lies by the roadside to Abuja and a military checkpoint of the Special Task Force (STF) not up to kilometre away from Jebu.” This proximity makes the military’s failure to respond even more inexplicable.

“The attackers did not drop from the sky,” the BYM statement pointedly noted. “They came with confidence, operated freely and left without challenge at the direction, where the reinforcement team deployed stationed itself like in previous cases recorded in some communities of Riyom.”

Governor’s Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Intelligence Failure

Plateau State Governor Caleb Mutfwang’s condolence visit to Bindi on July 16 revealed another layer of systemic failure. His admission during his condolence visit to the community that intelligence reports about the impending attack had been received beforehand, yet no preventive action was taken, underscores the disconnect between information gathering and protection of lives.

“It is very sad that we got intelligence for this attack, yet the attack still happened,” Governor Mutfwang stated during his visit. “I’m calling on the security agencies to redouble their efforts; we need to reappraise our strategy and tactics.”

Gov. Caleb Mutfwang. Credit: Punch

The Governor’s call for accountability was unambiguous: “I’m calling on the security agencies to arrest the perpetrators, insisting that the era of ‘unknown gunmen’ must end. Can people come and attack people and kill them in their homes and we say they are not known? The perpetrators of the act must be arrested; the era of unknown gunmen is over.”

His message to security agencies carried an edge of frustration: “Let me remind our security agencies again, you are not here for peacekeeping; you are here to defend the lives and property of Nigerians. Anybody that is threatening the lives of Nigerians is an enemy of the state and must be dealt with accordingly.”

However, Governor Mutfwang’s words rang hollow for residents who had witnessed similar pronouncements following attacks in other communities. Mathias, a Bindi resident, expressed the community’s skepticism to MBT: “We have heard such comments from the governor over and over again in Bokkos, Bassa, and other communities in Riyom long before this madness reached our community. We want action, we want to see people being arrested and prosecuted. That is the only way to send a message to future terrorists who may be contemplating attacking communities.”

The BYM statement echoed this frustration, noting that the massacre was “debilitating the early trust we have built in the Operation Safe Haven-OPSH, which we had believed will continue working according to the matching order issued by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu that terrorist elements should be crushed.”

Systematic Terror: Beyond a Single Attack

The BYM revelation exposes the July 15 massacre as part of a broader campaign of systematic terror. While the attack was ongoing, “the same Fulani went on rampage of mass mow down of crops last night in Jol, Bachi, Rinyan and other places,” indicating coordination across multiple fronts.

This broader campaign involves “hundreds of the armed men brought in addition to the ones that have been on ground in places such as Fass, Mahanga, Shong, Rakweng, Sharu, Diyan-Hei, Hawan-Kibo, amongst others, where from the armed groups are reportedly stationed.” The scale and coordination suggest resources and planning far beyond spontaneous farmer-herder conflicts.

Command Changes and Security Adjustments

Following the July 15 massacre, Lt. Col. Thomas Paave was redeployed from Sector 6, Riyom and replaced by Lt. Col Isaac Indiorwhey. When MBT visited Bindi for the third time on July 29, Mobile Policemen were on ground providing security for the community.

Mobile policemen stationed in Bindi. Credit: MBT

The deployment of mobile police reflects a pattern in Plateau State where communities under attack have previously called for replacement of soldiers with mobile police in their communities. In February 2024, following the Christmas attacks that claimed over 200 lives in Bokkos and neighbouring LGAs, residents of Bokkos expressed distrust for the Nigerian army and called for the deployment of mobile policemen.

“He has been redeployed and we are very happy,” Mathias told MBT regarding Paave’s removal. “We also hope they don’t send him to another local government in Plateau or anywhere facing insecurity in Nigeria because he lacks the professionalism required to handle such challenges.”

This concern reflects a systemic problem within Nigeria’s military hierarchy, where accountability often means reassignment rather than genuine consequences for failures that cost civilian lives.

Unanswered Questions and Urgent Demands

As Bindi attempts to rebuild from the ashes of July 15, critical questions remain unanswered:

• How did attackers obtain precise information about military movement schedules?
• Why was intelligence about the impending attack not acted upon?
• What investigation has been conducted into allegations of military complicity?
• Will the weapons used in the attack be traced to their sources?
• What measures are in place to prevent Lt. Col. Paave or similar commanders from failing other communities?
• Why did the reinforcement team fire only three gunshots during a two-hour massacre?
• How can the military explain the stark difference in response between different units?
• What investigation will be conducted into the death of youth leader Mr. Bitrus Garba and the recovered bullet allegedly bearing Nigerian army markings?

The residents of Bindi, like countless other Middle Belt communities before them, have presented specific allegations and evidence that they believe supports their claims of military complicity. Whether through incompetence or deliberate action, the security response during the July 15 attack fell far short of protecting civilian lives.

As Rev. Davou Musa, who lost nine family members but survived to tell their story, stated in his interview with MBT: “I believe God saved my life so I can tell the story of what truly happened.” His testimony, and that of other survivors, has been documented and now awaits official investigation and response.

The deaths of 27 people in Bindi have raised serious questions about military conduct and effectiveness in Plateau state. The community’s demands for accountability, investigation, and justice represent a test of Nigeria’s commitment to protecting its citizens and ensuring transparency in its security operations.

This investigation was conducted by Middle Belt Times through extensive interviews with survivors, eyewitnesses, and community leaders in Bindi village. Additional information was corroborated through statements from the Berom Youth Moulders-Association. All testimonies were independently verified where possible.

INVESTIGATION: How Armed Fulani Militants Executed Coordinated Attack While Nigerian Army Allegedly Provided Safe Passage

Part One of Two-Part Investigation

By Middle Belt Times Investigative Team

A Community Under Siege

The morning sun stretched long shadows over what was left of Rev. Davou Musa’s house in Bindi village—a stark reminder of the nightmare that struck in the early hours of July 15, 2025. This quiet Christian farming community sits in the green plains of Riyom Local Government Area, Plateau State, but now the air hangs heavy with the bitter smell of smoke and destruction, leaving behind too many unanswered questions.

When Middle Belt Times (MBT) arrived in Bindi on Monday, July 21, the village bore the hallmarks of a community traumatized. Only men remained on the grounds, their weathered faces etched with grief and anger. The women and children had fled after the devastating attack that claimed 27 lives, leaving behind a ghost town of mud houses and shattered dreams along the Jos-Abuja highway, just 30 miles from the state capital.

A Community’s Peaceful Existence Shattered

Bindi Tahoss community, home to approximately 1,000 residents living in 160 mud houses—some crowned with traditional thatch roofs—had been a picture of rural tranquility. The temperate climate, reminiscent of European cities, created ideal conditions for diverse vegetable cultivation, sustaining a population of subsistence farmers who had coexisted peacefully with their surroundings for generations.

“We have never had any misunderstanding with the Fulani,” Simon Davou told MBT, his voice carrying the bewilderment of a man whose world had been turned upside down without warning. “They graze around our community, but we have never had any reason to disagree with them over the years. Sometimes they graze into our farmlands and destroy our crops, but that is a reality we have learned to live with over the years.”

The community’s only protection came from an unusual source—cactus walls encircling the small settlement. “These cactus plants are our only form of security,” Rev. Davou Musa explained to MBT, gesturing toward the thorny barriers that had proven tragically inadequate against the coordinated assault that would follow.

Simon Davou’s words reveal the resigned acceptance of a vulnerable community: “There are times they attack our people in their farms, but what can we possibly do? We are a small community of about 160 houses. There is no police station or any security agency stationed here, so we overlook most of these issues by the Fulani herdsmen.”

The Calm Before the Storm: July 14 Warning Signs

The sequence of events that led to the massacre began on July 14, when women and children working their farms spotted an unusual gathering. Large numbers of Fulani herders were accompanied by unidentified men dressed in black clothing—a sight that immediately triggered alarm bells in the peaceful community.

“The women screamed to draw the attention of members of the community, whistles were blown across the community, and the herdsmen fled,” Rev. Musa recounted to MBT. “When they fled, we all thought they had gone, but by 4 pm, they returned, and the information went round our community that there was a threat in the community, and they were identified as Fulani from Hayin Bangai, a community about a mile from our community. You can see the community from here, over there.”

Google map obtained by MBT confirms Bangai’s proximity—less than a mile south of Bindi. More significantly, MBT investigations revealed that a prominent leader of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) maintains a house in Bangai of Bachit district, raising questions about MACBAN’s role in the attack among residents of Bindi.

The community’s response to the threat was swift and followed proper channels. “On that evening of July 14, we tried and informed the security about the movements of people that we don’t understand in our community,” Rev. Musa explained. “We called our Ward councillor, who then called the guard commander of the Nigerian army immediately. The commander sent some soldiers at about 5 pm on 2 gun trucks. We were all happy and confident since we saw the army in our community, and we went about our activities.”

The Army’s Brief Presence Hours before Attack

The arrival of Nigerian Army personnel brought temporary relief to Bindi residents. The sight of two gun trucks and soldiers patrolling their community provided a sense of security that would prove devastatingly false. At approximately 7 pm on July 14, the first signs of trouble emerged.

“At about 7 pm, we began to hear gunshots from the major road that passed through our community,” Rev. Musa recalled. “It was from the armed Fulani herdsmen. Then we also heard response from the soldiers, and we felt better because the soldiers responded to the gunfire from the herdsmen. Then the gunfire ceased, and everywhere became quiet. We went to bed trusting that the soldiers would be on ground to forestall any further threat that may arise, but we were wrong.”

3 AM Assault

At 3 AM on July 15, the nightmare began in earnest. “We started hearing gunshots again, this time around there was no response,” Rev. Musa told MBT. “It was just the herdsmen shooting sporadically. They cut down some cactus fence and came into our community through the direction of Bangai.”

Ezekiel Yakubu, the youth leader of Bindi, provided additional context to MBT: “They came in from Hayin Bangai to attack our village. They had in the past accused our community of killing a young herder, an accusation they couldn’t prove. The government knows the people carrying out these attacks against us and must be decisive, go into Bangai and ensure that the arms are recovered from the herdsmen and the perpetrators of this atrocity are brought to book.”

Sacred Ground Desecrated: Attack on the Community Church

Among the most disturbing aspects of the assault was the deliberate targeting of the community’s spiritual center. The Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), the only church in Bindi and the spiritual heart of this Christian community, was systematically vandalized during the attack. Windows were shattered, chairs were broken, and the public address system along with other musical instruments were destroyed—a calculated assault on the community’s faith and identity.

Rev. Davou Musa, who serves as the resident pastor of the COCIN church, witnessed firsthand how the attackers sought to destroy not just lives and property, but the very soul of the community. The targeting of religious infrastructure alongside residential homes suggests a coordinated effort to drive the Christian population from their ancestral lands permanently.

Explosive Evidence: Sophisticated Weapons and Tactics

MBT investigations revealed the sophisticated nature of the attack. Eighteen houses belonging to 27 families were destroyed using explosives believed to be calcium carbide—a substance that causes explosions on contact with damp air, water, or fire sparks. The use of such materials indicates a level of planning and resource access that goes far beyond spontaneous violence.

The impacts of these explosions were devastating and visible. Building roofs were completely blown off, leaving concrete evidence of the attackers’ intentions to cause maximum destruction. This marks a disturbing escalation in the weapons and tactics used against Middle Belt communities.

A Pastor’s Harrowing Testimony

Rev. Davou Musa’s account of the attack provides perhaps the most chilling insight into the attackers’ methods and knowledge. Having lost nine family members in the assault while witnessing the desecration of his church, his survival allows him to bear witness to the calculated nature of the violence.

“When they got to my house, which is the pastorium of the Church, they started hitting the gate for several minutes before they gained access to the compound,” he told MBT. “We had been hearing all the gunshots, weeping, and screaming from other victims being killed for over an hour. My house was the last they entered.”

The pastor’s decision to hide in a room with goats, while his wife and another woman concealed themselves in an outside bathroom, proved life-saving. “One of the attackers came into the room I was hiding and saw the goats. He was excited, telling his other colleagues that he had seen some goats in Fulfulde. I understand a bit of Fulfulde, so I heard what he was saying. I believe God saved my life so I can tell the story of what truly happened on that day.”

The most damning revelation came from what Rev. Musa overheard: “When it was 5 am, they spoke in Fulfulde that ‘it is 5am, soldiers,’ meaning they knew exactly when the soldiers were going to show up in our community. And indeed, few minutes later the soldiers came in after over two hours of killings.”

[Part Two will examine the military’s controversial response, allegations of complicity, and the broader implications for security in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region.]

Breaking: Suspected Fulani Militias Kill 20 in Riyom Community Despite Visible Military Presence

By Steven Kefas

Twenty people were killed in a brutal overnight attack on the peaceful community of Bindi in Ta-Hoss Village, Riyom Local Government Area of Plateau State, on Monday, July 14, 2025, according to local advocacy groups.

The Coalition for the Protection of Democracy (COPDEM), Riyom Branch, which announced the attack, described it as another devastating blow to communities already reeling from persistent violence in Nigeria’s volatile Middle Belt region.

Eyewitnesses and local sources confirmed that the assailants were heavily armed suspected Fulani extremists, continuing a tragic pattern of attacks across Riyom and other parts of Plateau State. The assault occurred despite the visible presence of security forces in the area, including armoured military assets, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of current security arrangements.

The attack is the latest in a series of violent incidents that have plagued the region. Just a day earlier, on July 13, gunmen suspected to be Fulani militia killed two preachers after their church service in the Gwon community of Rim District, also in Riyom LGA. The escalating violence has created a climate of fear and uncertainty among residents.

Escalating Violence in Plateau State

In Plateau state, armed herders carried out 38 attacks between March and April 2025 alone, according to Amnesty International. Between 27 March and 2 April 2025, coordinated attacks took place against five communities: Daffo, Gwande, Hurti, Manguna, and Ruwi in Bokkos local government.

With many herders belonging to the Muslim Fulani ethnic group, and many farmers Christian, the attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt often take on a religious or ethnic dimension. This dynamic has complicated resolution efforts and heightened communal tensions across the region.

Pattern of Impunity

COPDEM officials expressed frustration over what they described as the recurring nature of these attacks, noting that the locations and hideouts of the attackers have been repeatedly identified and reported to authorities. The group questioned why known threats continue to operate with apparent impunity despite security presence in the region.

“These attackers are not unknown. Their hideouts and base settlements in nearby enclaves have been repeatedly identified and reported by community leaders and local authorities,” the group stated in their press release. “Yet, year after year, these known threats continue to strike with impunity, often unchallenged.”

The attack on Ta-Hoss follows a devastating pattern in Riyom LGA. In April 2025, Daniel Mwanti of Wereng Community, Riyom LGA, was attacked and shot dead by Fulani militiamen, while on 24 December, gunmen killed at least 15 people — majority of them women and children —during an attack on Gidan Ado community of Ganawuri in Riyom LGA.

Broader Security Crisis

The Ta-Hoss attack is part of a broader security crisis affecting Nigeria’s Middle Belt. At least 50 people were reported killed in a similar attack in Zikke in April 2025, while at least 150 Christian farmers were killed by suspected Fulani Militias in weekend attacks in Yelwata in Benue state on June 13, 2025

Calls for Action

COPDEM has called on President Bola Tinubu and the National Security Council to order a high-level intervention and military operation to dismantle known terrorist enclaves threatening Plateau’s peace. The group also demanded that the Plateau State Government declare a state of emergency in affected areas.

The organization urged the Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Army Staff to audit and reposition security architecture across Riyom and adjoining local government areas, while calling on the Nigerian Police and Department of State Services to investigate the continued failure to apprehend attackers despite available intelligence.

In a direct appeal to international bodies, COPDEM called on the United Nations Human Rights Council, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other global organizations to take immediate interest in what they described as “systematic violence and creeping genocide in Plateau State.”

As families in Ta-Hoss village mourn their dead and begin the difficult process of rebuilding their lives, the attack serves as another stark reminder of the urgent need for comprehensive solutions to Nigeria’s persistent security challenges in the Middle Belt region.

How Fulani Militias Became Nigeria’s Deadliest Group While Escaping Global Notice

By Steven Kefas

In 2015, when the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranked Armed Fulani militants as the fourth deadliest terror group in the world, Nigeria was already grappling with the brutal reality of multiple security threats. Yet nearly a decade later, as these same militants have grown exponentially more lethal, they have mysteriously vanished from international terrorism rankings —despite becoming what many security experts now consider Nigeria’s most deadly non-state armed group.

This paradox raises troubling questions about how the global community measures and responds to terrorism, particularly when it involves complex ethnoreligious conflicts in Africa. While international attention remains focused on jihadist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a more devastating threat has been systematically erasing entire communities across Nigeria’s Middle Belt.

The Numbers Tell a Devastating Story

Recent data from the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) paints a picture of unprecedented violence that dwarfs the carnage attributed to Nigeria’s better-known terrorist organizations. Note: The following data represents preliminary research findings that have not yet been published on ORFA’s website but are based on their ongoing documentation efforts. Between October 2019 and September 2024, ORFA documented 66,656 deaths across Nigeria, of these, 36,056 were civilians. The Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) were responsible for a staggering 47% of all civilian killings —more than five times the combined death toll of Boko Haram and ISWAP, which together accounted for just 11% of civilian deaths.

These figures represent more than statistical abstractions; they reflect a systematic campaign of violence that has fundamentally altered the demographic landscape of Nigeria’s Middle Belt. The data reveals that 2.4 Christians were killed for every Muslim during this period, with proportional losses to Christian communities reaching exceptional levels. In states where attacks occur, Christians were murdered at a rate 5.2 times higher than Muslims relative to their population size.

The scope of violence extends far beyond killings. ORFA documented 13,437 incidents of extreme violence during the five-year study period, including 29,180 civilians abducted. The trajectory of kidnappings alone illustrates the escalating nature of the crisis: from 1,665 civilians abducted in 2020 to 7,705 in 2022, before declining slightly to 6,255 in 2023, then rising again to 7,648 in 2024. By the end of 2024, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that 3.4 million Nigerians had been forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and violence.

A Pattern of Systematic Violence

Unlike the headline-grabbing attacks of jihadist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, Muslim Fulani militants violence follows a different but equally devastating pattern. ORFA’s research indicates that 79% of civilian killings are land-based community attacks, where armed groups “invade mostly small Christian farming settlements to kill, rape, abduct, and burn homes.” This methodology, while less spectacular than suicide bombings or mass hostage situations, has proven far more effective at achieving long-term territorial control and demographic change.

The geographic concentration of these attacks is particularly telling. The North Central Zone and Kaduna state have borne the brunt of FEM violence. ORFA documented 3,776 incidents with civilian killings and 1,990 incidents with civilian abductions. Most of them by FEM. This concentrated campaign has effectively depopulated entire communities while military resources remain focused on the North-East and North-West regions where Boko Haram/ISWAP and Fulani bandits operate.

Recent mass casualty events underscore the escalating brutality of these attacks. The Yelwata massacre of June 13-14, 2025, stands as one of the most horrific examples, where FEM militants killed over 150 people—mostly women and children—in the farming community of Yelwata in Guma Local Government Area of Benue State. This attack followed a familiar pattern of targeting vulnerable agricultural communities during periods when people are fast asleep.

The violence is not new, but its intensity has dramatically increased. The Agatu Massacre of February-March 2016 saw between 300 and 500 people killed by FEM in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State, marking one of the earliest large-scale coordinated attacks that would become the group’s signature methodology. More recently, the Christmas Eve massacre in Bokkos Local Government Area of Plateau State claimed over 200 lives, demonstrating how FEM deliberately targets Christian communities during religious celebrations to maximize psychological impact.

The Global Terrorism Index Conundrum

The disappearance of Fulani militants from GTI rankings despite their escalating lethality raises fundamental questions about how international terrorism monitoring systems categorize and prioritize threats. The GTI, published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses specific criteria to define terrorist incidents, requiring acts to be intentional, involve violence or threat of violence, and have sociopolitical objectives.

However, the framing of Fulani militia violence as “farmer-herder conflicts” or “ethnic clashes” rather than terrorism may have contributed to their exclusion from global terror rankings. This categorization problem has real-world consequences, affecting international aid allocation, security cooperation, and diplomatic pressure. When violence is labeled as communal conflict rather than terrorism, it receives less international attention and fewer resources for intervention.

The methodological approach of global terrorism databases may also inadvertently favor tracking spectacular attacks by designated terrorist organizations over systematic violence by ethnoreligious militias. While Boko Haram’s suicide bombings and mass kidnappings generated international headlines and clear database entries, the daily reality of village raids, targeted killings, and forced displacement may be underreported or miscategorized.

The Cost of Invisibility

The absence of Fulani militias from international terrorism rankings has had profound implications for Nigeria’s security response and international support. While billions of dollars in international aid and military assistance have flowed toward countering Boko Haram and ISWAP, the regions most affected by Fulani militia violence have received comparatively little attention or resources.

This mismatch between threat levels and resource allocation has allowed the crisis to metastasize. ORFA’s data shows that what security experts describe as “twin” Islamist threats—Boko Haram/ISWAP in the northeast and Fulani militias in the Middle Belt—have created a pincer effect that is reshaping Nigeria’s religious and ethnic geography.

The human cost extends beyond immediate casualties to include the systematic destruction of agricultural communities that form the backbone of Nigeria’s food security. As Christian farming communities are displaced or destroyed, the country faces not only a humanitarian crisis but also long-term food production challenges that could affect regional stability.

Questions Demanding Answers

The case of Nigeria’s invisible terror crisis demands serious examination of how the international community monitors and responds to political violence. If the deadliest group responsible for civilian casualties can operate below the radar of global terrorism indices, what other threats are being overlooked? How can monitoring systems be reformed to capture the full spectrum of political violence, regardless of whether perpetrators fit traditional terrorist profiles?

The ORFA data suggests that Nigeria is experiencing what amounts to a slow-motion genocide in its Middle Belt, with one ethnic militia group systematically targeting civilian populations based on religion and ethnicity. The pattern evident from Agatu in 2016 to Yelwata in 2025 shows a consistent strategy of mass killing designed to achieve territorial control and demographic change. Yet this crisis receives a fraction of the international attention devoted to other jihadist groups operating in Nigeria with lower casualty rates.

As Nigeria heads into an uncertain future, the international community must grapple with uncomfortable questions about selective attention to terrorism and the consequences of allowing certain forms of mass violence to remain invisible. The 36,056 civilian deaths documented by ORFA represent more than statistics—they are fathers, mothers, children, and community leaders whose lives were cut short while the world looked elsewhere.

The time has come to acknowledge that terrorism takes many forms, and the deadliest threats are not always the ones that make international headlines. Until global monitoring systems adapt to capture the full spectrum of political violence, groups like the Fulani militias will continue to operate in the shadows, leaving devastation in their wake while escaping the accountability that comes with international recognition and response.

How Lakurawa Terrorists Are Carving Out a Caliphate in Nigeria’s Northwest

First published on TruthNigeria 

By Steven Kefas

(Kaduna), The tranquil morning of July 2nd, 2025, shattered into chaos as Lakurawa terrorists, led by former bandit commander Charambe, descended upon Kwallajiya village in Sokoto State’s Tangaza Local Government Area. When the dust settled, 15 villagers lay dead—the latest victims of a terror group that has transformed from seemingly peaceful recruiters into a violent force threatening Nigeria’s northwestern frontier. Lakurawa has about 3,000 fighters in its ranks, security expert Dr. Walid Abdullahi told TruthNigeria.

This deadly assault represents a chilling evolution for the Lakurawa group, whose name derives from the French “La recrue” (the recruit), and whose journey from obscurity to infamy offers a sobering lesson in how terrorist organizations exploit governance vacuums to establish territorial control.

The Deceptive Dawn of Terror

Lakurawa’s story begins not with violence, but with promises. When the group first crossed into Nigeria between 2017 and 2018, they presented themselves as peaceful implementers of Sharia law. Sa’idu Salewa, a resident of Tangaza, recalls their early days to TruthNigeria: “When they first came here, to Tangaza some months ago, they were calm, friendly and peaceful and were only after implementing sharia law but now things have changed. They now attack villages and kill people.”

Defense and security expert David Otto, speaking on Arise TV, explains that Lakurawa entered Nigeria in 2018, establishing footholds in communities across Sokoto and Kebbi states. Their initial strategy was one of patient infiltration—winning hearts and minds while quietly building organizational capacity. The group has in recent months sent out fighters to some states in the North-west and North-central parts of Nigeria, a security personnel serving in Sokoto told TruthNigeria on condition of anonymity. “Lakurawa has been expanding its reach beyond Sokoto and Kebbi states in recent months. Don’t forget that the Police in Zamfara attributed some attacks to Lakurawa late last year or so.” He said.

Dr. Walid Abdullahi, a security expert based in Birnin-Kebbi, warned of this deceptive strategy as early as November 2024. “The group is only playing the peaceful card to ascertain control of territories in the regions,” he cautioned, predicting that violence would inevitably follow once territorial control was established.

The Terror Emerges

The predicted violence materialized with devastating effect. Beyond the July 2nd massacre in Kwallajiya, Lakurawa’s operations have spread across multiple fronts. On May 16th, 2025, eight women were forcibly abducted from Zagani village in Kebbi State while attending church services. The Chairman of Danko-Wasagu Local Government Area, Hussaini Aliyu Bena, reported that poor network coverage has prevented contact with the abductors, leaving the victims’ fate unknown.

The group’s territorial ambitions have manifested in systematic taxation and control mechanisms. In Augi Local Government Area of Kebbi State, residents report that Lakurawa now imposes taxes on villages and restricts cattle sales. Abubakar Muhammad, a local resident, describes the suffocating control: “It is now almost impossible to sell your own cattle to buy, let’s say, a motorcycle. They will arrest you and get you to pay taxes. Their justification is that they want to be using the animals owned by villagers to help the less privileged.”

A Strategic Alliance of Terror

Perhaps most alarming is Lakurawa’s ability to attract dispersed bandit elements. Dr. Abdullahi’s intelligence sources confirm that former bandits, left without leadership after military operations eliminated their commanders, are now seeking shelter under Lakurawa’s umbrella.

“I can also confirm that some bandits who were dispersed by the military operations that killed their commanders are now entering into alliances with different Lakurawa cells in Kebbi and Sokoto states,” Dr. Abdullahi reveals. This fusion of ideological terrorism with criminal banditry creates a hybrid threat that complicates counter-terrorism efforts.

The security expert warns that this phenomenon causes confusion in attack attribution: “Communities may actually see bandits, but the bandits may be new Lakurawa members.” This strategic absorption of bandit elements strengthens Lakurawa’s operational capacity while providing desperate bandits with ideological cover for their activities.

The Larger Sahel Connection

Lakurawa’s ambitions extend far beyond local control. Dr. Abdullahi identifies the group as part of a broader jihadist project seeking to establish caliphates “in the Sahel down to the coast of Ghana.” This regional vision aligns with established terrorist networks operating across West Africa.

The geographic proximity between Kebbi and Niger states creates particular concern. Dr. Abdullahi warns that Lakurawa’s eventual convergence with JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin) fighters operating around Kainji Lake appears inevitable rather than possible.

“When you consider the proximity between Kebbi and Niger state, it is a matter of when, not if, Lakurawa will meet up with their counterparts; the JNIM fighters in the Kainji lake are where JNIM is now dominant,” he cautions. “We may soon have a dominant alliance of all terror groups in the Sahel, and that will be dangerous for Nigeria.”

Communities Under Siege

The human cost of Lakurawa’s expansion is devastating. Muhammed Rabiu, a Tangaza resident, describes communities living under constant threat: “The community has been under siege from both the Lakurawa terror group for weeks with the Nigerian security doing very little to intervene.”

Local residents report that the group has been “killing people silently in Tangaza local government for some time now,” suggesting a pattern of systematic intimidation designed to establish complete territorial control.

The Security Response Gap

The consistent reports of minimal security intervention highlight a critical gap in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy. Communities describe being abandoned to face Lakurawa’s expansion with little to no government support, creating conditions that allow terrorist groups to establish territorial control.

A Warning Unheeded

Lakurawa’s evolution from peaceful recruiters to violent terrorists validates expert warnings about the group’s true intentions. Their success in establishing territorial control, imposing taxation, and attracting criminal allies demonstrates how quickly terrorist organizations can exploit governance vacuums.

The group’s regional ambitions and potential alliance with established Sahel terrorist networks represent a strategic threat requiring immediate, coordinated response. Without decisive action, Lakurawa’s “recruitment” phase may prove to be merely the prelude to a broader campaign of terror across West Africa’s vulnerable northwestern corridor.

As communities continue to suffer under Lakurawa’s expanding control, the question remains: will Nigeria’s security apparatus mobilize effectively against this growing threat before it becomes too entrenched to dislodge?

First published on TruthNigeria

….Steven Kefas is the publisher for Middle Belt Times and also reports conflicts for TruthNigeria

Plateau SSG’s Convoy Evades Terrorist Ambush in Bokkos

Jos, Plateau State— In a dramatic confrontation that eerily mirrors the security situation in the state, the Secretary to the Government of Plateau State, Mr. Samuel Jatau, narrowly escaped an ambush by terrorists suspected to be Fulani Ethnic Militias (FEM) on Sunday during a humanitarian visit to communities devastated by recent attacks in Bokkos Local Government Area.

The incident, which unfolded near Hurti community in Monguna district, stands as a stark reminder of the persistent security challenges in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region

As Mr. Jatau’s convoy approached the area, gunmen concealed in surrounding terrain opened fire, likely planning to execute another devastating attack. However, unlike countless previous incidents in the state, the security team’s swift and effective response forced the attackers to retreat into nearby mountains, a security personnel who witnessed the incident told MBT.

“I lack words to express my sorrow and anger. We just tested what these communities are feeling,” recounted a visibly shaken Jatau. “I was looking at my phone in the car when I suddenly heard gunshots. When I looked up, I saw two young men running into the bush, armed with guns.” Jatau told journalists after the incident.

The attack came just days after a deadly raid that claimed over 40 lives in the same area, part of a troubling pattern of violence that has plagued several regions in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. Yet security experts note that the quick repulsion of the attackers demonstrates a marked improvement in tactical response—similar to developments that have helped stabilize Southern Kaduna after years of devastating conflict.

“We saw the destruction firsthand. Over 40 people were killed, homes were destroyed, and entire livelihoods were wiped out,” Jatau continued, describing the aftermath of the previous attack. “The terrorists looted essential goods like 26 bags of potatoes worth N80,000 each from one home. These are peasant farmers; how do they recover from this? We must do better than this as a country.” The SSG said.

Bokkos local government has come under sustained deadly attacks by terrorists in recent months. In December 2023, over 200 people, including women and children, were brutally murdered by FEM militias who launched coordinated attacks across 25 villages on Christmas Eve.

Troops Neutralize Kidnappers, Arrest Gunrunners, and Rescue Hostages in Plateau and Kaduna.

By Eke Chioma

(Jos), Troops of 3 Division and Operation safe haven,  under Operation LAFIYAN JAMA’A, have eliminated two kidnappers, apprehended suspected gunrunners, and seized arms and ammunition in Plateau and Kaduna States.

According to Major Samson Zhakom, Media Information Officer of Operation SAFE HAVEN, troops launched an offensive operation on March 12, 2025, targeting criminal hideouts in Kuru and Turu, Jos South LGA, Plateau State. 

During the operation, troops engaged armed kidnappers and terrorists near the high grounds of Kuru, successfully eliminating two suspects. A search of the area led to the recovery of 18 rounds of 7.62mm (Special) and 9 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm ammunition. 

Later that day, troops set up snap checkpoints along the Bokkos-Bot-Mangu road in Bokkos LGA, following intelligence reports on arms smuggling.  

The operation led to the arrest of 21-year-old Sengi David, a known gunrunner from Kopal Village in Panyam District, Mangu LGA. Troops recovered one AK-47 magazine and 48 rounds of 7.62mm (Special) ammunition from the suspect, who is now in custody for further investigation. 

In another covert operation on March 11, troops successfully arrested a notorious kidnapper, terrorist, and gunrunner, identified as Mr. Blessed Paul, 22, in Garaje Community, Jema’a LGA, Kaduna State.  

The suspect, who had been on security agencies’ wanted list, had previously escaped to Abuja to evade arrest. Troops lured him by posing as buyers interested in purchasing an AK-47 rifle for N1.5 million.  

“A search on the suspect led to the recovery of one AK-47 rifle, one AK-47 magazine, and 2 rounds of 7.62 mm (Special) ammunition. The suspect and recovered arms and ammunition are in custody,” Zhakom stated.  

According to the military, the suspect is cooperating with interrogators, providing useful information to help security forces track down other members of his syndicate.  

On March 12, 2025, troops of 3 Division/Operation SAFE HAVEN conducted a rescue operation at the outskirts of Josho Village, Daffo District, Bokkos LGA, Plateau State.  

”The operation followed credible intelligence that kidnappers were keeping some abducted victims in the area. Upon sighting troops, the kidnappers abandoned their victims and fled,” Zhakom explained.  

Following a search of the hideout, troops rescued two female victims:  

– Miss Nanbam Adamu, 11 years old and

– Miss Dorcas Wantu

Both victims are indigenes of Mbor Village in Mushere District, Bokkos LGA.  

“The rescued victims have been debriefed and handed over to their families. Troops are currently conducting follow-up operations to intercept and neutralize the fleeing kidnappers,” the military spokesman added. 

Deadly Suicide Bombing Strikes Night Market in Borno State

A night market in Kauri, a rural community within the Konduga district of Borno State, North East Nigeria, was the scene of a devastating attack when a suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated an explosive device.

The explosion took place at approximately 9 pm on Wednesday, July 31, in the bustling market area that operates during the night. The market, frequented by numerous locals, is situated along the Bama-Maiduguri road and has been a frequent target of Boko Haram attacks. This latest incident marks yet another in a series of assaults on the vulnerable communities in the region.

According to local sources, the attack resulted in multiple casualties. A police officer and a woman were among those killed, while two patrol vans were set on fire. A government official from the village reported that the bomb detonated at 8:05 pm in a local tea joint where villagers often gathered for evening conversations. Dozens of people were also injured in the blast.

“It is unclear exactly how the attack unfolded, but we suspect that the bomb was planted rather than being a suicide attack. We found the bodies of 19 people, with an unspecified number of civilians injured. The injured were transported to an undisclosed hospital in Maiduguri for treatment,” a source told Daily Trust on condition of anonymity.

This tragic event occurred just 24 hours after an Accountant working with the Local Education Authority in Damboa Local Government Area, Shettima Mustapha, was killed when his vehicle struck an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) planted by suspected Boko Haram terrorists along the Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu highway in Borno.

Efforts to reach the Police Public Relations Officer, DSP Kenneth Daso, for comment were unsuccessful, as his phone was unreachable at the time of reporting.

The attack comes as a nationwide protest is set to take place, with the government expressing concerns that such demonstrations could be exploited by criminals and terrorists.

As of the time of reporting, Middle Belt Times has not received an official statement regarding the incident, and authorities have yet to confirm the number of fatalities.

In a related development, Vanguard reported on Wednesday that a senior Accounting Officer from the Education Department of Damboa Local Government Area of Borno State, Shettima Mustapha, was killed along with another victim whose leg had to be amputated, and several others injured. This incident occurred when their vehicle encountered an IED planted by suspected Boko Haram terrorists along the Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu 185 km expressway.