Nigeria’s Mining Investment Promises Ring Hollow as Jupiter Lithium Dispute Exposes a Troubling Contradiction

By Biliyaminu Suraj

Biliyasuraj1980@yahoo.com

Nigeria’s renewed courtship of American investors in the mining sector deserves more than applause. It deserves scrutiny.

On September 24, 2026, Minister of Solid Minerals Development Dele Alake announced on X that Nigeria and the United States had signed a framework agreement on mining investment. He said it was signed in New York with US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and covers geological data and exploration, mineral development and processing, infrastructure and technical capacity. Minister Alake valued Nigeria’s mineral resources at about $700 billion. As reported, the announcement named no project and stated no investment figure.

That raises an uncomfortable question: what does a promise of a welcoming investment environment mean for investors who have already committed years of work and resources to developing Nigeria’s mineral wealth? The dispute over a major lithium project in Kaduna State offers a sobering answer.

In July 2024, American Resources Corporation’s subsidiary, ReElement Technologies, announced a joint development agreement with UK-based Jupiter Lithium Ltd to commercialise what the companies described as a world-class lithium deposit in Southern Kaduna. The project, held through Nigerian companies Basin Mining Limited and Range Mining Limited, covers about 442 square kilometres near Kafanchan under granted mining leases the companies said run to 2074 plus several mining lease applications awaiting grant by the Minister.

The announcement was ambitious. Jupiter planned to move from contract mining to large-scale operations, starting with 55,000 tonnes of spodumene concentrate a year and rising to 167,000 tonnes within two years, with first production projected for early 2025. It is not clear that production ever began. ReElement planned a processing facility in Nigeria to produce battery-grade lithium carbonate using the lithium concentrate produced from the Jupiter project, and the companies promised a continuation of community projects including potable water, electricity, agriculture and scholarships which Basin and Range had been implementing for several years. That is the domestic processing and industrial development Nigeria says it wants.

The project has since become an international investment dispute. Mid-last year, Jupiter alleged Nigerian authorities had unlawfully revoked its mining rights and seized the project. The firm also alleged that the government purportedly revoked 70 per cent of its mining leases and failed to decide on further mining lease applications within the 45 days the Mining Act requires, leaving the applications waiting more than two years. It further claims authorities forcibly escorted its personnel off the tenements. These are allegations, not findings.

The government’s case deserves a fair hearing. In a statement issued in early August 2026, the minister’s media adviser, Kehinde Bamigbetan, said the revoked titles belonged to Basin Mining Limited, a Nigerian company. He said they were revoked for failure to pay statutory annual service fees of ₦1.223 billion in 2024 on five mineral titles, a liability that rose to about ₦2.494 billion by the time the licences were revoked. The ministry says it has no legal or contractual relationship with Jupiter Lithium, Basin and Range’s UK parent company, because the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007 prohibits licences to foreign companies. But the government’s account leaves important questions unanswered. First, the ministry says it has no relationship with Jupiter Lithium Ltd and that Jupiter is unknown to the mining authorities, yet its own aide has described Basin Mining as an alleged Nigerian subsidiary of Jupiter and has acknowledged that Jupiter filed arbitration over the revocation. If a foreign mining company cannot directly hold a mining title how then does it invest in a mining project in Nigeria if not through a local Nigerian subsidiary? Second, by the ministry’s own figures the arrears roughly doubled before the licences were revoked. The  company alleges it had been denied access to its tenements for more than two years and questioned why it should pay annual fees if it could not access its tenements and could not develop the mineral assets it had discovered after years of exploration and investment. Third, why did the Ministry not grant the mining lease applications within the stipulated 45 days but reject the applications without notice nor reason after more than two years? Finally, the ministry has answered critics by calling their campaign blackmail, rather than publishing the records that would settle the matter.

The legal consequences are already in motion. The italaw docket lists a notice of intent dated July 1, 2025 and a request for arbitration dated December 1, 2025, under the 1990 Nigeria-United Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), part of the World Bank Group, has the case as Jupiter Lithium Ltd and Others v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Case No. ARB/26/27, and it is pending. The Tribunal has been constituted but is yet to hear submissions  on Jupiter’s allegations or Nigeria’s defence.

An investor-state arbitration over a strategically important critical minerals project is not a minor administrative disagreement. It raises questions about regulatory predictability, the security of mineral titles and the confidence investors can place in Nigeria’s legal and investment framework. The government may argue it is simply enforcing the law, and it can make that case before the tribunal. But investors and the Nigerian public are equally entitled to ask whether enforcement was transparent, proportionate and consistent with the stated commitment to long-term investment.

There is also a contradiction in the government’s messaging. Nigeria is seeking American capital and presenting itself as an emerging destination for mining investment, while an existing major project that attracted international technical and commercial partners sits in an arbitration. What assurance can the government give a new American investor if the future of a project established under an international investment treaty with Nigeria’ is contested? The slump in trade between Nigeria and the UK of -45% in 2025 may reflect the diminishing confidence Nigeria’s traditional trading partners place in Nigeria while Nigeria looks towards China with trade up 38.4% in 2025.

Investors do not make investment decisions on speeches, memoranda or official photographs. They study how companies already in the market have fared. Security of title, predictability and consistency in mining regulations are critical. The significant increases in mining licence fees in 2025 without mining industry consultation saw exploration licenses experiencing fee increments as high as 2,000 percent and mining leases seeing increases of 4,000 percent.

The consequences run both ways. If the revocations are found to have violated the UK-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty which provides investment protections, confidence in Nigeria’s mining sector would suffer and the country could face potentially significant financial liability in the Jupiter case. If the government shows the revocations were lawful and justified by genuine breaches, it reinforces the principle that investors must obey Nigerian law. Either way, the dispute demands transparency and documentary evidence, not public relations battles.

The Jupiter case is a litmus test for investment from reputable international mining companies. It demands transparency from both the Federal Government and the mining company. The Federal Government should clarify the status of the affected tenements and respond to the allegations about third-party access to the project area, the companies’ several petitions to remove illegal miners, the extraordinary delay in addressing the applications for mining licences and the MCO award of several licences over the companies’ valid tenements to third parties The same standard applies to Jupiter: its claims, however serious, must be backed by verifiable evidence and tested independently and they appear to be doing that by taking their claim to the World Bank’s arbitration platform, The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an expensive process that is not undertaken lightly.

The US-Nigeria September agreement may open real opportunities. Its value will be measured not by the enthusiasm around its signing, but by whether investors can operate under clear rules enforced consistently and fairly. Attracting foreign investment is only half the challenge. Protecting the credibility of the investment environment is the other half.

Until that contradiction is addressed, every new promise of a mining-sector investment boom deserves a pinch of salt.

How Nigeria’s Mineral Wealth Is Being Handed to China

Nigeria’s Minister for Mines, Dele Henry Alake, prides himself on his re-election as Chairman of the newly formed Africa Minerals Strategy Group. He congratulates himself on the cover of magazines. As a former journalist Minister Alake is good with scripting media stories. He doesn’t have any background in mining or related industries. During President Tinubu’s two terms as Governor of Lagos State it was Alake who managed the Governor’s media as the Commissioner for Information and Strategy.

Since bagging the Ministry for Sold Minerals Development Minister Alake’s primary focus has been on securing large-scale investments and fostering partnerships for local mineral processing. This has led to the development of several lithium processing plants in Nigeria, primarily backed by Chinese investment.

Minister Alake’s emphasis on moving beyond raw material extraction to local processing is a good decision that will support Nigeria’s industrialization and economic diversification. However, favouring Chinese companies and punishing local Nigerian miners is a cruel blow to Nigerians and a step too far in surrendering Nigeria’s natural assets to a foreign power.

Under Minister Alake’s tenure, major Chinese companies such as Canmax Technology, Jiuling Lithium, Avatar New Energy, and Asba have pledged lithium processing facilities in Nigeria.

Since late 2025, Canmax has aggressively secured raw spodumene (lithium ore) to feed its expanding processing faciliies. Canmax Technologies is primarily owned and controlled by its founder and chairman, Mr Pei Zhenhua, alongside his wife, Rong Jianfen. Alake claims Canmax is investing US$200M to develop lithium mining operations in Nigeria, in line with Chinese aggressive moves to control African mineral resources and infrastructure such as ports and railways necessary to exploit the mineral reserves.

In late 2025, Chinese megafirm CATL announced plans to increase its stake in Canmax’s lithium subsidiaries. CATL holds approximately 40 percent of the global EV battery market and almost 70 percent of the NCM (Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese) battery market in China. China as a whole processes approximately 65 percent to 80 percent of the world’s lithium. As the dominant player in China, CATL effectively directs a majority of the lithium hydroxide refined within the country toward its own Gigafactories.

While UK company Jupiter Lithium Ltd’s massive lithium project in Kaduna State reels under the onslaught from armed illegal miners, Alake’s ministry deployed a specialized security unit known as Mining Marshals to safeguard nearby Canmax and Avatar sites from illegal mining activities. No amount of requests from Jupiter for assistance from Minister Alake elicited any support. Rather, Minister Alake revoked key lithium deposits discovered by Jupiter and allowed Chinese mining companies, escorted by Federal Government security, to enter Jupiter’s leases and commence mining and removing the ore mined and stockpiled by Jupiter.

Minister Alake has prioritised diplomatic engagement with Chinese officials to discuss strengthening bilateral relations and find ways to diminish the public attention to China’s involvement in illegal mining in Nigeria.

The mines minister has become a strong and frequent advocate for China’s involvement in Nigeria’s minerals and infrastructure development which has been a hallmark of his many trips to China.

Nigeria has fallen into line with China’s strategy for accessing and controlling Africa’s minerals resources and delivering more markets for Chinese technology and products.

China’s first stage of embedding itself in another nation is the offer to develop a country’s infrastructure; ports, roads, airports and railways. This essential infrastructure often facilitates the development of mineral projects China has chosen.

The second stage is introducing Chinese technology through the project development, especially surveillance technology. China replaces the US-based Global Positioning System (GPS) with China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system and blocks access to Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite. In so doing China is able to offer its support for the national government while penetrating Nigeria’s national security. Chinese technology can deliver facial recognition throughout entire cities, even at night.

In Iran several of China’s communications companies including Huawei, facial recognition and ethnicity tracking company Tiandy Technologies and ZTE, often operating through Iranian front companies, have worked with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to provide 360 degrees 24/7 surveillance of Iran’s population. Iran and China have signed a 25-year co-operation agreement that will facilitate the transfer of a range of surveillance and monitoring technologies under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Surveillance of a nation’s populations is now an integral part of China’s program of building a nation’s infrastructure through roads, airports and mines. This provides an unprecedented tool for national governments to retain power and be manipulated by China.

…Steven Kefas is a conflict reporter with keen interest in mining and solid minerals.

Fees Before Mines: How Nigeria’s Mining Ministry Became Its Own Worst Enemy

The Ministry of Solid Minerals Development is celebrating record revenue but the available data suggests the money is coming predominantly from licence fees rather than from mines. The pattern, if confirmed by full-year data, would reveal a regulatory regime that may be pricing out legitimate investors, driving production underground, and suppressing the royalties Nigeria desperately needs. Granular verification is hampered by the absence of comprehensive public data — a transparency failure that is itself part of the problem.

Special Report  |  Nigeria Mining Monitor

Nigeria’s solid minerals sector generated N68 billion in revenue in 2025, a figure that Minister Dele Alake’s team has trumpeted as proof of a transformed industry. The headline may be accurate but the story behind it is not the one being told.

A reading of the government’s own data, cross-referenced with international trade records and fee schedules from Australia and Canada, raises serious questions about whether this sector’s revenue growth is built on administrative charges rather than productive mining. Royalties — the income stream that actually reflects minerals being mined, processed, and sold appear to remain a structurally suppressed component of total collections. Meanwhile, the Ministry’s fee policies appear to have created conditions that systematically favour illegal operators over legitimate ones, shrunk the pool of formal licence holders, and allowed substantial volumes of minerals and metals to leave the country without confirmed royalty payments. Due to limitations in the granularity and timeliness of data published by the Mining Cadastre Office (MCO) and the Ministry, full verification of the scale of these problems is not currently possible. This opacity is itself a governance concern.

Taxing the paperwork, not the production

In a well-functioning mining jurisdiction, royalties dominate revenue. They are, by definition, the state’s share of its natural wealth — calculated as a percentage of the value of minerals actually extracted and sold. Licence fees are secondary: legitimate cost-recovery for administrative services. Nigeria’s available data suggests this logic has been inverted — though the absence of a consistent, publicly published annual breakdown of fees versus royalties prevents a definitive structural conclusion.

In December 2025, the Ministry’s own FAAC submission recorded fees of N2.59 billion against royalties of just N1.58 billion — meaning fees accounted for approximately 62% of that month’s solid minerals revenue. This is the most recent month for which disaggregated data is publicly available. The Ministry does not consistently publish monthly or annual revenue breakdowns distinguishing fees from royalties across the full year, making it impossible to confirm with certainty whether December’s ratio is representative or exceptional. The available partial-year data suggests the pattern is broadly consistent across 2025, but the MCO’s data collection practices do not permit the kind of longitudinal verification that would put this beyond reasonable dispute. For a country sitting atop gold, lithium, tin, and dozens of other commercially significant minerals, even a single-month ratio of this kind is a governance alarm bell.

The royalty problem is compounded by how royalties are calculated. Nigeria’s official “approved market value” for each mineral, the base on which the royalty percentage is applied appears not to be updated to reflect actual market prices. Based on analysis published in November 2025 by Regan van Rooy, a specialist in Nigerian mining royalty valuations, the approved value for gold is approximately USD 750 per ounce. If this USD 750/oz benchmark remains operative, or anything close to it, the gap with market rates is extraordinary: the London spot price in late 2025 was approximately USD 4,138 per ounce. Even if every gold miner in Nigeria declared every gram honestly, royalties would be collected on less than one-fifth of the mineral’s actual worth. Whether this results from deliberate policy, administrative inertia, or a failure to update administrative instruments in line with market movements, the practical outcome is the same: the royalty base is structurally disconnected from real values.

Related Fact: 62 % is the Proportion of December 2025 solid minerals revenue derived from administrative fees, not production royalties, based on FAAC submission data. In a well-governed sector, this ratio should be significantly reversed. Full-year disaggregated data is not publicly available to confirm whether this month is representative of the annual pattern.

The July 2024 fee shock: a revenue surge with a hidden ceiling

On 4 July 2024, Minister Alake announced sweeping new rates across 268 items in the mining sector. The Mining Lease annual service fee jumped to N1,250,000. A new Mining Lease application was pegged at N3,000,000. Exploration licence fees rose sharply. And a punitive late-renewal penalty structure was introduced: N1.5 million for an exploration licence renewal paid late, and N3,000,000 equal to the original application fee for a late Mining Lease renewal.

The revenue effect was immediate and substantial. Collections rose from N6 billion in 2023 to N38 billion in 2024 and reached N68 billion in 2025. The Ministry hailed this as transformative. But context matters. The 2025 budget target set for the Ministry was N36.88 billion, a figure so conservative it was exceeded by April. The Ministry’s own officials had publicly projected over N70 billion for the year; the actual result of N68.1 billion fell short of even that revised target. More importantly, the surge appears to have been driven primarily by fee collection, not by a measurable expansion in mining output.

That dial has a ceiling. Fee schedules cannot be increased indefinitely. When charges reach the point at which formal operation becomes economically irrational compared with informal activity, operators make a rational choice: they go underground. The Ministry has not published exit surveys, licence surrender analyses, or operator feedback data that would allow a precise determination of whether this tipping point has been reached. The circumstantial evidence — rising revocations, documented illegal operations, and the divergence between royalty collections and export volumes is consistent with the hypothesis that the tipping point has been reached. But in the absence of behavioural data, this remains a well-grounded inference rather than a demonstrated fact.

The lithium gap: Nigeria’s missing billions

No single data series raises more serious governance questions than the contrast between Nigeria’s royalty collections and Chinese customs records.

According to the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (GACC), as reported by Shanghai Metals Market and Mysteel, Nigeria has become one of the world’s major suppliers of spodumene — the primary ore from which lithium is refined for use in electric vehicle batteries. In July 2025, Chinese customs recorded 217,000 tonnes of spodumene imported from Nigeria in a single month. Over the January–September 2025 period, arrivals from Nigeria appear to have exceeded 800,000 tonnes.

This “Mirror Data” of Chinese customs country-of-origin data should be treated as indicative rather than definitive proof of royalty liability. It does not account for possible re-exports, stockpiled material assembled from multiple sources, timing lags between shipment and royalty assessment, or informal cross-border aggregation. What it does establish is a very large physical volume of spodumene identified by Chinese importers as originating in Nigeria — a volume that warrants a credible, transparent reconciliation against Nigeria’s own royalty collection records. No such reconciliation has been published.

At Nigeria’s official royalty rate of N9,500 per tonne for spodumene, the July shipments alone would imply a royalty exposure of approximately N2.06 billion, more than Nigeria’s total royalty collection across all minerals in December 2025. The implied royalty exposure on nine months of spodumene exports would approach N7.6 billion. Whether these amounts were collected, deferred, or lost is unknown because the Ministry does not publish operator-level or mineral-level royalty data in the detail that would enable verification.

Is the lack of data from Nigeria’s Ministry of Mines intentional so as to thwart verification or is it simply very poor management?

The explanation for any gap is not complicated. A 2024 Associated Press investigation documented Chinese-funded operations employing artisanal miners including children as young as six at illegal sites across Nasarawa and other lithium-rich northern states. Dozens of arrests of illegal operators, including Chinese nationals convicted in Ilorin in April 2024, confirm that the activity is widespread and systematic. SBM Intelligence, a Lagos-based research firm, has documented links between illegal mining revenues and insecurity in affected regions; their reporting suggests a connection to the financing of armed actors, though the specific financial mechanisms and quantified flows have not been independently verified and this claim should be read accordingly. The minerals are leaving Nigeria. Whether, and to what extent, the royalties are being collected remains unanswerable given current data availability.

Related Fact: N7.6bn+ is the Estimated royalty exposure on Nigerian spodumene recorded arriving in China (Jan–Sep 2025), based on GACC data and Nigeria’s official royalty rate of N9,500/tonne. Whether these amounts were assessed and collected cannot be confirmed from publicly available data. Total royalties collected from ALL minerals in the same period appear to be a small fraction of this figure.

Paying more, getting less: the international comparison

A comparison with Western Australia and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and British Columbia, three of the world’s most active and investor-friendly mining jurisdictions, is instructive, though it requires contextual qualification. Nigeria’s fee structure looks not merely expensive but economically incoherent when set against these benchmarks, even accounting for differences in development stage and institutional capacity.

A Nigerian Mining Lease application costs approximately USD 1,875 at current exchange rates. The equivalent application fee in Western Australia is AUD 669 (approximately USD 426), that is less than a quarter of Nigeria’s charge. In Ontario, the equivalent is CAD 90 (approximately USD 65). In exchange for these modest fees, investors in WA and Canada receive: free, comprehensive digital geological databases covering decades of exploration data; publicly searchable, real-time tenement registers; 21-year Mining Lease terms renewable as of right; and regulatory frameworks where non-payment results in forfeiture, not criminal referral to an anti-corruption agency.

Nigeria offers comparatively little in return for fees. Its geological map costs N300,000. Its tenure register, the eMC+ system, has limited public accessibility and long periods offline. Geological survey data — the single most important input to any investment decision in mining  is thin relative to the country’s endowment. It is fair to note that Western Australia’s and Canada’s geological databases reflect decades of public investment that Nigeria did not make in the same period. The gap in data quality is partly a legacy issue, not purely a matter of current policy choice. That contextual point does not, however, explain why Nigeria’s current fees significantly exceed those jurisdictions’ charges while delivering demonstrably fewer services with attendant far greater risks.

Perhaps most structurally damaging is what Nigeria’s fees do not require: actual exploration work. In WA, Ontario, and BC, a licence is maintained by demonstrated expenditure on geological work, drilling, sampling, geophysics — that adds to the nation’s knowledge. Dormant licences lapse naturally. In Nigeria, licences are maintained by cash payment alone, with no requirement that any work occur. The Ministry has not published data on what proportion of licence holders have conducted exploration expenditure in any given year, which makes it impossible to quantify directly how widespread dormant licence-holding is. The absence of such a requirement, however, is structural and visible in the regulatory framework itself.

Related Fact: Nigeria’s fees are 29x Cananda’s. Nigeria’s Mining Lease application fee (USD 1,875) relative to Ontario’s equivalent (CAD 90 / USD 65). Nigerian operators receive no comparable geological database, limited tenure security, and face criminal referral for late payment. WA and Canadian fees reflect different development contexts, but the gap in cost-to-service ratio remains material.

3,794 revocations: an industry under pressure

Since President Tinubu’s administration took office in May 2023, the Ministry has revoked 3,794 mining licences. The waves came in three tranches: 1,633 in November 2023, 924 in May 2024, and 1,263 in September 2025. The primary trigger in every case was failure to pay annual service fees.

To understand the administrative scale of this, consider that the Mining Cadastre Office issued approximately 2,249 mineral titles in the entire year of 2023. Revocations since May 2023 therefore substantially exceed a full year’s worth of new grants. The Ministry may argue that many revoked licences were dormant, speculative, or non-compliant, legacy titles that added little productive value to the sector and whose removal represents regulatory hygiene rather than suppression however without production, employment, or investment data disaggregated by licence holder, it is not possible to determine definitively what proportion of revoked titles were genuinely active. The MCO does not publish this breakdown. What can be said is that more revocations are occurring than new licences are being issued, and that the compounding effect of punitive late-payment penalties makes recovery of title economically prohibitive for many operators who might otherwise have continued.

In Western Australia or Ontario, fee structures are calibrated to be sustainable for operating companies. Tenements are forfeited, not revoked with EFCC referral threats when operators cannot continue. Individual cases go through formal adjudication. The process is designed to preserve productive tenure in active hands, not to punish operators for cash flow difficulties. Nigeria’s approach creates the opposite incentive structure, regardless of intent.

For any international investor conducting due diligence, the combination of high fees, punitive late-payment penalties, and a track record of mass revocations represents a material risk factor. No investor surveys or documented deal withdrawals are cited here that data has not been published by the Ministry or by any independent body but the structural risk profile described is consistent with what deters capital in comparable emerging-market jurisdictions.

The transparency problem no one wants to name

Underlying all of the above is a failure of transparency that makes every other problem harder to solve. The IMF, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and every major mining jurisdiction treat granular revenue disclosure as a baseline governance requirement. Published production volumes by mineral and by operator, royalty declarations verifiable against independent trade data, licence registers open to public scrutiny — these are not luxuries. They are the tools that deter underreporting, build investor confidence, and allow policymakers to detect when a system is broken.

Nigeria’s Ministry does not consistently publish royalty data broken down by mineral type or by operator. The royalty base values which determine how much is owed per tonne are set administratively at prices that appear significantly disconnected from market rates, with no published methodology for how or when they are updated. It is acknowledged that some data is available through EITI submissions and FAAC reporting, and that these represent genuine improvements over earlier periods. The problem is not total absence of data, but insufficient granularity, consistency, and timeliness to allow external verification of whether royalties are being correctly assessed and collected. The MCO’s data collection practices do not currently support the kind of mineral-level, operator-level reconciliation that would make the sector’s royalty performance auditable.

A structural change is underway. As of January 2026, royalty collection has transitioned from the Ministry to the Federal Inland Revenue Service, now operating as the Nigeria Revenue Service under new tax laws. Both institutions have pledged collaboration and transparency. The intent is encouraging, and the separation of revenue collection from the regulating Ministry is consistent with international best practice. However, institutional reorganisation without data transparency is a rearrangement, not a reform. The transfer of collection responsibility to the Treasury does not, by itself, address the fundamental problem: Nigeria cannot yet reliably determine how much mineral is being extracted, by whom, and whether correct royalties are being paid. That will require investment in the information infrastructure, production monitoring, operator reporting obligations, and independent verification that neither institution has yet committed to provide, aside from the failed eMC+ system with its limited public accessibility and ongoing “upgrade” costs.

The verdict

Nigeria’s Ministry of Solid Minerals Development set out to transform a neglected sector. It has instead constructed a regulatory regime that charges heavily to hold ground, punishes those who struggle to pay, offers little in return in terms of data or security, and leaves the front door open for operators who have no intention of paying anything at all.

The result is visible in the data that is available: fees apparently outpacing royalties in the months for which disaggregated figures have been published; substantial volumes of lithium leaving the country with royalty collections that appear to fall far short of the implied liability; nearly 4,000 licences revoked in two years; and a sector whose headline revenue growth is almost entirely a product of administrative price increases rather than expanding output. The absence of more comprehensive public data, annual fee-versus-royalty breakdowns, operator-level royalty declarations, production volumes by mineral, means that the full extent of these problems cannot be established with precision. That absence is not a reason to dismiss the evidence that does exist; it is a governance failure in its own right.

Nigeria has extraordinary mineral endowments. It will not unlock their value by pricing legitimate operators into illegality. The path to a productive, revenue-generating mining sector runs through stable tenure, market-linked royalties, transparent data, and a fee structure that rewards development rather than punishing it. The January 2026 transfer of royalty collection to the Treasury is a step in the right direction. It will only matter if it is accompanied by the information systems and disclosure standards that make royalty compliance auditable and royalty performance visible.

Until the Ministry and the Nigeria Revenue Service together build that infrastructure and publish the results, the minerals will keep leaving the country and the royalties will remain, as they are today, largely unaccounted for.

The Ministry’s responsibility to develop Nigeria’s mining potential and transform Nigeria’s oil and gas economy into a clean energy and mining economy will remain just that — an unrealised potential.

Steven Kefas is a Nigerian journalist, activist, and mining enthusiast with nearly a decade of experience following Nigeria’s mining sector.

Sources and methodology

This analysis draws on MSMD monthly FAAC submissions (January–December 2025); the Nigeria Mining Cadastre Office 2023 Annual Report; GACC spodumene import data as reported by Shanghai Metals Market and Mysteel (January–September 2025); the MSMD July 2024 rate schedule (268-item fee revision); DEMIRS Western Australia Fees and Charges 2024–25 (effective 1 July 2024); Ontario O. Reg. 65/18 and O. Reg. 113/91; BC Mineral Tenure Act Regulation; Regan van Rooy analysis of Nigerian royalty valuations (November 2025); and reporting from THISDAY, Premium Times, AllAfrica, PBS NewsHour, Associated Press, SBM Intelligence, and Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Exchange rates: USD 1 = N1,600; AUD 1 ≈ USD 0.637; CAD 1 ≈ USD 0.725. The approved gold royalty value of approximately USD 750/oz is drawn from the Regan van Rooy analysis; the Ministry has not published a current royalty valuation schedule and has not confirmed or denied this figure in response to requests for information. Full-year disaggregated fee-versus-royalty data for 2024–2025 has not been published by the Ministry or MCO; the December 2025 FAAC figure is the most recent month for which this breakdown is available.

UK Miner Launches Arbitration Case as Nigeria Blocks Access to Multi-Billion-Dollar Lithium Project

A British mining company has launched international arbitration proceedings against Nigeria after authorities purported to revoke its licences, forcibly escorted company personnel off its legally held tenements, and blocked development of what it says is a multi-billion-dollar lithium and critical minerals project with strategic importance for the UK.

Jupiter Lithium Ltd, a UK-registered company, has filed a Request for Arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) based in Washington DC, Paris and Singapore.

Jupiter has spent several years exploring and delineating what it describes as a world-class hard-rock lithium deposit in central Nigeria. According to the company, the resource is large enough to supply all of Britain’s lithium requirements for decades, positioning it as one of the most significant potential contributors to the UK’s emerging battery and electric-vehicle supply chain.

But Jupiter alleges that the Nigerian Federal Government has unlawfully obstructed the project, including by purportedly revoking 70 per cent of its Mining Leases and failing to grant further Leases within the statutory timelines under Nigeria’s Mining Act. The Act requires the Minister of Solid Minerals to issue or refuse a mining title within 45 days; Jupiter says it has been waiting more than two years.

Tensions escalated further in late 2025 when, according to Jupiter, federal authorities forcibly removed its personnel from site and escorted a Chinese-backed mining company onto the tenements to begin operations, despite the Chinese operator holding no legal mining title. The company says it has repeatedly sought dialogue with the administration of President Bola Tinubu, but all attempts to initiate discussions through the Mines Minister and Director General Mining Cadastre Office have failed.

According to individuals familiar with the exchanges, Minister of Solid Minerals Dele Alake at one point asked whether an international court would believe a foreign mining company over the Minister himself, which is seen as signalling the government’s unwillingness to engage in a negotiated resolution.

Jupiter is protected as a foreign investor in Nigeria under the terms of the UK–Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which guarantees protections for British investors including fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, and safeguards against expropriation. The company alleges multiple breaches of the Treaty and in June 2025 formally notified the Tinubu government of its intention to proceed to international arbitration if Nigeria continued to interfere with its rights to its tenements and refused to engage in discussions to resolve the dispute.

“Jupiter has acted in full compliance with Nigerian law and has made every effort to resolve this matter amicably,” a company representative said. “We have been left with no option but to pursue international arbitration to protect our investment and the rights afforded under the BIT.”

The Nigerian Government has not publicly commented on the dispute. Officials have previously signalled an ambition to increase domestic control over strategic critical minerals and deepen partnerships with new foreign entrants, including Chinese investors, as part of a broader push to accelerate development of the sector.

The Jupiter Critical Minerals Project is, according to the Jupiter website, one of the largest lithium deposits in the world.  With an estimated output of 167, 000 tons of Lithium concentrate in the first two years, Nigeria stands to gain at least $6.2 billion in the first two years.

The confrontation comes at a critical time for the UK and US, which are both seeking to secure long-term supplies of lithium and other critical minerals essential for battery manufacturing. Britain currently has no commercial-scale domestic lithium production and relies heavily on imports from Australia, Chile, and China.

With London seeking to strengthen supply-chain resilience and deepen economic ties with African partners, the mistreatment of a major British investor in a strategic sector is likely to attract close attention from UK officials.

Meanwhile the US has made it clear it is concerned about the Chinese influence to control Critical Minerals and the processing of Rare Earth Elements which are essential components in defence technologies, smartphones, laptops, electric and hybrid vehicles, wind turbines and flat-screen displays.

Diplomatic observers say the dispute may feature prominently in discussions ahead of President Tinubu’s bid for a second term.

Jupiter says it remains open to a negotiated settlement but continues to prepare for arbitration and committed to arbitration under the Treaty to enforce its rights under the BIT should the stalemate persists.

China’s Increasing Control of Africa’s Mineral Resources

By Biliyaminu Suraj

biliyasuraj247@yahoo.com

Nigeria’s Minister for Mines prides himself on his recent re-election as Chairman of the newly formed Africa Minerals Strategy Group, established by African Ministers of Minerals and Mining to foster cooperation among African nations in the development of critical minerals. Minister Alake is a former journalist and close friend of President Tinubu. During Tinubu’s two terms as Governor of Lagos State it was Alake who managed Tinubu’s media as the Governor’s Commissioner for Information and Strategy.

It is this African Minerals Strategy Group that is leading the push for the introduction of the Madini Protocol, a blockchain platform which will be the Trojan Horse for Chinese control of the African minerals sector.

Since becoming Minister for Sold Minerals Development Alake’s primary focus has been on securing large-scale investments and fostering partnerships for local mineral processing. This has led to the development of several lithium processing plants in Nigeria, primarily backed by Chinese investment. Major Chinese companies such as Canmax Technology, Jiuling Lithium, Avatar New Energy, and Asba have announced investment in lithium processing facilities in Nigeria.

Since late 2025, Canmax has aggressively secured lithium ore to feed its expanding processing faciliies. Canmax Technologies is primarily owned and controlled by its founder and chairman, Mr Pei Zhenhua, alongside his wife, Rong Jianfen. Alake claims Canmax is investing US$200M to develop lithium mining operations in Nigeria, in line with Chinese aggressive moves to control African mineral resources and infrastructure such as ports and railways necessary to exploit the mineral reserves.

Chinese megafirm CATL announced plans to increase its stake in Canmax’s lithium subsidiaries. CATL holds approximately 40 percent of the global EV battery market and almost 70 percent of the NCM (Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese) battery market in China. China as a whole processes approximately 65 percent to 80 percent of the world’s lithium. As the dominant player in China, CATL effectively directs a majority of the lithium hydroxide refined within the country toward its own Gigafactories.

Minister Alake has become a frequent and strong advocate for China’s involvement in Nigeria’s minerals and infrastructure development which has been a hallmark of his many trips to China.

As Chairman of the Africa Minerals Strategy Group, Minister Alake has introduced the Madini Protocol, a Chinese backed blockchain-based platform for trading and digital financing. This hi-tech system is not only designed for tracking minerals from extraction to market but also tracking every person involved in the supply chain including local villagers who may be employed at the mine. The system converts unmined mineral reserves into tradable digital tokens.

In other central Asian countries China state-controlled tech companies are rolling out platforms that turn natural resources including water into digital tokens tradable on blockchain-based platforms and for digital financing. The Chinese companies rolling out deals with governments say there is no limit to what they can tokenize and make tradable on their platforms.

The Madini Protocol, made possible through a collaboration between David Chen (Founder of BLCP Capital, now Chairman of GTIF) and Chris Wong (CEO of LifeSite). LifeSite Inc., is fronted as the technology company behind the TokenX platform and the Madini Protocol. The background of Wong’s co-founders in this hi-tech digital software is interesting. Crystal Lee, a co-founder of LifeSite, was Miss California 2013 and runner-up in the Miss America 2014 pageant. YoonJin Chang, also a co-founder of LifeSite was a former Miss Korea runner-up in 2010.

Wong’s long term business associate is David Chen who founded and led Deloitte’s Chinese Services Group in Mexico. Chen’s experience is primarily with food, health, entertainment and real estate industries before moving into global esports and entertainment through FaZe Clan which achieved a valuation of $725 million via a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) merger in 2022 only to plunge to a 2026 estimate of $13 million.

Wong and Chen’s Madini Protocol is touted as a vehicle allowing African nations to raise capital via the Africa Mineral Token (AMT). In fact, it is a route for China to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources initially targeting Lithium and Gold. It is promoted by Minister Alake as a means of financing through the digital tokenisation to provide a way for Chinese funding for projects via smart contracts on the blockchain.

The Africa Minerals Strategy Group led by Minister Alake is China’s Trojan Horse to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources through mining infrastructure investment using the Madini Protocol to fund Chinese built and operated ore processing plants. All the while Nigerian officials turn a blind eye to the Chinese sourcing of lithium ore for their Nigerian processing plants from illegal miners, paying protection money to heavily armed militants, bandits and ISIS connected groups controlling increasingly larger areas of Nigeria’s North and Central regions. The extreme insecurity of these areas is a perfect cover for Chinese companies illegally mining who pay terrorists protection money rather than state royalties.

In the Year of the Horse Mines Ministers across Africa, like the people of ancient Troy, may welcome the gift brought to their gates by Minister Alake and his Chinese backed partners only to find it is a Trojan Horse which, once inside the gates, is uncontrollable.

Minister Alake’s Fantasy Economics: How Unrealistic Targets Are Destroying Nigeria’s Mining Sector

By Billiyamniu Suraj

Biliyasuraj247@yahoo.com

Nigeria’s Minister of Solid Minerals Development, Dr. Dele Alake, has made bold promises about transforming the country’s mining sector. His stated aspiration for mining to contribute “around 50 percent of GDP” has captured headlines and generated excitement about Nigeria’s mineral potential. However, this target reveals not ambition but a fundamental disconnect from the realities of international mining economics , a disconnect that is actively harming the sector it purports to develop.

To understand how divorced from reality this target is, consider the world’s premier mining nations. Australia, with over a century of mining development, world-class geological data, transparent regulation, sophisticated capital markets, and billions in ready investment capital, sees its mining sector contribute approximately 12-14% to GDP. Canada’s mining sector, similarly mature and well-developed, contributed about 4-6% to national GDP in recent years.

Yet Nigeria, where the mining sector currently contributes less than one percent to GDP and actually declined by 21% in 2024 compared to 2023, is supposedly targeting 50%. This is not merely optimistic, it suggests either a catastrophic misunderstanding of the mining industry or a cynical manipulation of public expectations to justify policies that serve other agendas.

The Seven-Point Agenda: Reforms That Ignore Root Causes

Minister Alake has unveiled a seven-point agenda to reposition the sector: establishing the Nigeria Solid Minerals Company, creating Mines Marshalls to combat illegal mining, acquiring comprehensive geological data, formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining, promoting value addition and local processing, attracting large-scale investment, and strengthening stakeholder engagement.

On paper, these initiatives sound reasonable. In practice, they fail to address or even acknowledge the fundamental problems destroying Nigeria’s mining sector: systematic corruption at the Mining Cadastre Office (MCO), lack of security of title, a punishing fee structure that bankrupts local miners, and the systematic sabotage of a $60 million World Bank-funded cadastre system specifically designed to prevent these failures.

The Ministry’s stated reasons for lack of investment, “insufficient geological data, weak infrastructure, informal operations, illegal mining, and a significant financing gap”, conveniently omit the elephant in the room: institutional corruption and regulatory dysfunction that makes Nigeria’s mining sector toxic to legitimate international investors. This selective diagnosis suggests the Ministry either does not understand how the global mining sector works or is deliberately obscuring the real obstacles to development.

When “Reforms” Become Instruments of Corruption

Perhaps most troubling is evidence that even newly created reform initiatives are being corrupted from inception. The Mines Marshalls, established ostensibly to combat illegal mining, have reportedly been deployed as private security for parties in the Minister’s favor. Rather than enforcing the law impartially, this taxpayer-funded force allegedly serves to protect connected operators while harassing legitimate miners who lack political patronage.

If accurate, this transforms a law enforcement initiative into an instrument of favoritism and intimidation, further entrenching the very corruption it was supposedly created to combat. When even new institutions are corrupted before they can function properly, it reveals the depth of the systemic rot and raises serious questions about whether reform is possible under current leadership.

The Revenue Paradox: Punishing Miners to Generate Numbers

In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the MCO and Mines Inspectorate recorded N6.9 billion and N7 billion in revenue respectively, figures the Minister and MCO Director-General hailed as an “outstanding success.” However, this purported success masks a devastating reality for Nigerian miners and exposes the Ministry’s fundamental misunderstanding of how mining investment works.

The dramatic fee increases that generated these revenue figures have created an unprecedented crisis for local mining operators. The national president of the Miners Association of Nigeria (MAN) highlighted that access to finance remains “the number one challenge facing artisanal and small-scale miners,” describing mining as “a capital-intensive and high-risk sector” where “without targeted funding, our local operators cannot survive, let alone thrive.”

Local miners have made clear that after paying the inflated MCO fees, they lack sufficient capital to actually conduct mining operations, forcing them to seek external financing for what should be operational capital. This is particularly devastating in Nigeria’s context, where the mining sector has not yet developed the mature capital markets seen in countries like Canada and Australia, where exploration is financed through regulated stock exchange listings that distribute risk among investors.

In mature mining economies, companies raise capital through public markets, allowing investors to bear exploration risk in exchange for potential returns. Nigeria’s mining sector has not reached this stage of development. Individual miners must find private capital to explore, make discoveries, and prove such discoveries are the basis for commercial mining operations. The exorbitant fees introduced by the Ministry make this already difficult task nearly impossible.

The Mass Revocation Crisis: Creating Illegality by Design

The result has been an unprecedented wave of title revocations as miners default on inflated fees they simply cannot afford. This mass revocation is not merely an administrative matter, it is forcing Nigerian miners to operate illegally, creating the very conditions for insecurity that the government claims to want to prevent.

When legitimate operators are pushed into illegality by impossible regulatory demands, they join the shadow economy alongside criminal networks. The distinction between forced illegality and criminal enterprise becomes blurred, creating lawless zones where neither regulatory authority nor community accountability operates. The natural resources that belong to all Nigerians are thus exploited and sold by illegal operators who pay no royalties to the federal government, enter into no community development agreements, and provide no fair compensation to landowners.

The Ministry has promoted a “use it or lose it” policy regarding mining titles, presenting it as a reform that will open opportunities for new operators. However, this ignores fundamental mining economics. In mature mining economies like Canada and Australia, the average period from discovery to mine development is eighteen years. This timeline reflects the realities of exploration, feasibility studies, environmental assessments, permitting, financing arrangements, and infrastructure development.

An environment where revocation has become routine due to unpayable fees is not an incentive for development, it is a powerful deterrent to international mining investment. Legitimate mining companies operate on decade-long timelines with hundreds of millions of dollars at stake. They cannot invest such capital in jurisdictions where titles can be arbitrarily revoked or where regulatory demands are economically impossible to meet.

The Stark Reality: A Sector in Decline, Not Growth

The statistics tell a story that contradicts the Ministry’s triumphalist rhetoric. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria’s solid minerals, mining, and quarrying sector’s contribution to GDP declined by 21 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, this despite “various reforms and policy changes aimed at revitalising the sector under the current administration.”

In 2021, the mining industry contributed a mere 0.33% of Nigeria’s GDP. The sector generated N193.59 billion in revenue that year, representing less than 1% of national GDP, only 2.62% of total revenue, and a negligible 0.24% of total exports. Over fifteen years, the sector has generated only N814.6 billion in revenue total, indicating it is far from being a major revenue earner.

These figures expose the hollowness of the Ministry’s claims of success. When your sector is shrinking rather than growing, when your contribution to GDP is declining rather than increasing, and when international investors are fleeing rather than arriving, declaring high fee collection as an “outstanding success” reveals either profound delusion or deliberate deception.

International Investor Confidence: From Bad to Worse

International investor confidence in Nigeria’s mining sector is at an all-time low, despite ministerial rhetoric to the contrary. Minister Alake has claimed that UK, US, Saudi Arabia, and UAE officials have expressed interest in Nigeria’s lithium and other critical minerals. However, industry insiders describe this as an “improbable interpretation of the real situation.”

The reality is starkly different: the US, Canada, and Australia, all major international mining economies with mature industries, have effectively put investment in Nigeria’s mining sector on hold. The UK, France, and Germany, which require stable long-term supplies of critical minerals for their green energy transitions, are engaged only in tentative discussions with no concrete progress to date.

Nigeria’s absence from the 2025 Africa Down Under conference in Australia is particularly telling. The conference serves as a major platform for African mining investment promotion and would typically feature significant Nigerian participation given the country’s mineral wealth and need for foreign investment. Speculation has linked this absence to concerns about international arbitration proceedings, including those involving Jupiter Critical Minerals Project over a billion-dollar lithium project.

The lack of security of title, the fundamental requirement for mining investment, undermines any possibility of attracting investment from major international mining companies. When legitimate investors face license cancellations, overlapping claims, or other bureaucratic obstacles, they may seek recourse through international arbitration. Nigeria could face multiple such cases, potentially costing the nation far more than any revenue generated by inflated fees.

The Environmental and Social Costs

Beyond financial dysfunction, the Ministry’s policies have enabled environmental destruction on a massive scale. Chinese mining companies operating in Nigeria have been accused of deploying outdated and environmentally destructive technologies that would be banned in their home country. The absence of rigorous environmental oversight has resulted in ecosystem damage, soil degradation, and health problems for communities near mining operations.

Local residents in mining-affected areas report contaminated water sources, destroyed agricultural lands, and respiratory illnesses linked to mining dust and chemical runoff. The failure to enforce environmental standards or revoke licenses from violating operators suggests either incompetence or deliberate complicity in the destruction.

This environmental crisis is compounded by the illegal mining operations that flourish as legitimate miners are forced underground by impossible fee structures. These illegal operators have even less incentive to follow environmental protocols. The irony is stark: while the Ministry claims to be formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining as part of its seven-point agenda, its policies are actually driving miners underground, creating more environmental damage and less regulatory oversight than before.

Meanwhile, foreign companies with ready access to capital and connections operate with impunity, extracting Nigeria’s resources while leaving behind environmental devastation and providing minimal benefit to local communities who bear the costs of contaminated ecosystems. The growing investment by Chinese players in downstream minerals processing, rather than in exploration and development of new mines, creates ready markets for illegally extracted minerals, establishing a parallel economy that benefits foreign processors while Nigerian communities and the national treasury receive nothing.

The Question of Competence vs. Intent

The pattern of policy failures raises a fundamental question: Is the Ministry incompetent or corrupt? Does it genuinely not understand how international mining investment works, or does it deliberately implement policies that serve interests other than national development?

The 50% GDP target suggests profound ignorance of mining economics. The fee structure that bankrupts local miners while generating impressive revenue numbers suggests a focus on short-term financial extraction rather than long-term sector development. The failure to acknowledge or address institutional corruption at the MCO suggests either wilful blindness or complicity. The corruption of new initiatives like the Mines Marshalls suggests that reform is impossible under current leadership because even new institutions are captured before they can function.

Whether through incompetence or intent, the result is the same: a mining sector in accelerating decline, local miners driven into bankruptcy or illegality, international investors fleeing, environmental destruction proceeding unchecked, and billions in potential revenue lost to corruption and dysfunction.

The Cost Question: At What Price “Transformation”?

Minister Alake is determined to transform the sector, but at what cost? At what cost to local miners forced into bankruptcy or illegality? At what cost to communities suffering environmental destruction? At what cost to national security when regulatory failure breeds insecurity and empowers criminal networks? At what cost to Nigeria’s international reputation when legitimate investors flee and arbitration cases loom?

The question “at what cost?” reverberates through every aspect of the current situation. The Minister’s determination has produced impressive revenue numbers but a sector in decline. It has produced bold targets but collapsing investor confidence. It has produced new institutions that are corrupted before they function and new policies that punish compliance while rewarding corruption.

Conclusion: When Ambition Becomes Delusion

Nigeria possesses significant mineral wealth that could drive economic development, create jobs, and reduce dependence on oil revenues. Realizing this potential requires realistic targets grounded in international mining economics, policies that enable rather than punish local investment, genuine security of title, environmental enforcement, and above all, addressing the institutional corruption that makes Nigeria’s mining sector toxic to legitimate investors.

Minister Alake’s 50% GDP target is not ambitious, it is delusional. His seven-point agenda does not address root causes. His revenue numbers mask the destruction of local mining operations. His reforms are corrupted before implementation. His rhetoric about international interest contradicts the reality of fleeing investors.

The Minister’s stated priorities reveal a profound disconnect from reality. Insufficient geological data, weak infrastructure, and informal operations are genuine challenges, but they pale in comparison to the fundamental problem the Ministry refuses to name: institutional corruption so deep and systematic that it has made Nigeria’s mining sector a cautionary tale rather than an investment destination.

Without a fundamental shift in approach, including realistic targets, affordable fee structures, genuine security of title, environmental enforcement, and above all, confronting rather than obscuring institutional corruption, the mining sector will continue its decline. The 21% drop in GDP contribution in 2024 is not an anomaly; it is the predictable result of policies disconnected from economic reality and a leadership either unable or unwilling to address the fundamental obstacles to sector development.

The minerals will remain in the ground long after current officials have departed. The question is whether Nigeria will have developed the institutional capacity, regulatory credibility, and economic understanding necessary to extract them responsibly and profitably, or whether fantasy economics and corrupted reforms will continue to ensure that Nigeria’s mineral wealth benefits everyone except Nigerians.

This article is based on multiple investigative reports, stakeholder accounts, public documents, and industry data detailing policy failures in Nigeria’s Ministry of Solid Minerals Development. The issues documented represent patterns identified by journalists, industry participants, and civil society observers concerned about governance in Nigeria’s mining sector.

INVESTIGATION: How Federal Government’s Abandonment of Strategic Manchok-Vom Road Strangles Economic Lifeline and Fuels Insecurity

By Steven Kefas

The sun beats down mercilessly on dozens of stranded vehicles along what should be one of Nigeria’s most vital economic arteries. For hours, commercial drivers, traders, and farmers have been trapped in a quagmire of mud, broken asphalt, and bureaucratic neglect that defines the current state of the Manchok-Ganawuri-Vom federal road.

This 52-kilometre stretch, designated as a federal highway, serves as a critical economic lifeline connecting Plateau State with Kaduna and numerous neighboring states across Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. Yet today, it stands as a monument to governmental abandonment and institutional failure.

The communities dotting this strategic corridor are among Nigeria’s most productive agricultural zones. Farmers here cultivate vast quantities of yam, maize, rice, potatoes, and ginger – crops that feed millions across the country. However, the deplorable condition of their primary route to market has transformed what should be prosperity into a daily nightmare of economic losses and human suffering.

“We produce enough food to feed millions of Nigeria, but we cannot get our harvest to the people who need it,” laments Musa Ibrahim, a farmer from Ganawuri whose truck loaded with yams overturned last month, destroying produce worth over 3 million naira.

The economic implications extend far beyond individual losses. Trucks carrying goods such as bottled drinks, water etc worth millions of naira regularly topple over on the treacherous terrain, their cargo spilling into roadside ditches where it rots under the elements. The ripple effects reach urban markets in Jos, Kaduna, and Abuja, where food prices continue to soar partly due to transportation challenges from these productive farming communities.

Perhaps the most insulting aspect of this crisis is the massive signpost erected by the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) boldly declaring that the Manchok to Vom Junction stretch has been “rehabilitated.” This gigantic billboard stands as a cruel joke to daily road users who navigate crater-sized potholes and impassable mud pools.

All efforts to reach FERMA for comments on the road’s condition and their maintenance claims proved unsuccessful. Multiple phone calls to the two contact numbers listed on the agency’s official website went unanswered, while a text message sent seeking their response was never replied to.

A closer examination reveals the truth behind FERMA’s claims. While minor patch work was indeed carried out on sections with small potholes, the Ganawuri portion – the most critical and severely damaged section – remains completely untouched. It is a classic case of cosmetic intervention designed more for political optics than genuine infrastructure development.

The agency’s selective rehabilitation approach has created an even more dangerous situation. Drivers, encouraged by the initial smooth patches, accelerate into what becomes a vehicular trap at Ganawuri, where the road deteriorates so dramatically that vehicles frequently get stuck for entire days.

The federal government’s neglect has created an unprecedented situation where local youths have essentially privatized a federal highway. Young men from Ganawuri now control access to the most treacherous sections, strategically placing rocks across deep craters and charging motorists 500 naira for the privilege of attempting passage.

During this reporter’s investigation on Wednesday, August 27, the situation had reached absurd proportions. After paying 1,000 naira through mobile transfer for road access, this correspondent joined dozens of other vehicles in a hours-long traffic standstill that stretched for about 1 kilometre.

The scene resembled a refugee camp more than a major highway. Frustrated passengers had disembarked, seeking shade that did not exist on the road. Hawkers moved through the stationary traffic selling water, sugarcane, and snacks to stranded travelers. Mothers with crying babies pleaded with drivers to somehow find alternative routes that simply do not exist.

The agricultural community has been forced to adapt in ways that highlight the severity of the situation. Farmers who once loaded their produce onto trucks for efficient transport to distant markets now depend entirely on motorcycles for their logistics chain.

“I used to send bags of potatoes to Kaduna and Abuja markets in one trip,” explains Rebecca Dung, a potato farmer in the area. “Now I can only send two bags at a time on a motorcycle, and the transport cost has tripled. Many of us are considering abandoning farming altogether because we cannot transport our potatoes to the market and they go bad after a few days”

This shift from truck-based to motorcycle-based transportation has reduced agricultural efficiency by approximately 80 percent while increasing costs exponentially. The knock-on effects include reduced agricultural investment, lower crop cultivation, and ultimately, decreased food security for the broader region.

Commercial drivers operating along this route have become unwilling martyrs to federal government negligence. Michael Adamu, who has been plying this route for over a decade, provides a heartbreaking testimony of occupational hazard that no professional should endure.

“Any time I manage to pass this road with passengers during the rainy season like this, I have to go straight to the mechanic workshop,” Adamu reveals, his voice heavy with frustration. “We are suffering here as you can see, we have been here for several hours and don’t know when we will move. The government must do something about this road.”

His experience is not unique. Conversations with multiple commercial drivers reveal a pattern of vehicle damage, increased maintenance costs, and lost income that threatens their livelihoods. Some road users have developed back and joint problems from navigating the rough terrain, while others have abandoned the route entirely, reducing transportation options for rural communities.

The road’s deplorable condition has created a security vacuum that armed militants and criminals exploit with devastating consequences. Habu Lucky, a local vigilante member in Ganawuri, articulates a reality that government security strategists seem to have ignored completely.

“As you can see, the condition of this road also makes it difficult for security response. Even if there is a security challenge, how do you think security personnel can access the communities? Tell me,” he challenges, gesturing toward the impassable terrain.

His concerns proved tragically prophetic on December 22, 2024, when armed Fulani militants attacked Gidan Ado community in Ganawuri chiefdom, Riyom Local Government Area. Fourteen people, including a pregnant woman, were killed in an attack that security forces struggled to respond to effectively due to the impassable road conditions.

The incident illustrates how infrastructure neglect becomes a national security threat. When government forces cannot reach crisis zones quickly, local communities become sitting targets for criminal elements who understand the terrain’s strategic advantages.

The Manchok-Ganawuri-Vom road crisis demands immediate federal intervention that goes beyond the superficial patch work that has characterized previous efforts. What is required is comprehensive reconstruction that acknowledges this route’s strategic importance to Nigeria’s food security and regional economic integration.

The federal government must treat this highway with the urgency it deserves – as a critical piece of national infrastructure whose failure threatens the economic survival of entire communities and the food security of millions of Nigerians.

Until then, farmers will continue watching their harvests rot, drivers will keep visiting mechanics after every journey, and communities will remain vulnerable to security threats that thrive in the shadow of governmental neglect.

The question remains: How long will the federal government allow one of Nigeria’s most productive regions to remain economically strangulated by a road that should be connecting communities, not isolating them?

This investigation was conducted over multiple visits to the Manchok-Ganawuri-Vom corridor, with extensive interviews of affected stakeholders including farmers, commercial drivers, local leaders, and security personnel.

Colin Ikin’s Half-Billion Dollar Failure: A Cautionary Tale for Nigeria’s Mining Ambition

By Steven Kefas 

When Atlantic Mining CEO Colin Ikin walked into a high-profile meeting with the Kaduna State government in May 2025, promising a $300 million investment in the state’s solid minerals industry, officials likely saw dollar signs and job creation opportunities. This wasn’t Ikin’s first foray into Nigerian mining opportunities—in June 2024, he had visited Nasarawa State, meeting with Commissioner of Environment and Natural Resources, Hon. Kwanta Yakubu, to discuss establishing what he described as a “multi-million dollar lithium processing company.” The Australian mining executive painted a picture of economic transformation, positioning his company as a catalyst for diversifying Nigeria’s economy beyond oil dependency. But beneath the polished presentation and impressive financial commitments lies a cautionary tale that should give Nigerian authorities pause—one that underscores the critical importance of thorough background checks before opening the nation’s mineral wealth to foreign investors.

Nigeria stands at a crossroads in its economic development. With abundant mineral resources including gold, tin, lithium, coal, limestone, and rare earth elements scattered across its 36 states, the country possesses the raw materials to become a mining powerhouse. The federal government’s aggressive push to diversify from oil revenues has created unprecedented opportunities in the solid minerals sector. However, this gold rush atmosphere has also attracted a mix of genuine investors and opportunistic operators, making due diligence not just advisable but essential for protecting national interests.

A Multi-State Mining Campaign

Ikin’s Nigerian mining ambitions extend beyond Kaduna State. His June 2024 visit to Nasarawa State reveals a calculated strategy to establish footholds across multiple Nigerian states rich in mineral resources. During his meeting with Commissioner Yakubu, Ikin positioned himself as the managing director of “Atlantic Mining Techniques Ltd,” describing his company as “a Nigerian mining company” focused on the state’s lithium deposits.

Commissioner Yakubu’s Facebook post captured the optimistic tone of the meeting: “I welcomed Mr. Colin Ikin, Managing Director of Atlantic Mining Techniques Ltd, to Nasarawa State. Mr. Ikin’s visit is in connection with the potential establishment of a multi-million dollar lithium processing company in the state. This aligns with the industrialization agenda of His Excellency, Engr. Abdullahi A. Sule, Executive Governor of Nasarawa State.”

Ikin’s own comments during the Nasarawa visit echo the grandiose promises that characterized his Preston Resources era. “So my name is Colin Ikin, I’m the managing director of Atlantic Mining Techniques in Abuja. We are a Nigerian mining company and are here in Nasarawa today to look at this well-administered state that is endowed with some fantastic riches. At the moment we are looking at Lithium outcrops, of which there are many. I think this is a very exciting opportunity for us and for Nasarawa state,” he declared.

The pattern is familiar: identify mineral-rich locations, often discovered or already held by others, meet with government officials, make expansive promises about investment and job creation, and position projects as transformative opportunities. What’s concerning is how closely this mirrors the promotional strategy that preceded the Preston Resources disaster.

A Pattern of Spectacular Failure

Colin Ikin’s mining career in Australia reads like a masterclass in how not to manage large-scale mining operations. As executive chairman of Preston Resources, Ikin presided over what financial columnist Trevor Sykes(has won eight national awards and written eight books in his illustrious 61 years of journalism) described as one of the worst corporate disasters in modern Australian mining history—a spectacular collapse that wiped out nearly $750 million in investor funds and left a trail of financial devastation.

The Preston Resources saga began in the late 1990s when the company, under Ikin’s leadership, owned the Marlborough lateritic nickel deposit in Queensland. With shares trading at $1.90 and a market capitalization of $80 million, Preston appeared positioned for growth. However, Ikin’s decision to acquire the Bulong nickel project from Resolute Resources for $319 million—money the company didn’t have—would prove catastrophic.

The acquisition itself was structured in a way that left shareholders with little choice. Preston committed to a $10 million break fee to Resolute if the deal was rejected, but the company only had $2 million in the bank at the time. Shareholders were effectively held hostage by their own board’s commitments. Ikin’s promotional materials painted Bulong as “an outstanding opportunity,” promising initial output of 9,000 tonnes of nickel annually and describing Preston as “poised to become a significant international nickel producer.”

The reality proved starkly different. The Bulong plant never met production forecasts, cash flow projections failed to materialize, and Preston found itself in default to lenders for more than a year. By 2000, the company had accumulated losses of $497 million, with liabilities exceeding assets by $430 million. The Bulong plant was written down by $224 million, exploration expenditures were completely written off, and shareholders were entirely wiped out.

Perhaps most telling was the aftermath: Preston’s board, including Ikin, proposed handing over 95% of Bulong to note holders in exchange for debt relief, leaving the company with assets worth just $787,000 against liabilities of $5 million. Investors who had paid $1.50 per share to support the Bulong purchase were, in Sykes’ memorable phrase, “financially disembowelled.”

From Collapse to Opportunity

The financial press reported that after Preston’s collapse, Ikin had “quickly fallen on his feet with a new overseas gold project and a fashionable address in the south of France.” This pattern—moving from one jurisdiction to another after corporate failure—raises red flags that Nigerian authorities should carefully consider. The fact that Ikin emerged from a half-billion-dollar corporate disaster to pursue new mining ventures overseas suggests either remarkable resilience or concerning opportunism.

Industry sources who spoke on condition of anonymity have raised troubling questions about Ikin’s current operations. “Colin Ikin’s record of failure in mining is well documented by authorities in Australia,” said one mining title holder familiar with his background. “His pattern is to make grand promises, raise capital, and then struggle to deliver on projections.”

More concerning are allegations from mining sector players who claim Ikin may have used improper means to gain access to Nigerian mining opportunities. While these remain unverified allegations, they highlight the need for robust vetting processes. “There are questions about whether he has the financial backing he claims,” noted another industry source. “Nigeria can’t afford to hand over mineral assets to operators who lack both the capital and competence to develop them properly.”

Nigeria’s Mining Imperative

Nigeria’s push to develop its mining sector represents more than economic diversification—it’s a strategic necessity. With oil revenues volatile and global energy transitions underway, the country needs alternative economic pillars. The solid minerals sector offers immense potential: Nigeria possesses 44 different types of minerals across 500 locations, with estimated reserves worth over $700 billion.

However, transforming this potential into reality requires partners with proven track records of successful project delivery. The mining industry is notoriously capital-intensive and technically complex, demanding expertise in geology, engineering, environmental management, and community relations. Failed mining projects don’t just waste investment capital—they can cause lasting environmental damage, displace communities, and poison relationships between government and investors.

The Kaduna and Nasarawa state governments’ enthusiasm for Ikin’s proposed investments is understandable. The promise of hundreds of millions in investment, lithium processing facilities, and job creation is attractive for states seeking economic development. However, the Preston Resources debacle demonstrates that ambitious promises from mining executives don’t always translate into operational success.

The Due Diligence Imperative

Nigerian authorities at federal and state levels must implement rigorous due diligence processes before approving major mining investments. This should include comprehensive background checks on company executives, verification of claimed financial resources, technical audits of proposed mining methods, and environmental impact assessments.

The Australian Securities Exchange and financial media provide extensive documentation of Preston Resources’ collapse, offering Nigerian authorities a clear picture of Ikin’s previous performance. Australian regulatory bodies and industry associations can provide additional insights into his reputation and capabilities. Such information is publicly available and should be mandatory reading for any Nigerian official considering mining partnerships.

Furthermore, Nigerian authorities should demand proof of funding before approving mining licenses. Letters of intent and preliminary agreements are insufficient—actual capital commitments from verified financial institutions should be required. The Preston Resources case shows how companies can leverage debt and equity markets to fund operations they cannot sustain, leaving investors and host communities to bear the costs when projects fail.

Building Mining Excellence

Nigeria’s mining sector development requires partners who bring not just capital but proven expertise in sustainable mining practices. The country needs investors who understand that successful mining projects require long-term commitment, community engagement, environmental stewardship, and technical excellence.

Countries like Ghana, Botswana, and South Africa have built successful mining industries by carefully selecting international partners and insisting on high operational standards. Nigeria can follow similar models, but only if it maintains rigorous standards for foreign investment approval.

The solid minerals sector represents Nigeria’s best opportunity to create an economy less dependent on oil revenues. However, this transformation requires careful stewardship of mineral resources and partnerships with operators who have demonstrated competence in managing large-scale mining operations.

The Path Forward

As Nigerian authorities evaluate Atlantic Mining’s proposals and other foreign mining investments, they must balance the urgent need for economic diversification against the imperative of protecting national resources. The Colin Ikin story serves as a powerful reminder that impressive presentations and ambitious financial commitments mean little without the track record and resources to deliver results.

Nigeria’s minerals belong to its people and future generations. Handing them over to operators with histories of corporate failure—regardless of their promotional skills or political connections—would represent a betrayal of the national trust. Due diligence isn’t just good governance; it’s essential for ensuring that Nigeria’s mining revolution creates lasting prosperity rather than expensive disappointment.

The choice facing Nigerian authorities is clear: rush into partnerships with questionable operators and risk repeating the Preston Resources disaster on Nigerian soil, or implement rigorous vetting processes that attract genuine investors capable of unlocking the country’s mineral wealth responsibly. The stakes are too high for anything less than excellence in partner selection.

The gold rush mentality that has gripped Nigeria’s mining sector must be tempered with wisdom learned from other countries’ experiences. Australia’s mining industry, despite its overall success, is littered with failed projects and collapsed companies. Nigeria can avoid similar pitfalls by learning from these failures and demanding higher standards from potential partners.

As Colin Ikin and Atlantic Mining await decisions from Nigerian authorities in Kaduna, Nasarawa, and potentially other states, the question isn’t whether Nigeria needs foreign investment in mining—it clearly does. The question is whether the country will settle for any investor willing to make promises, or insist on partners with the competence and resources to keep them. With Ikin’s multi-state campaign already underway, Nigeria’s economic future may well depend on getting this calculation right.

Steven Kefas is mining and mineral resources enthusiast and writes from Kaduna state

Transforming Kaduna’s Revenue Landscape: Comrade Jerry Adams’ Visionary Leadership at KADIRS

In the heart of Kaduna State, a quiet revolution is reshaping the financial future of the region, led by the dynamic and innovative Comrade Jerry Adams, Executive Chairman of the Kaduna State Internal Revenue Service (KADIRS). Since assuming the role of acting executive chairman in July 2023, this seasoned tax administrator has spearheaded groundbreaking initiatives that have redefined revenue administration in Nigeria’s northern region.

Record-Breaking Performance

Adams’ strategic foresight and commitment to transformative governance have propelled Kaduna’s Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) to unprecedented heights. Under his astute leadership, KADIRS has not only solidified its position as Northern Nigeria’s highest revenue-generating state but has also set new benchmarks for fiscal transparency and accountability, achieving N62.49 billion in 2023, N70 billion in 2024, and targeting an ambitious N112 billion for 2025.

Early indicators suggest this ambitious target is achievable, with January and February 2025 alone recording collections of N14.16 billion. His leadership is marked by a blend of technological innovation, financial inclusion, and a people-centric approach that has revitalized the state’s economy and restored public trust in KADIRS.

Innovation-Driven Solutions

Recognizing that major sources of revenue for the state have dried up, Adams has championed groundbreaking technological solutions. In May 2024, KADIRS launched two transformative platforms: Project CRAFT and the PayKaduna Portal.

Project CRAFT, which stands for Cross-Systems for Revenue Administration and Fiscal Transparency, marks the beginning of a new era in revenue generation and management for Kaduna State. The Central Data Repository (CDR) established under Project CRAFT ensures secure, state-owned management of taxpayer data, enabling informed decision-making and strategic planning.

The PayKaduna Portal allows residents and businesses to pay taxes remotely, fostering a seamless, transparent process that has significantly boosted voluntary tax compliance. The chairman emphasized that these initiatives represent not just technology but a transformative approach to governance, allowing the state to leverage advanced data analytics and automation to enhance revenue generation capacity, curb leakages, and improve service delivery.

Business-Friendly Policies and Economic Impact

Comrade Adams’ innovative horizontal expansion of the tax base, as opposed to increasing tax rates, has created a business-friendly environment that encourages economic growth. This strategy has attracted companies to invest in the state. A typical example is the $50 million Soya Bean Oil Refining Plant investment by Sunagrow International Oil Limited.

Governor Uba Sani’s administration, under Adams’ guidance, has embraced a “Tax for Service” motto, with visible projects in road construction, education, and rural transformation demonstrating the tangible impact of increased revenue. Adam’s enforcement of tax compliance, such as addressing Kaduna Electric’s N600 million tax liability, reflects his unwavering commitment to equitable taxation without burdening the poor.

Jerry Adams brings over 23 years of professional experience as a seasoned tax administrator, chartered accountant, business development expert, and marketer. His appointment as Executive Chairman built upon his previous role as Executive Director of Corporate Services, where he demonstrated exceptional competence in revenue administration.

Building Interstate Collaboration

Adams’ expertise has gained recognition beyond Kaduna’s borders. In July 2024, the Katsina State Internal Revenue Service delegation visited KADIRS for a peer review engagement, with Adams promising to share necessary information to propel the sister agency’s performance. He has also hosted delegations from organizations like the Danube Institute, fostering knowledge-sharing and regional collaboration.

His collaboration with the Code of Conduct Bureau in June 2025 underscores his dedication to ethical standards within KADIRS, positioning Kaduna as a leader in innovative tax administration. This demonstrates the national significance of Kaduna’s revenue transformation model.

Addressing Contemporary Challenges

The KADIRS chairman has been transparent about the fiscal realities facing Nigerian states. He acknowledged that traditional revenue sources have dried up, necessitating out-of-the-box innovations to identify revenue potential and block leakages. This honest assessment has informed the strategic pivot toward technology-driven solutions.

The PayKaduna Portal specifically addresses taxpayer convenience, providing seamless payment processes across the state. This digital approach reduces bureaucratic bottlenecks while ensuring transparency in revenue collection and management.

Strategic Vision and Future Outlook

Adams’ leadership philosophy centers on fiscal transparency and accountability. The Cross-Systems approach embedded in Project CRAFT creates interconnected revenue administration processes, minimizing human interference and potential corruption while maximizing collection efficiency.

His strategic focus on data analytics represents a paradigm shift from traditional tax administration methods. By leveraging technology, KADIRS can identify previously untapped revenue sources, track compliance patterns, and provide predictive insights for policy formulation.

Impact on Governance

The revenue transformation under Adams’ leadership has broader implications for Kaduna State’s development trajectory. Increased IGR provides the state government with greater fiscal autonomy and capacity to fund critical infrastructure and social programs without excessive dependence on federal allocations.

The initiatives leverage advanced data analytics and automation to enhance revenue collection, curb leakages, and improve service delivery, creating a multiplier effect that benefits citizens through improved public services.

Looking Ahead

As KADIRS pursues its ambitious N112 billion target for 2025, Adams’ leadership continues to emphasize sustainable revenue growth through innovation and stakeholder engagement. The success story of Kaduna’s revenue transformation offers valuable lessons for other states seeking to optimize their internally generated revenue.

Under Comrade Jerry Adams’ stewardship, KADIRS has evolved from a conventional tax collection agency into a modern, technology-driven revenue administration system. This transformation positions Kaduna State as a model for fiscal innovation in Nigeria’s evolving economic landscape, demonstrating that strategic leadership and technological adoption can overcome traditional revenue challenges.

The journey ahead promises continued innovation as Adams and his team work toward making Kaduna a reference point for efficient, transparent, and citizen-friendly revenue administration across Nigeria.

Powder Keg in the Creeks: Niger Delta Militants Threaten Nigeria’s Economic Lifeline

By Steven Kefas

(PortHarcourt), Nigeria’s fragile economic recovery faces a new threat as militants in the oil-rich Rivers State issue ultimatums that could destabilize the nation’s primary revenue source amid a complex political crisis.

A chilling video emerged Thursday showing armed militants from the Niger Delta Rescue Movement (NDRM) threatening to attack oil installations in Rivers State, one of Nigeria’s largest oil producers. The militants, brandishing AK-47 rifles and other dangerous weapons from an undisclosed forest location, issued warnings that could potentially cripple Nigeria’s oil production and further destabilize an economy already on life support.

The group’s emergence comes in response to a political crisis that has seen the federal government withhold Rivers State’s allocation following a Supreme Court judgment that upheld the Martin Amaewhile-led 27-member House of Assembly as the legitimate legislative body. The Assembly subsequently issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Governor Siminalayi Fubara to present the 2025 state budget, which expired Wednesday night.

In the video lasting just over three minutes, a spokesman for the militants declared, “If the federal allocation due to Rivers state cannot be released promptly, we will have no choice but to take decisive action, including hitting oil production.” The militants also ominously advised non-indigenes to leave Rivers State for their safety, chanting “asawana, asawana” – a traditional war cry among the Ijaw people.

Economic Implications

For an economy struggling to find its footing, the timing couldn’t be worse. Nigeria’s recent modest economic gains have hinged largely on improved oil production after years of decline due to theft, vandalism, and underinvestment.

Dr. Adebayo Adegbine, a Lagos based Economist, warns that any disruption to oil production in Rivers State would deliver a devastating blow to Nigeria’s economy.

“The federal government has only recently begun to see slight improvements in oil output, which remains the backbone of our export earnings and government revenue,” Adebayo told TruthNigeria. “If militants carry through with their threats and successfully target key oil infrastructure, we could see production drop by as much as 300,000-400,000 barrels per day or even more. The ripple effects would be catastrophic – from exchange rate instability to budget deficits and delayed salary payments across multiple states.”

The threat evokes painful memories of the 2003-2009 insurgency, when militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) reduced Nigeria’s oil production by more than 50 percent through a coordinated campaign of pipeline bombings, facility attacks, and kidnappings of oil workers. At its peak, the violence slashed production from 2.2 million barrels per day to barely 1 million, costing the nation an estimated $100 billion in lost revenue in 10 years. The petroleum industry’s vulnerability was exposed as multinational companies declared force majeure and evacuated non-essential staff, while insurance premiums for operations in the region skyrocketed. It wasn’t until the 2009 amnesty program offered militants training, stipends and reintegration opportunities that relative stability returned to the region. “We’ve been here before,” notes energy consultant Ebi Johnson to TruthNigeria. “And the economic recovery took years, even with higher global oil prices than we have today.”

Nigeria’s economy has barely emerged from a period of hyperinflation, with the naira stabilizing slightly after months of freefall. The Central Bank has been working to rebuild foreign reserves, largely dependent on oil export earnings.

“We’re looking at a potential economic catastrophe if oil installations are attacked,” explains financial analyst Chika Okonkwo to TruthNigeria. “With government borrowing already at unsustainable levels and debt servicing consuming nearly 97% of revenue, any significant drop in oil output would likely trigger another currency crisis and inflation spike that could push millions more Nigerians into poverty.”

Why Americans Should Care

The brewing crisis has implications well beyond Nigeria’s borders, particularly for American consumers and businesses. As one of the largest oil suppliers to the United States, Nigeria’s production disruptions directly impacts global energy markets and prices at American pumps. Rivers state produces 344,000 barrels of crude per day.

Security Overstretched

The threat of renewed militancy in the Niger Delta represents more than just an economic challenge – it poses a serious security dilemma for a military already stretched across multiple conflict zones.

Dr Walid Abdullahi, a security consultant, describes the situation as potentially unmanageable.

“The Nigerian military is already fighting on at least four fronts – against Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Northeast, containing Lakurawa terrorists in the Northwest, managing deadly farmer-herder conflicts in the North Central states, and addressing banditry across multiple regions,” Abdullahi explained to TruthNigeria. “Opening another active theater in the Niger Delta would severely strain our operational capacity and effectiveness.”

The complexity of Niger Delta operations presents unique challenges. The region’s network of creeks, swamps, and waterways requires specialized training and equipment, including naval assets that are already in short supply.

“The terrain in the Niger Delta is notoriously difficult for conventional military operations,” notes Dr. Abdullahi “Previous militant campaigns demonstrated how relatively small groups could effectively evade security forces while targeting critical infrastructure. The military simply doesn’t have the resources or specialized units needed to secure thousands of kilometers of pipelines and oil facilities while maintaining operations in other conflict zones.”

Political Dimensions

The crisis is deeply rooted in the political standoff between incumbent Governor, Similaye Fubara and his predecessor Nyesom Wike, now Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. The militants explicitly mentioned Wike in their statement, accusing him of orchestrating the crisis to undermine Fubara’s administration.

“We call on President Bola Tinubu to intervene immediately and put a stop to the action of the Minister, Nyesom Wike, and his associates whose intent is to drag Rivers state to avoidable crisis,” the group stated.

Political analysts suggest the federal government faces a precarious balancing act. “Heavy-handed intervention could further inflame tensions, while inaction might allow the situation to deteriorate beyond control.” Says Michael Udeme, Uyo-based political scientist to TruthNigeria

Path Forward

Security experts emphasize that only a political solution can prevent potential catastrophe.

“Military action alone cannot resolve this situation,” warns Udeme. “The federal government must immediately convene all stakeholders – including Fubara, Wike, community leaders, and civil society – to address the legitimate grievances while isolating those seeking to exploit the situation for violence.”

For ordinary Nigerians already struggling with economic hardship, the prospect of disrupted oil production represents yet another threat to their livelihoods and stability.

As Rivers State residents anxiously await developments, the nation holds its breath, hoping that cooler heads will prevail before the powder keg in the Niger Delta ignites a crisis Nigeria can ill afford.