Easter Sunday Massacre, Army’s False Rescue Claims, and a Suspended Lawmaker: Civil Society Breaks Silence on Kaduna’s Descent into Terror

Five worshippers killed. Thirty-eight abducted from two churches. A military rescue claim the families say is a lie. And a lawmaker suspended for daring to speak the truth.

This is Ariko, Kachia Local Government Area, Kaduna State, on Easter Sunday, 2026.

On the morning of 5th April, heavily armed terrorists stormed Ariko Community in Awon Ward, attacking the First ECWA Church and the Catholic Church while congregants gathered for one of the most sacred observances on the Christian calendar. When the violence subsided, five people were dead and thirty-eight others had been dragged away into captivity.

What followed was, to many observers, almost as disturbing as the attack itself.

The Nigerian Army issued a widely circulated statement claiming to have rescued 31 of the abducted victims. But the families of those victims say it never happened. As of the time of this publication, all abducted persons remain in the hands of their captors. The Kuturmi Unity Development Association (KUDA), whose president Dr. J.D. Ariko signed a statement on 6th April, said plainly: “Contrary to the reports being circulated, all the abducted persons are still in captivity with their abductors. This clearly invalidates any claim of a successful rescue operation.” KUDA’s Publicity Secretary, Hon. Manasseh Samuel, co-signed the statement.

The families have confirmed they remain in direct contact with the abductors, who have themselves confirmed the victims are in their camps.

In a press statement released on 10th April, the Civil Society for Good Governance and Accountability, a coalition of over thirty human rights and community organisations, described the Army’s statement as propaganda, saying it revealed “unfortunate efforts at deception rather than a plausible effort at the rescue of the abducted.”

But for the civil society coalition, the Army’s false claims are not the whole story. They point to a recognisable pattern. On 18th January 2026, armed bandits abducted 177 worshippers from three churches in Kurmin Wali, Kajuru LGA. The Police and the Kajuru LGA Chairman initially denied the attack entirely. Public outrage eventually forced an acknowledgment. The coalition’s statement is blunt: “The playbook is unchanged: deny, deflect, discredit, then concede only when pressure becomes unbearable.”

The Ariko attack is also not the only active emergency in the region.

On 29th March 2026, Palm Sunday, terrorists killed 13 people in a night raid on Kahir, Aribi Ward, Kagarko LGA, and abducted 28 others. Ransoms of 200 million naira are being demanded. Those 28 remain in captivity. On 31st March, bandits abducted 11 people from Zunturum, also in Kachia LGA, and are demanding 150 million naira and 10 motorcycles for their release. In Maro Kasuwa, Easter Sunday also brought bloodshed: three people were killed and an unconfirmed number abducted.

Kachia LGA Chairman Dr. Manzo Daniel Maigari’s own admission compounds the scale of the crisis. He has acknowledged that 74 communities in Kachia have been deserted due to insecurity, a figure the coalition describes as “a clear indictment of both state and federal governments.”

Yet even as communities are hollowed out by violence, truth-tellers are being punished.

The Honourable Speaker of the Kachia LGA Legislative Council, Hon. Mark Bawa, gave a press interview published in The Punch on 5th April addressing the reality of the Ariko attack. Two days later, the Executive Chairman issued a directive suspending him indefinitely. The suspension letter alleged that the Speaker had “misrepresented the true position on ground” and had failed to attend a meeting with the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Army’s 1 Division “to clarify and possibly apologize.” The letter called his conduct “a deliberate attempt to sabotage the efforts of Government.”

The civil society coalition has rejected the suspension in unambiguous terms. “Suspending a lawmaker for speaking about a security incident that affects his own constituents makes him a double victim,” the statement reads. The signatories include legal practitioners, professors, community associations, and advocacy organisations drawn from across southern Kaduna and the Middle Belt.

Their demands are clear: the unconditional reinstatement of Hon. Mark Bawa; the immediate rescue or facilitated release of all abductees across Ariko, Zunturum, Kahir, and Maro Kasuwa; the return of displaced persons from 74 abandoned communities; and full activation of the government’s constitutional obligations under Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.

“These are not numbers,” the statement says. “They are mothers, fathers, children, and grandparents whose safe return must be the single most urgent priority of every security agency in Kaduna State.”

As of press time, not one of the hostages has been returned.

China’s Increasing Control of Africa’s Mineral Resources

By Biliyaminu Suraj

biliyasuraj247@yahoo.com

Nigeria’s Minister for Mines prides himself on his recent re-election as Chairman of the newly formed Africa Minerals Strategy Group, established by African Ministers of Minerals and Mining to foster cooperation among African nations in the development of critical minerals. Minister Alake is a former journalist and close friend of President Tinubu. During Tinubu’s two terms as Governor of Lagos State it was Alake who managed Tinubu’s media as the Governor’s Commissioner for Information and Strategy.

It is this African Minerals Strategy Group that is leading the push for the introduction of the Madini Protocol, a blockchain platform which will be the Trojan Horse for Chinese control of the African minerals sector.

Since becoming Minister for Sold Minerals Development Alake’s primary focus has been on securing large-scale investments and fostering partnerships for local mineral processing. This has led to the development of several lithium processing plants in Nigeria, primarily backed by Chinese investment. Major Chinese companies such as Canmax Technology, Jiuling Lithium, Avatar New Energy, and Asba have announced investment in lithium processing facilities in Nigeria.

Since late 2025, Canmax has aggressively secured lithium ore to feed its expanding processing faciliies. Canmax Technologies is primarily owned and controlled by its founder and chairman, Mr Pei Zhenhua, alongside his wife, Rong Jianfen. Alake claims Canmax is investing US$200M to develop lithium mining operations in Nigeria, in line with Chinese aggressive moves to control African mineral resources and infrastructure such as ports and railways necessary to exploit the mineral reserves.

Chinese megafirm CATL announced plans to increase its stake in Canmax’s lithium subsidiaries. CATL holds approximately 40 percent of the global EV battery market and almost 70 percent of the NCM (Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese) battery market in China. China as a whole processes approximately 65 percent to 80 percent of the world’s lithium. As the dominant player in China, CATL effectively directs a majority of the lithium hydroxide refined within the country toward its own Gigafactories.

Minister Alake has become a frequent and strong advocate for China’s involvement in Nigeria’s minerals and infrastructure development which has been a hallmark of his many trips to China.

As Chairman of the Africa Minerals Strategy Group, Minister Alake has introduced the Madini Protocol, a Chinese backed blockchain-based platform for trading and digital financing. This hi-tech system is not only designed for tracking minerals from extraction to market but also tracking every person involved in the supply chain including local villagers who may be employed at the mine. The system converts unmined mineral reserves into tradable digital tokens.

In other central Asian countries China state-controlled tech companies are rolling out platforms that turn natural resources including water into digital tokens tradable on blockchain-based platforms and for digital financing. The Chinese companies rolling out deals with governments say there is no limit to what they can tokenize and make tradable on their platforms.

The Madini Protocol, made possible through a collaboration between David Chen (Founder of BLCP Capital, now Chairman of GTIF) and Chris Wong (CEO of LifeSite). LifeSite Inc., is fronted as the technology company behind the TokenX platform and the Madini Protocol. The background of Wong’s co-founders in this hi-tech digital software is interesting. Crystal Lee, a co-founder of LifeSite, was Miss California 2013 and runner-up in the Miss America 2014 pageant. YoonJin Chang, also a co-founder of LifeSite was a former Miss Korea runner-up in 2010.

Wong’s long term business associate is David Chen who founded and led Deloitte’s Chinese Services Group in Mexico. Chen’s experience is primarily with food, health, entertainment and real estate industries before moving into global esports and entertainment through FaZe Clan which achieved a valuation of $725 million via a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) merger in 2022 only to plunge to a 2026 estimate of $13 million.

Wong and Chen’s Madini Protocol is touted as a vehicle allowing African nations to raise capital via the Africa Mineral Token (AMT). In fact, it is a route for China to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources initially targeting Lithium and Gold. It is promoted by Minister Alake as a means of financing through the digital tokenisation to provide a way for Chinese funding for projects via smart contracts on the blockchain.

The Africa Minerals Strategy Group led by Minister Alake is China’s Trojan Horse to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources through mining infrastructure investment using the Madini Protocol to fund Chinese built and operated ore processing plants. All the while Nigerian officials turn a blind eye to the Chinese sourcing of lithium ore for their Nigerian processing plants from illegal miners, paying protection money to heavily armed militants, bandits and ISIS connected groups controlling increasingly larger areas of Nigeria’s North and Central regions. The extreme insecurity of these areas is a perfect cover for Chinese companies illegally mining who pay terrorists protection money rather than state royalties.

In the Year of the Horse Mines Ministers across Africa, like the people of ancient Troy, may welcome the gift brought to their gates by Minister Alake and his Chinese backed partners only to find it is a Trojan Horse which, once inside the gates, is uncontrollable.

Court of Appeal Reserves Judgment on Elrufai’s Order That Scrapped Friday Work and School Days in Kaduna

By Steven Kefas

A significant legal battle over the constitutional validity of a controversial executive order that effectively eliminated Fridays as a working and school day in Kaduna State moved a step closer to resolution on Wednesday, as the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, reserved judgment in the matter of Gloria Mabeiam Ballason v. Governor of Kaduna State and 3 Others, Appeal No: CA/K/104/2023.

The three-man panel, comprising Hon. Justice Onyekachi Aja Otisi, Hon. Justice Abimbola Osarugue Obaseki-Adejumo, and Hon. Justice Sybil Onyeji Nwaka-Gbagi, heard arguments from both sides on 11 March, 2026, before reserving the appeal for judgment.

The case centres on an executive order issued by former Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir Ahmad Elrufai, which took effect on 1 December, 2021, reducing the official working and schooling week from five days to four. Under the order, Fridays ceased to be working days for civil servants and school days for pupils across the state. Remarkably, despite El-Rufai’s departure from office, the policy has remained in force to this day, making it over four years since Kaduna residents lost the Friday workday.

Gloria Mabeiam Ballason, a prominent human rights lawyer and the appellant in this matter, argues that the executive order is unconstitutional and has caused measurable harm to workforce productivity, school children’s education, and her own professional legal work. Appearing in person to argue her case, Ballason adopted her filed briefs and urged the appellate court to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the lower court, which had previously ruled against her position.

Appearing for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents was Dr. J.A. Kanyip, the Attorney General of Kaduna State, who was accompanied by a legal team including A.A. Aku Esq., S.M. Gamaliel Esq., M.P. Danjuma Esq., and Koni Tauna Esq. The respondents similarly adopted their briefs and urged the court to uphold the lower court’s ruling and dismiss the appeal.

Notably absent was any representation for the Minister of Interior, named as the 4th Respondent in the suit, despite evidence presented to the court confirming that the Minister’s office had been properly served with hearing notices. The court took note of this absence.

Background to the Matter

When Elrufai announced the four-day work week in late 2021, it was one of several sweeping administrative decisions that defined his controversial second term as governor. The order applied to civil servants and public schools across Kaduna State, with Fridays effectively becoming a non-working day. Proponents of the policy argued it could reduce overhead costs for the state government and offer workers an extended rest period. Critics, however, raised immediate alarm about the impact on service delivery, the disruption to children’s schooling calendars, and whether a sitting governor possessed the executive authority to unilaterally restructure the working week without legislative backing.

Ballason’s case strikes at exactly that question of constitutional authority. Her suit contends that an executive order of this scope, one altering the fundamental structure of public employment and public education, exceeds the powers of a state governor acting alone, and that the policy as implemented violates applicable constitutional provisions.

What makes the case particularly striking is its longevity. Elrufai left office in May 2023, and yet his successor’s administration has allowed the four-day order to stand, meaning the policy has now outlasted the man who created it. Workers, schoolchildren, and professionals across Kaduna State continue to operate under an arrangement that was never subjected to legislative debate or public consultation.

With judgment now reserved, the Court of Appeal’s decision will carry far-reaching implications, not only for Kaduna State, but potentially setting a precedent on the limits of gubernatorial executive power across Nigeria’s northern states.

Middle Belt Times will report the judgment as soon as it is delivered.

Southern Kaduna: Three Christian vigilantes detained after helping troops rescue kidnap victim from terrorists

…Community security volunteers held atCID as families demand their release, citing cooperation with military forces

KADUNA– Three Christian vigilante members from Kajim village in Kaura Local Government Area of Kaduna State have been held in Criminal Investigation Department (CID) detention since Monday, 16 February 2026, sparking allegations of religious persecution and raising questions about community security participation in Nigeria’s troubled Middle Belt region.

The detained men – Habila Yaro Umaru (aka ‘Yaro’), Philibus Ninyioh (aka ‘MC Filibus’), and Augustine Tinat (aka ‘Election’) – are volunteer vigilantes who assisted military personnel during an anti-terrorism operation on 13 January 2026. As of Ash Wednesday, 18 February 2026, they remain in custody.

The January 13 Incident

According to a military statement released on 14 January 2026 by Captain Joshua Atu John, Acting Media Information Officer for Joint Task Force Operation Enduring Peace (JTF OPEP), troops from Sector 7 responded to reports of terrorist activity on the Jos-Kaduna road between Manchok and Jankasa.

The military reported that Fulani terrorists had blocked the road, kidnapped several persons including a young woman from Kajim who was allegedly raped. In the ensuing firefight, troops neutralized three individuals and rescued the victim.

Community sources indicate the three vigilante members were part of the joint operation, working alongside military personnel in accordance with established security cooperation protocols in the area.

Allegations of Targeting

Approximately one month after the military operation, community members learned that associates of the neutralized terrorists had submitted a petition to authorities in Kaduna, allegedly facilitated by the state government, seeking action against the vigilante members.

One community contact alleged the petition was coordinated by Ardo Hari, a Fulani migrant from Bauchi now residing in Manchok. Community sources claim Ardo Hari has been previously arrested in connection with attacks, kidnappings, and the abduction and assassination of Catholic priest Rev. Fr. Sylvester Okechukwu on Ash Wednesday, 5 March 2025.

A video circulating on social media allegedly shows Governor Uba Sani standing with Ardo Hari in Manchok on 15 June 2025, with the governor heard saying, “there is no indigene or visitor, Fulanis should feel free to herd their cattle while farmers go about their agricultural activities.”

Pattern of Violence

Community members report escalating security challenges since mid-2025, including:

– Systematic destruction of crops by cattle sent into farmlands

– Multiple cases of rape, abductions, and killings

– A Christmas Day attack on 25 December 2025 that resulted in the death of Istifanus Stephen, a young man from First Baptist Church Kwarga who died attempting to defend a young woman from abduction

Five days after the 13 January incident, a public notice circulated on social media warning of “a planned attack by Fulani youth any moment from this night on Kajim village close to Manchok in Kaura LGA of Kaduna State.” The alleged attack did not materialize.

Timing and International Context

The detention coincides with the US Congress advancing the Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act 2026 (HR 7457), which specifically identifies Fulani terrorists and Miyetti Allah in connection with patterns of religious persecution in Nigeria.

Community members question why vigilantes who cooperated with federal military forces are now in detention while alleged terrorist associates remain free. They also note the irony that the immediate past Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Gwabin Musa – now Minister of Defence – hails from Southern Kaduna.

Reports indicate a meeting was held in Manchok on 18 February involving the local chief and alleged members of Miyetti Allah from Jos, though the purpose of this meeting has not been confirmed.

Official Response

As of press time, neither the Kaduna State Government, the Nigeria Police Force, nor military authorities have issued statements regarding the detention of the three vigilante members.

Community members are calling for the immediate release of the detained men, arguing they were fulfilling their lawful duties as community security volunteers in cooperation with federal security forces.

The situation remains developing.

Kaduna Survivors Unite: Coalition Demands Justice for Victims of El-Rufai Era Abuses

A powerful coalition of survivors, victims’ families, and civil society groups has emerged to demand full accountability for alleged human rights violations during the eight-year governorship of Nasir el-Rufai in Kaduna State, vowing “no more impunity, no more silence.”

The Kaduna Victims’ Coalition, comprising community leaders, traditional rulers, academics, lawyers, journalists, and other professionals, issued a press statement on Monday calling for thorough investigations and prosecutions of alleged crimes committed between 2015 and 2023.

At the heart of their demands are high-profile cases that have come to symbolize what the coalition describes as an era of unchecked impunity. Among them is the October 2018 abduction and brutal murder of HRH Dr. Maiwada Raphael Galadima, the Agwam Adara (paramount ruler of the Adara Chiefdom), who was killed despite a ransom payment. The coalition notes that suspects arrested for his murder have yet to be successfully prosecuted, and their whereabouts remain unknown.

Equally prominent is the case of Abubakar Idris, popularly known as Dadiyata, a lecturer at Federal University Dutsenma and social media commentator who was abducted from his Barnawa residence in Kaduna on August 2, 2019. Nearly seven years later, his whereabouts remain unknown. August 2026 will mark the seventh anniversary of his disappearance, triggering a statutory presumption of death under Nigerian law.

The coalition highlighted a controversial tweet posted by Bashir el-Rufai, son of the then-Governor, on December 23, 2019, shortly after Dadiyata’s abduction, which was “widely perceived as gloating over the incident and dismissing calls for his safe return.”

“We speak today as representatives of countless individuals, families, and communities who endured eight years of profound hardship, terror, fear, and loss,” the coalition stated. “These acts bypassed constitutional safeguards and Nigerian law, turning gubernatorial immunity into unchecked impunity.”

The coalition accused the former governor of presiding over “a pattern of indiscriminate actions: arbitrary abductions, persecution of critics, reprisal violence, unlawful demolitions of homes, mass dismissals of workers without due process, forced sackings by employers of perceived opponents, and the displacement of citizens into exile.”

Expressing concern over recent attempts to “reframe this history, portraying Nasir el-Rufai as a champion of due process and human rights,” the coalition insisted that survivors and families continue to seek truth and justice.

“On behalf of ourselves, and in solemn memory of those killed or disappeared who cannot speak, we have a moral and civic duty to bear witness,” the statement read. “Our sole demand is accountability under the rule of law: thorough, independent investigations; prosecutions where evidence warrants; and closure for traumatized victims and families.”

The coalition pledged full cooperation with law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, and human rights institutions, offering to provide testimonies, evidence, and material assistance to support inquiries.

The statement was accompanied by hashtags #JusticeToElrufai, #JusticeForKadunaVictims, #WhereIsDadiyata, and #AccountabilityNow.

The statement was signed by the following individuals and organizations on behalf of the coalition:

1. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu
2. Audu Maikori, Esq
3. Gloria Ballason, Esq
4. Steven Kefas
5. Luka Binniyat
6. Midat Joseph
7. Segun Onibiyo
8. House of Justice
9. Community Development & Rights Advocacy Foundation
10. Resilient Aid and Dialogue Initiative
11. Southern Kaduna Indigenous Progressive Forum (SKIPFo)
12. Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA)

The coalition’s emergence represents a significant moment in the quest for accountability in Kaduna State, as victims and their families publicly break their silence on alleged abuses that have long remained unaddressed.

ONLY THE FULANI JIHADIST–IMPERIAL AGENDA FEARS A UNITED MIDDLE BELT

Barr. John Apollos Maton
9th February 2026

A REBUTTAL TO A SAD JOKE MASQUERADING AS POLITICAL ANALYSIS

I don’t know who the recent Fulani stooge Cham Faliya Sharon is, but his/her writeup “IS THE CONFUSION OF THE MIDDLE BELT COMING FULL CIRCLE TO BITE THE MIDDLE BELT” is such a ridiculous piece I was ashamed for the writer when it opened with a quote from Thomas Paine. I mean, it takes a special pompous type of clown to not only go through writing this but even have it reshared on public platforms by the Fulani Immigrants Nigeria should be sending packing.

The joke of an article under review is not analysis but performance—an exercise in ideological ventriloquism by a writer who mistakes obedience for insight. It reads like a brief written to order, not a position arrived at through honest inquiry. Like Judas Iscariot, the author appears to have concluded that selling one’s intellectual integrity for proximity to power is a rational transaction. History, however, records such bargains not as cleverness but as cowardice.

We are told, with great theatrical confidence, that the Middle Belt is a confusion: a geographical impossibility, a political contradiction, a manufactured identity sustained by ignorance and manipulation. Yet what is truly confused is an argument that elevates imposed constitutions to divine scripture while dismissing lived history as irrelevant; that treats maps as sacred while treating people as disposable; and that assumes identity must first be approved by dominant blocs before it can exist. This is not reason—it is authoritarian logic wrapped in the language of common sense.

Let us nonetheless grant the author every imaginable concession. Let us ignore, for the moment, the extensive scholarly work of Dr. Bitrus Pogo and numerous historians, sociologists, and political scientists who have rigorously documented the Middle Belt as a historical and political reality. Let us assume—without conceding—that they are wrong. Let us even accept the childish claim that because the phrase “Middle Belt” does not appear verbatim in the 1999 Constitution, the identity itself must therefore be fraudulent. Even under these generous assumptions, the argument collapses completely.

For even if the Middle Belt were nothing more than a political consciousness emerging from shared experiences of marginalization, violence, and exclusion, that alone would make it real. Peoples are not born fully mapped and notarized; they are forged through history, memory, and struggle. And it is precisely this process—now ripening into collective clarity—that terrifies the imperial imagination animating the essay.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION ARE NOT GIFTS FROM ANY HEGEMON

At the most elementary level, the argument fails because it assumes identity is something granted rather than asserted. Under Nigeria’s own Constitution, this assumption is indefensible. Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution explicitly guarantees every citizen the right to assemble freely and associate with others for the protection of their interests. Section 39 guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart ideas. These provisions are not decorative—they are foundational.

Beyond domestic law, Nigeria is a signatory to binding international instruments that go even further. Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the unequivocal right of all peoples to self-determination and to freely pursue their political, economic, and social development. Article 22 reinforces this by recognizing the collective right to development. These are not abstract ideals; they are enforceable norms incorporated into Nigerian law by domestication of the Charter.

At the global level, the principle is even clearer. Common Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states plainly that all peoples have the right to self-determination and to freely determine their political status. Nowhere in international law is there a requirement that a people must first satisfy the cartographic preferences of their detractors before asserting this right.

The demand that the Middle Belt must “draw a perfect map” before it may exist is therefore not legal reasoning; it is imperial obstruction. Colonial borders across Africa were drawn arbitrarily, yet no one questions their legitimacy on the grounds of incoherence. To suddenly demand mathematical neatness only when marginalized peoples organize themselves is not intellectual rigor—it is selective skepticism deployed as a weapon.

THE MIDDLE BELT POSSESSES ANCESTRAL LAND, HISTORY, AND MEMORY—IT IS NOT A FICTION

While totally excusing the Fulani Immigrants who have made the lives of true natives and real Indigenes of Nigeria a living hell, one of the most dishonest maneuvers in the essay is its deliberate avoidance of ancestry. We are invited to obsess over lines on a map while ignoring the more uncomfortable question of who has lived where, for how long, and under what conditions. The communities commonly described as Middle Belt peoples are not recent arrivals, nor are they abstract categories invented in conference halls. They are indigenous populations rooted in specific territories long before colonial intrusion.

Unlike the Fulani Immigrants who don’t belong in Nigeria, these communities possess traceable genealogies, distinct languages, religious traditions, and systems of governance that predate both British colonial rule and the later Nigerian state. Historical records—from colonial archives to oral histories—document repeated episodes of subjugation, forced incorporation, and indirect rule imposed upon them. To pretend that these histories dissolve simply because a constitution failed to name them explicitly is not ignorance; it is historical vandalism.

International law has long rejected the notion that identity disappears because it is inconvenient to power. The United Nations’ recognition of indigenous peoples worldwide—culminating in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007—affirmed that historical continuity with pre-colonial societies is a valid basis for collective rights, regardless of later political rearrangements. Identity survives conquest; memory survives subjugation.

What unsettles the Fulani and their stooge — the essay’s author is that this memory is now politically articulate. The Middle Belt is not asking to be invented; it is insisting on being recognized on its own terms, not as an appendix to someone else’s empire. And once ancestry and land are acknowledged, violence can no longer be dismissed as “misunderstanding,” nor dispossession reframed as inevitability.

POLITICAL DIVERSITY DOES NOT NEGATE COLLECTIVE EXISTENCE

Perhaps the most intellectually hollow claim advanced is that internal political diversity invalidates Middle Belt identity. By this logic, Nigeria itself—fractured by ethnic, religious, and ideological divisions—should not exist. The argument collapses the moment it is applied consistently.

Political disagreement is not evidence of non-existence; it is evidence of political life. Only caricatures are uniform. Real peoples debate leadership, disagree on strategy, and pursue competing interests while still recognizing shared historical experiences and structural threats. To demand absolute unanimity as the price of recognition is to demand silence, not coherence.
International practice confirms this reality. From Catalonia to Kurdistan, from Quebec to Scotland, political plurality has never been treated as proof that a people does not exist. On the contrary, it is often cited as evidence of democratic maturity. The insistence that the Middle Belt must be perfectly homogeneous before it can claim identity is therefore not a standard—it is a pretext.

What truly disturbs the essay’s author is not contradiction but consolidation. As long as Middle Belt communities were forced to negotiate individually, they could be managed and ignored. A shared political vocabulary changes that balance. Patterns can be named, responsibilities assigned, and demands articulated collectively. That shift, not geography, is the real provocation.

IDENTITY ERASURE AS A CLASSIC IMPERIAL STRATEGY

The structure of the essay follows a script as old as the attempted Immigrant Fulani empire in Nigeria itself. First, deny that the people exist. Next, ridicule their attempts at self-definition. Then, frame their resistance as manipulation by outsiders. Finally, present continued domination as common sense and stability. This pattern has been documented across colonial history, from the Americas to Africa to Asia.

International law evolved precisely to dismantle this logic. The post-World War II order—reflected in the UN Charter’s emphasis on self-determination—was a direct response to the catastrophic consequences of identity denial and imperial domination. The decolonization movements of the twentieth century did not succeed because empires suddenly became benevolent; they succeeded because peoples insisted on naming themselves.

By portraying Middle Belt consciousness as a southern plot or a geographical error, the essay avoids confronting the structural realities of exclusion and violence. Identity erasure here is not accidental; it is instrumental. If a people do not exist, then nothing done to them can be legally or morally framed as injustice.
What the Fulani and author fears, ultimately, is accountability. A people who know who they are can trace how they arrived at their present condition. They can distinguish accident from policy, conflict from campaign. Once that distinction is made, the old excuses collapse, and the Immigrants who have long overstayed their welcome will be evicted.

CONCLUSION: MIDDLE BELT UNITY IS THE THREAT TO FULANI IMPERIALISM, NOT CONFUSION

Strip away the sarcasm, selective geography, and performative concern, and one truth remains unmistakable: a united Middle Belt disrupts long-standing arrangements of Fulani immigrant domination. It replaces silence with memory and fragmentation with demand for what we as a native people are due. It transforms suffering and genocide under the Fulani Islamic Terrorist Jihadists agenda into political clarity, self determination and intolerance for foreign terrorist influence.

The Middle Belt does not require validation from those Fulani invested in its marginalization and destruction. It does not need permission to associate, to name itself, or to pursue its collective interests. Even the fake Nigerian constitutional law made to further Fulani agenda in Nigeria protects this right. African human-rights law affirms it. International law enshrines it.

The joke of an article I was sent and repeatedly asked to consider is therefore not a warning to the Middle Belt but a confession from Fulani and their stooges. It reveals anxiety, not authority—fear, not confidence.

Like with the Fualni’s who through the Genocide of Christians and Indigenes of Nigeria hope to continue the Fodio Caliphate agenda, empires are never threatened by confusion. They are threatened by clarity.

And clarity is precisely what is emerging.

General Musa’s Rising Charisma: A Strategic Asset for President Tinubu and a Political Advantage the APC Cannot Ignore

In every political era, certain personalities rise above the noise not because they shout the loudest, not because they seek attention, but because their character, competence, and calm presence resonate with the public in ways the political class often fails to anticipate.

In Nigeria today, that figure is General Christopher Gwabin Musa (Rtd.), the Minister of Defence and one of the most unexpectedly influential personalities in the Tinubu administration.

His influence is not formal.
It is not partisan.
It is not manufactured.

It is rooted in earned trust built over decades of military service and now crystallizing into a quiet yet powerful political force.

This article examines the extraordinary rise of Musa’s charisma, its implications for the Tinubu administration, and why the APC may be sitting on one of its most significant political advantages heading into the coming years.

A Reputation Built on Service, Not Politics

Unlike many public figures whose reputations are shaped in the arena of political bargaining, alliances, and media engineering, General Musa’s national appeal is a by-product of his professional journey.

From his days at the forefront of counter-insurgency operations to his tenure as Chief of Defence Staff, Musa became synonymous with discipline, integrity, humility, operational excellence, and national service above personal ambition.

These qualities have followed him into the Federal Executive Council.

In a period when Nigeria continues to grapple with insurgency, banditry, regional tensions, and organized criminal networks, Musa’s appointment was a deliberate signal by President Tinubu to anchor national defence in competence rather than politics.

That decision is now yielding political dividends.

Why Musa’s Charisma Is Different

In Nigeria, political charisma is often loud, theatrical, combative, and attention-seeking. Musa’s charisma is the opposite. It is quiet, steady, and deeply persuasive.

It is the charisma of competence, not performance.

His public appeal rests on four pillars:

1. Calm Demeanor
At a time when public communication is often emotionally charged, Musa speaks with measured precision. He avoids sensationalism and speaks to citizens with respect. His clarity inspires confidence.

2. Authentic Humility
He does not project himself as a politician hungry for relevance. He carries himself as a custodian of responsibility. This humility makes him relatable and trustworthy.

3. Record-Backed Authority
Musa does not need political propaganda to legitimize his views. Nigerians remember his frontline contributions from overseeing the mass surrender of insurgents to stabilizing military operations in difficult theatres.

4. A Non-Partisan Reputation
Though a key figure in the Tinubu administration, Musa is viewed as above partisan politics. He is seen as a national asset, not a party operative. This gives him credibility across political divides.

This combination of attributes is incredibly rare and politically invaluable.

A Strategic Win for the Tinubu Administration

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has long demonstrated an ability to recognize and elevate credible technocrats whose work bolsters the image of his government. Musa’s appointment fits this strategic pattern perfectly.

Through Musa, the administration has achieved the following:

1. Restored Public Confidence in Defence Leadership
After years of skepticism toward Nigeria’s security system, Musa’s reputation reassures citizens that competent hands are steering the sector.

2. Strengthened Internal Stability
His leadership provides stability and continuity within the military hierarchy, reducing internal friction and strengthening operational cohesion.

3. Projected Professionalism Over Politics
Musa symbolizes the administration’s preference for expertise over political interference a key narrative as Tinubu implements complex reforms.

4. Enhanced the APC’s National Appeal
A credible, widely respected figure in a politically tense environment helps soften public criticism toward the government.

These advantages are not symbolic they are strategic.

A Political Advantage the APC Cannot Ignore

The APC currently faces a difficult communication environment due to economic reforms, subsidy removal impacts, and rising living costs. In moments like this, political parties need figures who inspire trust.

General Musa fits that profile.

He is a:

credible spokesperson
national unifier
trusted public face
competent operator
reassuring communicator

He reduces political hostility without engaging in politics.

This is political capital rare, powerful, and often decisive.

A Bridge Across Nigeria’s Divides

One of Musa’s most remarkable strengths is that he appeals to voters across ethnic, religious, and regional lines.

Across the North, he is respected for professionalism and results.

Across the South, he is admired for his articulate communication and unassuming leadership style.

Among Christian communities, his presence in a high-security office is seen as reassuring and inclusive.

Among Muslim communities, his military reputation commands respect.

Among the youth, he represents discipline, intelligence, calm, and a non-corrupt public image.

This broad appeal is politically significant. Very few figures in Nigeria today can draw admiration across such diverse constituencies without controversy. Musa is one of them.

Media Visibility and Rising Public Trust

In recent months, Musa’s visibility has increased not because he is seeking attention, but because:

he is central to resolving critical national issues
he communicates effectively
media platforms find him credible
citizens trust him instinctively

His statements often go viral because Nigerians yearn for leadership that sounds both competent and sincere.

Public discourse on national security, governance, and leadership quality increasingly references him as a stabilizing figure.

This organic rise is the clearest proof that his political value is expanding naturally.

A Nightmare for the Opposition’s Strategy

Opposition parties typically rely on portraying government officials as incompetent or corrupt. But attacking Musa is politically risky because:

he has no corruption scandals
no record of ethnic or religious bias
no political baggage
no history of public misconduct
no reputation for disrespect or arrogance

He is difficult to discredit.

Any attempt to malign him risks alienating neutral Nigerians who view him as one of the few credible figures in government.

This gives the APC a protective shield and forces the opposition to rethink its messaging strategy.

Could Musa Become a National Political Force?

Not necessarily in the electoral sense though in politics, anything is possible but in terms of influence, Musa is already becoming a defining figure.

He strengthens:

public trust
institutional legitimacy
inter-agency cooperation
national confidence in security leadership
APC’s perception across key demographics

In previous administrations, figures like Dora Akunyili, Lamido Sanusi, and Attahiru Jega became national stabilizers. Musa fits into this lineage.

His influence, if strategically harnessed, could reshape the APC’s national image ahead of the next election cycle.

Conclusion: The Era of The Musa Effect

General Christopher Musa may not be a traditional politician, but he represents the kind of leadership Nigerians crave competent, calm, sincere, and unifying.

He strengthens the Tinubu administration.
He boosts the APC’s credibility.
He reassures investors, communities, and citizens.
He elevates the public perception of Nigeria’s security leadership.
He bridges divides in a polarized nation.

In an era where political noise often disguises a lack of substance, Musa’s quiet strength is refreshing. Nigeria is noticing. The political establishment is noticing. And the ruling party, if strategic, will recognize that it has in Musa one of its most valuable assets.

The Musa Effect has begun.
Its implications will be felt for years to come.

By Samuel Ateh Stephen
Digital Strategist & Public Affairs Commentator
Focused on National Development
19/01/2025

EVALUATING THE HOUSE OF JUSTICE IMPACT AT IBA 

The Aircraft glided its descent into Toronto Pearson International Airport at 20:02hrs – twelve minutes behind the estimated arrival time. The temperature outside was 9°C , the sun had set. Gloria Mabeiam Ballason Esq, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of the House of Justice set foot on the Great White North for the 2025 International Bar Association Conference which held at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre.

For the House of Justice, the purpose was beyond attending a conference to keep up with global legal trends or networking; it was for a mission much nobler: consolidating the public’s access to justice and finding effective methods of accountability against mass atrocities. The starting point for the intervention is Nigeria, her home country where political operations frequently affect terror crimes victims’ access to justice.

Building it Better Through Magnitsky Proceedings.

For a society that continues to evolve, it is imperative that accountability measures keep pace – and what better way than to explore the Magnitsky procedure.

After the death of Sergei Magnitsky, Sir Bill Browder, KCMG, curated the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign.

Browder’s lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, had uncovered a massive tax fraud of $230million by the Russian government. The innovative legal procedure which is named in honour of Browder’s lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, enables accountability measures like asset freezes, disruption of access to western financial systems, restrictions on travel, banking, or ability to conduct businesses globally. The procedure creates significant personal and financial consequences and deterrence for sanctioned individuals.

The Global Magnitsky Act (2016) expanded its reach to target abusers worldwide with similar laws enacted by the EU, UK, Canada, and Australia. Time for the House of Justice to pitch in: ‘What is the legal framework and success rate of the Magnitsky procedure?’

Browder in reply said the Global Magnitsky Act had since sanctioned individuals from various countries including former Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh who was convicted for corruption and human rights abuses, Dan Gertler, an Israeli businessman, for corrupt mining deals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Abdulaziz al-Hasawi who was implicated in the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,

Chen Quanguo and other Chinese officials sanctioned in 2020 for human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China and

Filipos Woldeyohannes, the Eritrean military leader, sanctioned in 2021 for war crimes in Tigray.

If Eritrea’s Filipos Woldeyohannes could be sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for leading an entity accused of “despicable acts” then surely, there could be individual accountability for terrorism and Mass Atrocities in the Sahelian states.

Ballason raised the stakes higher: In a private conversation with Sir Browder, she proposed an extension of Magnitsky accountability alongside International Criminal Law justice to terrorism and Mass Atrocities in Africa’s Sahelian countries. ‘Oh, brilliant! pleased to work on that; Browder replied, handing his contact card to Ballason for the continuation of engagement to actualize the idea.

In the course of the conference, the War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association also explored the question of accountability.

Terrorism and war crimes continue in the 21st century despite a plethora of alternatives for war prevention and war crimes accountability. Ballason, whose life story is shaped by religious crisis that marred her childhood and terrorist attacks that have shaped much of her work as advocate, consultant and regional justice and peace worker, was fully engaged in the brainstorming:

‘The ultimate goal is to ensure war and terrorism do not take root as accountability cannot match the irreparable damage on humanity or resources; ‘ said Ballason. In the session which had in attendance Nigeria’s Dr. Babatunde Ajibade, SAN, Chair of the International Bar Association’s Section on Public and Professional Interest,

Ballason explained that the House of Justice position requires that governments unable to prevent war or terrorism have a duty to frame conflicts and crises for what they are: ‘ Call it ‘terrorism’ not ‘Farmer-Herder, Religious or Communal clashes’ if there is unlawful use of violence or threats that create widespread fear and intimidates government or civilian populations for the achievement of political, religious, or ideological goals; and by all means, call it ‘Genocide’ when there are killings and serious harm that inflict life conditions, prevents births, destroys in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. No government should sugar coat it. If it smells, feels, tastes, looks or is perceived as it, then it is it;’ Ballason said, her voice searing the room.

House of Justice: Rejecting Justice Rollback on Terrorism.

Why is House of Justice moving for justice for victims of Terrorism and Mass Atrocities?

Nigeria and the Sahelian countries fit Maximilien de Robespierre, the French revolutionary leader and political philosopher’s, description when he said: ‘when a person is killed, it is termed murder; when tens are killed, the killers are seen as lunatics and when thousands are killed, the killers are invited to the negotiation table.’

The psychic numbing illustrates how state accountability does not scale proportionally instead it often decreases with the scale of atrocities floating over politically transcendent or conventional laws.

The House of Justice galvanises the public to elevate their anger at injustice beyond their fears, to be uncomfortable with despots and to hold to criminal sanctions officials who through commission or negligence, are responsible for mass casualties.

The Only Way is Justice.

Since 2014, The House of Justice has continued to work on accountability measures against terrorism and Mass Atrocities through litigation, stripping corrupt leaders off public engagement and submitting petitions to ensure enablers and sponsors of terrorism are not appointed to political offices. One of such high ranking officials is Mallam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai whose tenure as Governor of Kaduna state, Nigeria’s third largest state, was characterized by numerous murders, enforced disappearances, wilful destruction of cultural heritages, brutal persecution of critics and journalists and mass illegal destruction of houses and means of livelihood. President Muhammadu Buhari who led Nigeria, Africa’s largest country between 2015-2023 was egregiously negligent as Nigeriacontinued to feature in the rating of the top most terrorized countries in the world accounting for two top terrorist groups: Boko Haram and Herdsmen Terrorists – two groups the President was reluctant to declare as terrorists until the global community affirmed them as such.

The House of Justice continues to call for global collaboration in addressing root causes, provision of alternative narratives, terror and war financing disruption, actionable intelligence and multi-sector collaboration in preventing terror and where there are war and terror victims, that victims’ justice and resettlement should be prioritized by the state while those in the ecosystem of wars such as financiers, instigators, collaborators or executors of terrorism are held to account.

For the House of Justice, the mission is more than Law and Justice. The end point is the supremacy of the Rule of Law so there can be just societies and a safe world.

The Bombs That Had to Fall: America’s Christmas Day Strike on Jihadist Camps in Sokoto, Seat of the Caliphate

In the early hours of December 26, 2024, as most Nigerians slept off Christmas festivities, the skies over Tangaza Local Government Area in Sokoto State erupted with the thunderous roar of precision airstrikes. For 45 minutes, from 11:45 PM on December 25 to 12:30 AM, United States military aircraft unleashed what President Donald Trump described as “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS Terrorist Scum in Northwest Nigeria.”

The operation, estimated by experts to have cost between $1 million and $3 million, marked a significant escalation in international counterterrorism efforts within Nigeria’s borders. Both the U.S. Department of War and Nigeria’s Foreign Minister confirmed that the strikes were a coordinated operation between the two nations, targeting a terrorist base hosting key jihadist affiliates in the Bouni axis of Tangaza.

Yet, predictably, the strikes have sparked intense debate across Nigeria. Skeptics have questioned everything from the existence of ISIS in Sokoto to the legitimacy of American military intervention on Nigerian soil. Kaduna-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmed Gumi went as far as calling the operation symbolic of a “neo-Crusade war against Islam,” urging Nigeria to halt all military cooperation with the United States and seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead.

But as someone who has reported extensively from Tangaza and witnessed firsthand the creeping menace of transnational jihadism in Nigeria’s Northwest, I can say with confidence: these airstrikes were not only necessary, they were overdue.

The Lakurawa Threat: A Clear and Present Danger

In November 2024, my colleague Segun Onibiyo and I published an exclusive investigation into Tangaza and the alarming influx of foreign Islamist terrorists from the Sahel region into Nigeria through its porous northwestern borders. What we found was chilling: the Lakurawa terrorist group, a coalition of jihadists with ambitions to establish Islamic caliphates stretching from the Sahel down to the coast of Ghana, had been actively recruiting local fighters, including Fulani militias, across Sokoto and Kebbi states.

Tangaza, situated along Nigeria’s border with Niger Republic, has become a critical transit and operational hub for these jihadists. The porosity of this border facilitates the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and ideology between the Sahel’s conflict zones and Nigeria’s increasingly vulnerable Northwest. This isn’t speculation, it’s documented reality.

The Lakurawa aren’t merely bandits or cattle rustlers. They represent a sophisticated, ideologically driven terror network affiliated with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating across the Sahel. Their objectives are clear: destabilize governments, impose harsh interpretations of Sharia law, and expand their territorial control. Their methods are equally clear: targeted assassinations, mass kidnappings, extortion, and brutal attacks on anyone who resists their authority, including Muslims.

Why Sokoto? Understanding the Strategic Significance

Critics have questioned why Sokoto, the historic seat of Nigeria’s caliphate and a region perceived as peaceful, would be targeted. This question betrays a dangerous ignorance of contemporary jihadist strategy.

Sokoto’s symbolic importance cannot be overstated. For groups like Lakurawa and their Sahel-based allies, controlling or influencing territories with deep Islamic heritage lends them religious legitimacy. Tangaza’s strategic location along smuggling routes and its proximity to ungoverned spaces in Niger Republic make it an ideal staging ground for operations deeper into Nigeria.

Furthermore, the U.S. military doesn’t invest millions of dollars in precision airstrikes based on hunches. In recent weeks, American forces have conducted intensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations across the Sahel region of Nigeria. These missions undoubtedly revealed credible intelligence about the presence of high-value terrorist targets in Tangaza, likely including senior commanders planning coordinated attacks across multiple Nigerian states.

The Sokoto State Government has confirmed that terrorist locations were indeed bombed. Reports from Niger indicate that Nigerien soldiers observed fleeing Lakurawa fighters escaping Tangaza after the strikes. The operation targeted a terrorist base where top jihadist commanders were reportedly meeting to strategize large-scale attacks. No civilian casualties were recorded, a testament to the precision and coordination involved.

Trump’s “ISIS” Rhetoric: Politics Meets Reality

President Trump’s characterization of the targets as “ISIS Terrorist Scum” warrants clarification. While Lakurawa is primarily affiliated with JNIM and Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS, the distinction may be more relevant to terrorism analysts than to practical counterterrorism operations. Both organizations share overlapping ideologies, tactics, and objectives. Both seek to establish Islamic caliphates through violence and terror. Both recruit from the same radicalized populations and exploit the same governance vacuums.

Trump’s reference to ISIS likely serves a dual purpose: it resonates with American audiences familiar with ISIS’s atrocities, and it simplifies a complex security landscape into terms that justify decisive action. For Nigerians living under the threat of these groups, whether the terrorists pledge allegiance to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or JNIM matters far less than whether they’re being effectively neutralized.

The Broader War: Why This Strike Matters

This operation represents more than just a tactical victory, it signals a renewed international commitment to confronting transnational terrorism in West Africa. For too long, Nigeria has faced these threats with insufficient resources, inadequate intelligence capabilities, and an overstretched military. The involvement of U.S. military assets, with their advanced surveillance technology, precision strike capabilities, and real-time intelligence, provides a force multiplier that Nigeria desperately needs.

The Lakurawa threat extends beyond Sokoto and Kebbi. Their influence has been felt in Zamfara, and increasingly in parts of Niger and Kwara States. They operate with impunity in areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. They impose taxes on communities, recruit disaffected youth, and coordinate with local bandits to create a complex web of criminality and ideological extremism.

Sheikh Gumi’s concerns about sovereignty and the symbolism of American intervention are not without merit in principle. No nation should casually cede control of military operations within its borders. However, his suggestion that “terrorists don’t fight terrorists” ignores the fundamental difference between legitimate counterterrorism operations conducted with host-nation consent and the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by jihadist groups.

His recommendation that Nigeria seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead raises its own questions. Are these nations better positioned to provide the sophisticated ISR capabilities, precision strike assets, and actionable intelligence that this operation demonstrated? The evidence suggests otherwise.

Looking Forward: Recommendations for Sustained Action

While the Tangaza strikes represent a significant achievement, they cannot be a one-off event. Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy must evolve to address the full spectrum of jihadist threats across the country.

The next priority should be the systematic dismantling of known terror cells in the Middle Belt, particularly in Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue, and Taraba states. These cells serve as planning and staging grounds for attacks on farming communities that have displaced thousands and devastated agricultural production. Precision airstrikes targeting these locations, combined with ground operations to clear and hold territory, would significantly degrade their operational capacity.

Nigeria must also invest in border security infrastructure along its northern frontiers. Technology, surveillance drones, biometric checkpoints, rapid response units, must replace the current patchwork of undermanned outposts. Regional cooperation with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon needs strengthening to create a coordinated response to groups that exploit national boundaries.

Finally, Nigeria must address the governance vacuums that make communities vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. Where the state is absent, in providing security, justice, education, and economic opportunity, extremist groups fill the void. Long-term victory against terrorism requires not just military action but the restoration of effective governance.

Conclusion: A Necessary Strike in a Long War

The Christmas Day airstrikes in Tangaza were not an American crusade against Islam, as some have claimed. They were a necessary surgical intervention against a metastasizing terrorist threat that endangers Muslims and Christians alike. The Lakurawa and their affiliates have killed indiscriminately, enslaved communities, and sought to drag Nigeria into the chaos consuming the Sahel.

Those who doubt the necessity or success of these strikes should ask themselves: Would they prefer that the terrorists meeting in that Tangaza forest had been left to execute whatever atrocities they were planning? Would they prefer that Nigeria face these transnational threats entirely alone, without the intelligence and capabilities that international partnerships provide?

The war against terrorism in Nigeria is far from over. But on December 25, 2025, in the skies over Sokoto, a significant battle was won. Now comes the harder work: sustaining the pressure, expanding operations to other terrorist strongholds, and building the state capacity necessary to ensure that when terrorists are eliminated, they cannot simply be replaced.

The strike in Tangaza matters because it demonstrates that Nigeria is not alone in this fight, and that those who wage jihad against innocent Nigerians, regardless of their religious affiliation or international backing, will face consequences.

The question now is whether Nigeria has the political will to build on this success or whether the Tangaza strikes will remain an isolated event in an otherwise reactive and inadequate counterterrorism strategy.

For the sake of every Nigerian farmer, trader, student, and family living under the shadow of these groups, we must choose the former.

…Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over a decade.

Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The 11-Year Ordeal of the Gbagyi Three in Kaduna

By Steven Kefas

(Kaduna), On a November morning in 2025, Gloria Mabeiam Ballason received a WhatsApp message at 8:16 a.m. from the court registrar. Judgment would be delivered at 9:00 a.m.—in less than an hour. The lead counsel for the defendants was out of town and so she delegated a lawyer to attend the session. The court doors closed to others including journalists seeking entry.

Inside Court 15 of the Kaduna State High Court, three men who had already spent 11 years behind bars learned they would remain imprisoned for 10 more years.Their crime? Conspiracy and “Intention to commit culpable homicide”, a charge that has left legal experts questioning how Nigerian courts can determine the intentions of a person’s heart. “Not even the devil knows the intention of the heart of man,” Ballason said, her frustration palpable as she reflected on the judgment handed down by Justice B.M. Balarabe.

The case of the Gbagyi six, three of whom the prosecution presented at the High Court for trial, were arrested in January 2014 following a violent clash rooted in a land dispute in Jere chiefdom, Kagarko Local Government Area of Kaduna, has become yet another stark illustration of Nigeria’s troubled justice system, where prolonged detention, denied bail, and questionable verdicts have turned courtrooms into instruments of persecution rather than justice.

A Conflict Born of Land and Power.

The story begins in early January 2014, along the road from SSC Jere to Bwari in Kagarko Local Government Area. Dr. Sa’ad Usman, the Emir of Jere and husband of former Finance Minister, Senator Nenadi Usman, was traveling when he encountered a gathering of Gbagyi youths who stopped him. What happened next remains disputed. According to the Jere Traditional Council, one Ayuba Barde who was the first Defendant in the case but was not presented before the Court shouted at the traditional ruler, which led to a violent altercation in which the Chief, his driver, and police orderly were attacked with machetes and axes. The Gbagyi community told a different story: they claimed the Chief of Jere had for long formed the habit of confiscating lands from Gbagyi natives in Jere chiefdom with impunity, and that the most recent incident involved the destruction of food crops belonging to Ayuba Barde. Ayuba Barde was first shot by the orderly of the Chief following which a melee ensued.

A State Security Service source confirmed that serious crisis had been brewing in the area, with the Gbagyi people writing that their ancestral lands were being seized by the Fulani Emir. According to court documents, the incident left both the Chief and Ayuba Barde requiring hospitalization. In the days following the January 3, 2014 clash, Kaduna State Police Commissioner Olufemi Adenaike confirmed that several persons were arrested and would be detained until all principal characters could speak. Among those arrested were individuals who would spend the next 11 years fighting charges that evolved from “inciting disturbance” and “causing grievous hurt” to the far more serious charges of culpable homicide, and conspiracy.

A Trial Without End.

The Defendants ‘s Journey through Nigeria’s judicial system reads like a kafkaesque nightmare. They were first arraigned before a Magistrate Court, then transferred to the High Court. Their case moved from Justice Gideon Kurada, who granted them bail, to Justice Bashir Sukola, who also granted them bail, but on terms they could not meet despite repeated applications for review. Justice Sukola eventually died, and the file moved to Justice Binta F. Zubairu, who started the case afresh. After five years before Justice Zubairu, the longest period in their ordeal, the judge was elevated to the Court of Appeal just as the defense was set to open. The case then landed with Justice Buhari M. Balarabe, who again started the proceedings afresh. “The prosecution was not within reasonable time,” Ballason emphasized. “The trial took 11 years.”Throughout this period, the Defendants remained in custody. According to Ballason, Justice Balarabe’s court refused to take the bail application until after the hearings concluded, a decision she describes as “a violation of the right to fair hearing and presumption of innocence until proven guilty. “The Nigerian Constitution is explicit on this matter. Section 35(4) mandates that any person arrested or detained must be brought before a court within a reasonable time, and if not tried within two months (for those in custody) or three months (for those on bail), they must be released. Yet the Gbagyi defendants spent over a decade in pretrial detention.

A Judgment That Raises Questions.

On November 19, 2025, Justice Balarabe delivered his verdict. The court found the defendants guilty of conspiracy and intention to commit culpable homicide. Notably, the defendants were not found guilty of culpable homicide itself, as the prosecution could not prove that Dr. Sa’ad Usman, who died on April 1, 2020, died as a result of an incident that occurred six years prior in January 2014. Dr. Usman had been hospitalized in London following the 2014 altercation and battled with injuries for years before his death in 2020. The court could not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his 2020 death was directly caused by the 2014 incident. Yet the defendants received five years for conspiracy and ten years for “intention to commit culpable homicide,” to run concurrently. Combined with the 11 years already served, they face a total of 21 years imprisonment. “To hand down 21 years imprisonment for conspiracy and intention to commit culpable homicide is not contemplated by Justice,” Ballason stated. “The punishment is excessive.”She pointed to critical gaps in the prosecution’s case: “The medical report as to the cause of death of Dr. Sa’ad Usman was not tendered as evidence, which would have been grounds linking the defendants with the alleged offence. It was not properly established by the prosecution that there was no break in the chain of causation.”

The Prosecution counsel led by J.N. Dan’azumi Esq, Solicitor General of the Kaduna Ministry of Justice, had hoped for capital punishment on the charges they filed before the Court but declined to react to the judgement on the records.

Echoes of Sunday Jackson.

The Gbagyi case bears disturbing similarities to another controversial verdict that has outraged Nigerians: the death sentence handed to Sunday Jackson, a farmer from Adamawa State. In 2015, Jackson was working on his farm in Kodomti Community when a herdsman, Buba Ardo Bawuro, herded his cattle into Jackson’s farm to feed on his crops. When Jackson confronted him, the herdsman attacked Jackson with a knife, stabbing him. In the ensuing struggle, Jackson managed to disarm his attacker and fatally stabbed him in the neck.Jackson was arrested and charged with murder despite his consistent assertion that he acted in self-defense. After years of trial marked by delays and procedural irregularities, he was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. In March 2025, the Supreme Court of Nigeria upheld Jackson’s death sentence, with the court reasoning that having seized the dagger, Jackson no longer faced an imminent threat and should have fled instead of retaliating with deadly force. The verdict sparked national and international outrage. Legal luminary Mike Ozekhome, SAN called the Supreme Court’s position “unrealistic and disconnected from the realities of violent encounters,” noting that the notion that Jackson had a clear opportunity to flee while entangled in a fight with an armed opponent was speculative and a dangerous oversimplification. It later emerged that Justice Helen Ogunwumiju, the most senior judge on the appeal panel, had issued a dissenting judgment that was initially omitted from the certified true copy. She ruled it was a case of self-defense. “In the circumstances, I am of the view that the defence of self defence avails the Appellant and that his response was not excessive. It is my view that the judgment of the two lower Courts should be set aside as a miscarriage of justice”. – Per HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C. Both cases, the Gbagyi defendants and Sunday Jackson emerge from the same context: Nigeria’s deadly farmer-herder conflicts, where disputes over land and livelihood frequently turn violent. In both cases, those who claim to have defended themselves or their property face the full weight of the criminal justice system, while questions persist about whether justice has truly been served.

The Broader Context: Gbagyi Marginalization.

The Gbagyi people are one of the most populous ethnic groups in the middle belt and among the bonafide owners of the Nigerian capital city, Abuja. When Abuja was chosen as Nigeria’s new federal capital, the Gbagyi were the largest among the ethnic groups that inhabited the land proposed for development, resulting in dislocation and the removal of people from their ancestral homes.The Gbagyi people are known to be peace-loving, transparent, and accommodating. Northerners often say in Hausa language “muyi shi Gwari Gwari,” meaning “let’s do it like the Gbagyi” or “in the Gbagyi way”. Yet their perceived docility has sometimes worked against them.Across the north, it is believed that the Gbagyi lost most of their ancestral lands to other tribes because of their laid-back attitude. The 2014 incident in Jere was rooted in exactly such tensions, a community feeling their lands were being systematically taken from them, with their appeals to authorities going unheeded. The defendants’ legal team believes their clients were not fairly treated. “Courts have a duty to not only do justice but to ensure that a reasonable man can come to the conclusion that justice was done.”

What This Means for Nigeria As Nigeria grapples with ongoing security challenges, from banditry in the Northwest to terrorism in the Middle Belt and North central that have claimed thousands of lives.

The cases of the Gbagyi four and Sunday Jackson send a chilling message: defending oneself or one’s property may be criminalized while attackers escape accountability. “Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution provides that any person arrested or detained shall be brought before a court within a reasonable time,” Ballason emphasized. “This constitutional provision was argued along with the bail application, but the court refused to take the bail application until the conclusion of hearing. This is against the law. “She continued: “No administrative issue can override the right to fair and timely trial. Eleven years for a criminal trial under a democracy is simply not justifiable. “The defendants plan to appeal the November 19 judgment. They argue that beyond the excessive punishment, the necessary elements of the alleged offenses were not properly examined, the medical evidence linking Dr. Usman’s 2020 death to the 2014 incident was never produced, and the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of causation. As the four men begin what could be another decade behind bars, having already lost 11 years of their lives, their case stands as a stark reminder of the urgent need for judicial reform in Nigeria. The scales of justice, many argue, have tipped dangerously out of balance. “It is essential to recognize the importance of timely justice and justice according to law,” Ballason concluded.

For the Gbagyi defendants, and for Sunday Jackson still on death row, the question remains: When will Nigeria’s justice system deliver the justice its name promises? The defendants have confirmed they will file an appeal challenging both the conviction and the sentencing. Meanwhile, growing calls for clemency for Sunday Jackson continue, with human rights organizations and religious bodies urging the Adamawa State governor to exercise his constitutional power of pardon.