Who Is Behind the Violence in Northern Nigeria?

By Steven Kefas

Nigeria is often portrayed in international headlines as simply “unstable,” a sweeping, unhelpful label that conceals a far more complex and geographically specific crisis. For those seeking to understand the country’s security situation, the details matter enormously. Over the past ten years, I have conducted extensive field research across Nigeria with a particular focus on the north, carrying out on-the-ground interviews with victim communities, local leaders, survivors, and witnesses. What I found challenges vague narratives and points to identifiable actors perpetrating the majority of violence in two critical regions: the Northwest and the North Central.

Systematic data gathered by the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) consistently records a significant proportion of Christian victims even in predominantly Muslim northwestern states, evidence that the violence carries a dimension that purely ethnic or economic explanations cannot fully account for. This piece argues that the crisis is best understood as ethno-religious in character: rooted in ethnic identity, but inflected with religious targeting that demands honest acknowledgment.

The Northwest: Bandits, or Something More?

In Nigeria’s Northwest comprising states such as Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Kaduna, the dominant perpetrators of mass violence are armed groups widely referred to as “bandits.” This label, while useful as shorthand, does not fully capture the sophistication, the ethnic profile, or the religious dimensions of these actors.

After conducting field interviews across victim communities in this zone over ten years, my research found that at least 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani origin. This finding is broadly consistent with what credible international and Nigerian bodies have documented. Approximately 30,000 Fulani bandits operate in several groups in northwest Nigeria, with individual groups consisting of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 members. These are not loosely organized mobs. They are structured armed networks that have carved out territories, imposed illegal taxation on farming communities, and responded to resistance with lethal force.

This ethnic and religious identification of the bandits was confirmed publicly by one of Nigeria’s most senior political figures. In September 2021, then-Katsina State Governor Aminu Bello Masari, himself a Fulani man made an extraordinary admission on Channels Television’s “Politics Today” programme, stating that the bandits were “the same people like me, who speak the same language like me, who profess the same religious beliefs like me.” He added that “majority of those involved in this banditry are Fulanis, whether it is palatable or not, but that is the truth,” and noted that some fighters had infiltrated from West and North African countries, all of Fulani extraction. His candid acknowledgment effectively confirmed from within Nigeria’s political establishment what field researchers and affected communities had long documented.

What makes these groups particularly alarming is the level of weaponry in their possession. Bandit gangs notably downed a Nigerian Air Force Alpha Jet on 18 July 2021, a stunning demonstration of anti-aircraft capabilities. This is not the profile of ordinary criminals; it is the profile of an insurgent-level armed group[i].

The Religious Dimension in the Northwest

Framing the northwest violence purely as criminality or ethnic predation risks missing an important layer. ORFA data document a disproportionately high number of Christians among the dead in northwestern states, including Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kebbi states where Christians are a demographic minority. The targeting pattern is not random. Churches have been burned, Christian farming communities repeatedly selected for raids, and witnesses across multiple communities have reported attackers chanting Allahu Akbar during assaults. This does not make every attack a formally declared religious war, but it does mean that religion functions as a marker of who is targeted and who is spared in many attacks in the region.

The historical memory of the Usman Dan Fodio jihad of the early nineteenth century, which transformed the religious and political landscape of what is now northern Nigeria remains a live current in the identity of sections of the Fulani community. This does not reduce every Fulani herder to a jihadist. But it means the violence should be understood as ethno-religious in character: ethnicity and religion are intertwined as both motivation and method. The term “ethno-religious warfare” captures this more accurately than either “religious warfare” (as practised by Boko Haram and ISWAP) or plain criminality. Minority Christian communities in the Muslim northwest have come under attacks in a manner that suggests they are being targeted. For example, in Faskari LGA of Katsina state, the ORF four-year report shows a significant number of Christians killed. Considering the small population of Christians in the LGA, there is no better explanation to the number killed than being targeted.

Furthermore, the convergence between bandit groups and declared jihadist networks adds an additional dimension to an already dangerous situation. ISWAP and Boko Haram factions  including Ansaru, Mahmuda, and Lakurawa  have claimed attacks in northwest Nigeria, and some bandit groups have reportedly forged alliances with these jihadist organisations.

The economic impact has been devastating regardless of motive. Armed Fulani militant networks have inflicted catastrophic damage on Nigeria’s economy and governance, with deliberate destruction of farms and grain stores triggering soaring food prices and nationwide food insecurity, and millions displaced since the crisis began.

The Middle Belt: Armed Herdsmen and Ethno-Religious Targeting

In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, covering states such as Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Niger, and Kwara, the picture is similar in terms of perpetrator identity but different in framing. Here, the media refers to armed actors as “Armed Herdsmen” rather than bandits. My field research, spanning ten years of interviews in the Middle Belt, led me to the same conclusion as in the Northwest: over 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani descent.

Attacks on 23 to 24 December 2023 in Plateau State left at least 200 people dead and more than 500 injured across no fewer than 20 rural communities in Bokkos and Barkin Ladi Local Government Areas, were attributed to Fulani militants. Less than two years later, on 14 June 2025, at least 258 Christians were brutally murdered in Yelwata, Benue State, in an attack attributed to armed Fulani militia fighters.

These are not isolated incidents. They form part of a sustained and escalating pattern of violence against settled farming communities, communities that are overwhelmingly Christian, carried out with apparent impunity and, in documented accounts, accompanied by religious invocations.

The Nasarawa Connection

Field research and security reporting have established that some of the most lethal Fulani militant groups operating across the Middle Belt do not simply emerge from within the states they attack. Several armed groups have maintained known encampments in Nasarawa State, using these as staging posts for coordinated raids into Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and other Middle Belt states. This cross-state operational pattern, attackers arriving, killing, and retreating to camps across state line has frustrated local security responses and allowed militant networks to strike with impunity while remaining outside the effective jurisdiction of any single state authority. This is not a local herder dispute; it is a coordinated militant operation with identifiable logistics, known geography, and a command structure that must be addressed at both federal and state levels.

Religious Markers in Middle Belt Attacks

The ethno-religious character of the Middle Belt attacks is well-documented, and the evidence is substantial. Across multiple states and many years of field interviews, survivors and witnesses have consistently reported the following:

Burning of churches. The deliberate targeting and destruction of Christian places of worship has been documented in attacks across Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and Southern Kaduna. In numerous incidents, church buildings are primary targets, not incidental casualties of fighting.

Chants of Allahu Akbar. Multiple survivor testimonies, corroborated by field researchers and documented record attackers chanting “God is Greatest” in Arabic during raids on Christian communities. This is not consistent with violence that has no religious dimension.

Targeting of pastors and their families. Church leaders have been disproportionately killed or abducted in attacks across the Middle Belt. The deliberate elimination of religious leaders signals an intent that goes beyond land and grazing disputes.

These patterns do not mean that every armed Fulani herder is motivated primarily by religion, or that ecological pressures are irrelevant. But when attackers burn churches, announce their actions in religious terms, and single out pastors for killing, the violence has crossed into ethno-religious territory that demands a different analytical and policy response.

Governor Elrufai’s Admission

The identity of the perpetrators responsible for killings in Southern Kaduna was confirmed by the state’s own governor. In December 2016, then-Kaduna State Governor Nasir Elrufai made a public admission that he had identified the killers as Fulani, including foreign Fulani fighters from Cameroon, Niger Republic, Chad, Mali, and Senegal. Rather than pursuing legal accountability, Elrufai disclosed that his government sent emissaries across borders to appeal to these individuals to stop the killings, because he, as governor, was Fulani like them. He stated plainly that he sent people to tell them “there is a new governor who is Fulani like them and has no problem paying compensations for lives lost and he is begging them to stop killing.”

What the World Needs to Understand

The violence in northern Nigeria is not random or faceless. Field research consistently points to identifiable armed groups, predominantly of Fulani origin, operating with sophisticated weapons, organised command structures, cross-state logistics, and ethno-religious motivations that make the label “farmer-herder conflict” dangerously inadequate.

Framing this crisis as mere “ethnic conflict” or “farmer-herder clashes” serves several false purposes: it implies mutual fault between two equal parties, it erases the religious dimension of targeting, and it obscures the organised, predatory, and often one-sided nature of attacks on civilian communities. ORFA data demonstrate clearly that Christians bear a disproportionate share of the killing, not only in the Middle Belt, where this might seem demographically predictable, but in northwestern states where Christians are a distinct minority. That pattern is not an accident of geography; it is evidence of targeting.

For policymakers, aid organisations, and international observers, understanding who the perpetrators are and what drives them is not an exercise in blame. It is a prerequisite for crafting responses that can actually protect lives. The communities I interviewed are not statistics. They are people who have survived raids, buried their dead, seen their churches burned, and are still waiting for meaningful intervention.

This crisis demands a response commensurate with its actual character: ethno-religious violence, prosecuted by organised armed groups, with identifiable actors, documented methods, and a regional geography that crosses state and national borders.

Steven Kefas has conducted field research across northern Nigeria for over ten years. Data referenced from ORFA (Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa) is available at www.orfa.africa . For previous reporting on these communities, see the author’s coverage in www.middlebelttimes.com 

Kaduna’s Broken Compass: Why Zoning Must Travel Beyond Abuja

By Steven Kefas

There is a quiet hypocrisy at the heart of Nigerian democracy, one that the political class has mastered the art of ignoring. We speak grandly of federal character, of inclusion, of ensuring that no region feels permanently shut out of power. We build this principle into party constitutions, into presidential tickets, into the unwritten codes that govern who gets to lead. And yet, when the lens shifts from the national stage to the states, the principle dissolves. Nowhere is this contradiction more glaring than in Kaduna State.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Kaduna State has been governed almost exclusively by political figures from its predominantly Muslim north. This is not an accident of electoral mathematics. It is the product of deliberate choices made within the corridors of the Peoples Democratic Party and, later, the All Progressives Congress, choices that have consistently elevated northern Kaduna at the expense of the state’s Christian-majority south. In a state where the population is almost evenly divided between north and south, between Muslim and Christian, this pattern is not merely a political inconvenience. It is a wound that festers quietly beneath the surface of every election cycle.

The lone, luminous exception came not through the foresight of party leaders, but through the intervention of fate. When President Goodluck Jonathan appointed Governor Namadi Sambo as his Vice President in 2010, the governorship fell almost by accident to Sir Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa, a Christian from southern Kaduna who was then deputy governor to Sambo. Yakowa proved that the fears used to justify exclusion were unfounded. He governed with competence and dignity, won election in his own right in 2011, and built a coalition that crossed religious and regional lines. His victory was historic. The violence that greeted it in parts of the north was a sobering reminder of how deeply the politics of exclusion had poisoned the well.

Then, in December 2012, Yakowa perished in a helicopter crash. Power returned, as if by gravitational pull, to the northern part of the state. The brief window had closed. And in the decade-plus since, neither the PDP nor the APC has shown the political will to revisit what that window revealed: that Kaduna’s south is ready, capable, and deserving of a turn at the helm.

This context matters enormously as Nigeria’s political class turns its attention to the emerging Nigeria Democratic Congress. The NDC has already made a statement of intent by zoning its presidential candidacy to the south, with former Anambra Governor Peter Obi widely tipped as the consensus candidate. It is a credible, principled gesture, one that signals the party understands the logic of inclusion that has undergirded national politics since 1999. But a party that champions inclusion at the top while tolerating exclusion at the state level is not a party of principle. It is a party of convenience.

The question analysts are beginning to ask and that the NDC’s leadership must answer directly is whether the party’s commitment to fairness will cascade downward into the states. Will the NDC, as it builds its structures in Kaduna, demonstrate the courage that the PDP and APC have consistently lacked? Will it zone its governorship ticket to the south of the state, to a zone that has held the position for only a fleeting, grief-cut tenure in over twenty-five years of democracy?

The case for doing so is not merely sentimental. It is strategic. Southern Kaduna carries deep reservoirs of political grievance, grievances born not of imagination but of lived experience. Communities that have endured cycles of violence, displacement, and political marginalisation do not need more promises. They need the concrete, visible proof that democracy means something for them too. A party that offers that proof in Kaduna will not simply win votes. It will build loyalty of a different and more durable kind.

There are those who will argue that zoning is a blunt instrument, that merit should prevail over geography. It is a reasonable objection, and in a mature democracy with a level political field, it would carry great weight. But Nigeria’s political field is not level. It has been tilted, in state after state, by the accumulated weight of incumbent advantage, party gatekeeping, and the quiet veto of those who benefit from the status quo. In such conditions, zoning is not an abandonment of merit. It is the scaffolding that gives merit the chance to be seen.

Nigeria’s democracy turns twenty-seven this year. It has produced much to be proud of: peaceful transfers of power, a vibrant press, citizens increasingly willing to hold leaders accountable. But it has also produced stubborn patterns of exclusion that no amount of constitutional rhetoric has dislodged. If the NDC is to represent something genuinely new and not merely a reshuffling of old political elites under a fresh banner it must be willing to do in the states what it is doing at the centre.

Patrick Yakowa did not govern Kaduna as a southern Christian. He governed it as a Kaduna man, and the state was better for it. His story is both an argument and an invitation, an argument that inclusion works, and an invitation to every political party with the courage to take it seriously. The NDC now stands at that threshold. What it decides about Kaduna and about states like it across the federation will tell us whether it has truly read the lesson that Nigeria’s history has been trying, with such patience, to teach.

Beyond its own electoral fortunes, the NDC has an opportunity that few parties in Nigeria’s history have been handed: to become a model. The PDP governed for sixteen years and entrenched the very imbalances it once promised to dismantle especialli at state levels. The APC rode to power on the language of change and proceeded, in state after state, to replicate the exclusions it had condemned. If the NDC is serious about being different, let it demonstrate that seriousness not only in its presidential ticket but in every senatorial zone, and governorship race it contests. Let it be the party that other parties are embarrassed to ignore, the standard against which Nigerian voters begin to measure political seriousness. Equity and fairness should not be the NDC’s campaign slogan. They should be its operating system.

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Captivity by Creed: The Religious Sorting System Nobody Talks About

…Inside the two-tier captivity system of Fulani ethnic militias — where faith determines who suffers, how much a life is worth, and whether a hostage comes home at all.

By Steven Kefas

May 2026

The terrorists conveniently called bandits by the media had a rule. They stated it plainly, in the open, in front of their captives: Fulani people would not be taken. They were brothers. Christians and certain Muslims majorly non-Fulani were fair game. What happened next depended entirely on which category you fell into.

Sunday Cletus was abducted on 28 February 2026, while travelling through Kachia Local Government Area in Kaduna State. What he witnessed and endured over the days that followed was not random cruelty. It was, according to his account and the findings of extensive field research spanning multiple states and multiple years, a system, deliberate, consistent, and organised around two variables: religion and ethnicity.

The differential treatment of Muslim and Christian abductees by Fulani Ethnic Militias (FEM) in Northern Nigeria is among the most under-documented dimensions of a security crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands and left communities across Kaduna, Plateau, Kogi, and the wider Middle Belt and northwest regions in a state of sustained terror. While public attention has focused on the frequency and geography of attacks, which villages were raided, how many were killed, the testimony of survivors reveals that what happens after capture is equally telling, and equally horrifying.

‘They Are Our Brothers’

The classification begins at the point of abduction. Cletus reported that his captors were explicit: Fulani individuals were not to be targeted because of ethnic solidarity. The instruction was not whispered or implied. It was declared. In that moment of capture, a sorting mechanism was set in motion that would govern every subsequent hour of captivity.

This is not a single camp, a single commander, or a single incident. Field interviews conducted across multiple states over several years return the same account with remarkable consistency: from the moment of capture, Muslim abductees and Christian abductees enter different realities.

“For a Christian in Southern Kaduna, the danger of being kidnapped is compounded by the near certainty of harsher treatment, higher ransom demands, and a meaningfully greater risk of death, not because of anything they have done, but because of their faith.” Says a retired security personnel who spent 4 months in captivity in Southern Kaduna.

Inside the Two-Tier System

Survivor testimonies describe a captivity environment divided into two parallel experiences. Muslim abductees are, in the words of multiple survivors, treated with a degree of restraint. They are generally not subjected to the physical and sexual violence that Christian captives endure as a matter of routine. They receive adequate food. They are permitted relative freedom of movement within the camp. In documented cases, they have been allowed to observe religious obligations. The logic, as captors have articulated it in the presence of Muslim detainees, is one of communal solidarity, a fellow Muslim, however different in ethnicity or background, is assigned a different moral status.

For Christian captives, the experience is of another order entirely. Men are beaten systematically not as punishment for specific behaviour, but as a baseline condition of captivity. Women face the additional horror of sexual violence. Cletus described an environment in which abuse was pervasive, in which captives were entirely at their captors’ mercy, and in which psychological torment was deployed as deliberately as physical violence. Christian abductees are subjected to prolonged uncertainty, repeated threats of execution, and in documented cases, forced to witness violence against fellow captives as a mechanism of coercion and terror.

There are exceptions. Field research has documented cases in which non-Fulani Muslim abductees were also treated harshly, suggesting that ethnicity intersects with religion in complex ways. But the pattern holds across the breadth of the data: faith is the dominant variable.

The Price of Faith: Ransom Asymmetry

The differential does not end with conditions in captivity. It extends into the financial machinery of release. Across field interviews with survivors and families in the north central region and parts of the northwest, a consistent pattern emerges: Muslim abductees are released on comparatively lower ransoms, negotiations are shorter, and in several documented cases, Fulani community intermediaries with informal access to the armed groups have facilitated release with minimal negotiation.

For Christian families, the process is an ordeal of a different kind. Demands are higher. Timelines stretch for weeks. The threat of lethal consequences for delay or non-compliance is more frequently and more credibly invoked. Field interviews document cases in which families gathered and paid the full ransom demand, only to receive no release, followed by escalating demands. In some cases, Christian abductees were killed even after their families complied.

The death that Sunday Cletus described witnessing, a teenage boy executed because his family did not initiate negotiations quickly enough is not an aberration. It is an example of a broader operational logic in which a Christian life is assigned a lesser and more conditional value, one that can be cancelled at will.

A Religious Hierarchy of Human Worth

What emerges from years of field testimony is not a picture of chaotic, opportunistic violence. It is a picture of a system, one with internal rules, consistent practices, and an embedded hierarchy. Religion functions as a determinant of fate at every stage of the abduction experience: who gets taken, how they are treated in captivity, on what terms they may be released, and whether they survive.

This pattern is consistent across multiple states, multiple armed groups, and multiple years of survivor testimony. It is not incidental variation between individual captors. It is, as the evidence compels us to describe it, a religious hierarchy of human worth embedded in the operational logic of Fulani Ethnic Militias.

The implications reach beyond security analysis. The same sorting mechanism documented in community attacks where Muslim members of mixed villages are spared while their Christian neighbours are killed is replicated and deepened inside the captivity system itself. Faith does not merely determine who is attacked. It determines what they endure, how much their life is worth in negotiation, and whether they return.

The Reckoning

Sunday Cletus came home. Many do not. His testimony, set against the accumulated weight of survivor accounts gathered across the region over years, forces a confrontation with a dimension of Northern Nigeria’s security crisis that policy discussions have consistently failed to address with adequate seriousness.

The violence is not indiscriminate. The suffering is not evenly distributed. And the religious character of the crisis does not begin and end with the moment of attack. It permeates the entire machinery, the raid, the abduction, the camp, the negotiation, the release, or the execution. Until that reality is named plainly and confronted directly, the communities living under it will continue to bear its weight largely alone.

…Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over decade

Middle Belt Concern Issues Global SOS: Remove Nigeria’s NSA, Stop the Killings, or Face a Regional Catastrophe

By Steven Kefas

(Abuja, Nigeria), They came during Palm Sunday. They came during Easter. As Christian families gathered in prayer across Nigeria’s Middle Belt, armed men descended on their villages, burning homes, raping women, killing children, and driving entire communities into the bush. These were not random acts of chaos. They were calculated, coordinated, and chillingly timed.

Now, a coalition of more than eighty civil society organisations has decided that silence is no longer an option. On April 24, 2026, Middle Belt Concern launched an urgent international petition, calling on the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Parliament, and the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and other democratic nations to intervene in what it formally describes as an ongoing genocide against predominantly Christian farming communities in Nigeria’s heartland.

The ten-page petition titled Stop the Genocide in Nigeria’s Middle Belt & Avert a Looming Refugee Crisis in West Africa  is both a cry for help and a damning indictment of a government that, the coalition alleges, has watched, wavered, and in some cases, enabled the carnage.

The Middle Belt is no peripheral region. Stretching across states including Benue, Kaduna, and Nasarawa, it is home to over 50 million people, representing more than 400 indigenous ethnic nationalities. It is also Nigeria’s primary food-producing zone, the breadbasket of Africa’s most populous nation. For years, its farming communities have suffered relentless attacks by Islamist terrorist groups and armed Fulani militia. Villages reduced to ash. Harvests abandoned. Generations of indigenous life erased.

The numbers are staggering. Millions have been forcibly displaced. Entire communities that have farmed the same land for centuries now live as refugees within their own country, sheltering in camps or cramped urban fringes while strangers occupy their ancestral homelands.

And yet, according to Middle Belt Concern, the Nigerian government’s response has not been protection, it has been paralysis, at best, and complicity, at worst.

At the heart of the coalition’s fury is Nigeria’s Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the body that coordinates the country’s intelligence and security architecture. The coalition alleges that ONSA has presided over decades of catastrophic intelligence failures, selective law enforcement, and a disturbing pattern of preferential treatment toward the very perpetrators of these attacks.

Most alarming is the characterisation by the current National Security Adviser of violent terrorists as “brothers who want peace” , a description the coalition calls not only tone-deaf, but deeply revealing of bias at the highest levels of Nigeria’s security leadership. This is the same office, Middle Belt Concern notes, that has championed the country’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme — a policy that offers rehabilitation packages to so-called “repentant terrorists” while their victims remain landless, traumatised, and without justice.

The coalition is also raising urgent alarm about mining activities continuing in conflict zones where indigenous populations have been violently expelled. These operations, they argue, are not incidental to the violence, they are incentivising it. Terror, in this reading, has become a business model for land seizure, and the Nigerian state, through its inaction, is a silent partner.

The consequences of continued inaction, the coalition warns, will not be contained within Nigeria’s borders. As Africa’s largest country by population, Nigeria’s instability has a gravitational pull on the entire sub-region. A spiralling humanitarian catastrophe in the Middle Belt could trigger mass refugee flows into neighbouring West African states, nations that are already grappling with their own fragile security environments. What begins as a domestic failure of protection could rapidly metastasise into a regional crisis with global ramifications.

Middle Belt Concern is therefore demanding that the international community bring firm diplomatic, legal, and economic pressure to bear on Nigeria, not out of interference, but out of a moral obligation that the post-Holocaust promise of “never again” actually means something.

Their demands are clear: restructure Nigeria’s national security leadership, beginning with the immediate removal of the National Security Adviser; halt all mining in terror-affected regions; ensure the safe return of all displaced persons; deliver reparations to survivors; end the DDRR programme that rewards terrorists; and invite independent international press to document what is happening without reliance on government narratives.

The farms lie fallow. The churches stand burned. The survivors wait.

The world has been given the facts. The only question now is whether it will choose to act before the Middle Belt becomes yet another entry in history’s long, shameful catalogue of genocides the international community watched unfold in real time and did nothing to stop.

To read the full petition or add your voice, visit: https://bit.ly/NigeriaMBCPetition10Apr26

Easter Sunday Massacre, Army’s False Rescue Claims, and a Suspended Lawmaker: Civil Society Breaks Silence on Kaduna’s Descent into Terror

Five worshippers killed. Thirty-eight abducted from two churches. A military rescue claim the families say is a lie. And a lawmaker suspended for daring to speak the truth.

This is Ariko, Kachia Local Government Area, Kaduna State, on Easter Sunday, 2026.

On the morning of 5th April, heavily armed terrorists stormed Ariko Community in Awon Ward, attacking the First ECWA Church and the Catholic Church while congregants gathered for one of the most sacred observances on the Christian calendar. When the violence subsided, five people were dead and thirty-eight others had been dragged away into captivity.

What followed was, to many observers, almost as disturbing as the attack itself.

The Nigerian Army issued a widely circulated statement claiming to have rescued 31 of the abducted victims. But the families of those victims say it never happened. As of the time of this publication, all abducted persons remain in the hands of their captors. The Kuturmi Unity Development Association (KUDA), whose president Dr. J.D. Ariko signed a statement on 6th April, said plainly: “Contrary to the reports being circulated, all the abducted persons are still in captivity with their abductors. This clearly invalidates any claim of a successful rescue operation.” KUDA’s Publicity Secretary, Hon. Manasseh Samuel, co-signed the statement.

The families have confirmed they remain in direct contact with the abductors, who have themselves confirmed the victims are in their camps.

In a press statement released on 10th April, the Civil Society for Good Governance and Accountability, a coalition of over thirty human rights and community organisations, described the Army’s statement as propaganda, saying it revealed “unfortunate efforts at deception rather than a plausible effort at the rescue of the abducted.”

But for the civil society coalition, the Army’s false claims are not the whole story. They point to a recognisable pattern. On 18th January 2026, armed bandits abducted 177 worshippers from three churches in Kurmin Wali, Kajuru LGA. The Police and the Kajuru LGA Chairman initially denied the attack entirely. Public outrage eventually forced an acknowledgment. The coalition’s statement is blunt: “The playbook is unchanged: deny, deflect, discredit, then concede only when pressure becomes unbearable.”

The Ariko attack is also not the only active emergency in the region.

On 29th March 2026, Palm Sunday, terrorists killed 13 people in a night raid on Kahir, Aribi Ward, Kagarko LGA, and abducted 28 others. Ransoms of 200 million naira are being demanded. Those 28 remain in captivity. On 31st March, bandits abducted 11 people from Zunturum, also in Kachia LGA, and are demanding 150 million naira and 10 motorcycles for their release. In Maro Kasuwa, Easter Sunday also brought bloodshed: three people were killed and an unconfirmed number abducted.

Kachia LGA Chairman Dr. Manzo Daniel Maigari’s own admission compounds the scale of the crisis. He has acknowledged that 74 communities in Kachia have been deserted due to insecurity, a figure the coalition describes as “a clear indictment of both state and federal governments.”

Yet even as communities are hollowed out by violence, truth-tellers are being punished.

The Honourable Speaker of the Kachia LGA Legislative Council, Hon. Mark Bawa, gave a press interview published in The Punch on 5th April addressing the reality of the Ariko attack. Two days later, the Executive Chairman issued a directive suspending him indefinitely. The suspension letter alleged that the Speaker had “misrepresented the true position on ground” and had failed to attend a meeting with the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Army’s 1 Division “to clarify and possibly apologize.” The letter called his conduct “a deliberate attempt to sabotage the efforts of Government.”

The civil society coalition has rejected the suspension in unambiguous terms. “Suspending a lawmaker for speaking about a security incident that affects his own constituents makes him a double victim,” the statement reads. The signatories include legal practitioners, professors, community associations, and advocacy organisations drawn from across southern Kaduna and the Middle Belt.

Their demands are clear: the unconditional reinstatement of Hon. Mark Bawa; the immediate rescue or facilitated release of all abductees across Ariko, Zunturum, Kahir, and Maro Kasuwa; the return of displaced persons from 74 abandoned communities; and full activation of the government’s constitutional obligations under Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.

“These are not numbers,” the statement says. “They are mothers, fathers, children, and grandparents whose safe return must be the single most urgent priority of every security agency in Kaduna State.”

As of press time, not one of the hostages has been returned.

The Unfortunate Price of “Second-Term” Politics: Middle Belt Nigeria

By Zariy Yusuf

It does seem the primarily focus of some politicians has moved away from impactful governance – if at all they swore their oath of office with sincerity – to scheming how to remain in power, come 2027. Protection of lives and property must no longer be seen as strictly a Federal government responsibility; state governors and elected representatives must be held accountable as well.

Kaduna and Plateau states have seen a lot of bloodshed within these past days with a kind of response I can best describe as either weak or cowardly from the state governors. There is an energy that forces one to think that even the response of these “chief security officers” must be such that does not displease the centre.

Kaduna is notorious for suppression of the facts about the activities of these militant Islamists, who are more conveniently described as mere “bandits”, thanks to the immediate past governor, Nasir Elrufa’i.

The Adara nation has suffered untold raids from these extremists with little or no media or government attention. Mrs Haske Solomon was abducted in a raid in the early hours of March 17th, 2026 in addition to three others that were taken on the 10th of March, 2026. The terrorists are demanding a ransom of 20 million naira.

The recent massacres of Christians in these states (Kagarko in Kaduna and Unguwar Rukuba in Plateau) should be a call on the political leaders of these states and the entirety of the Middle Belt to focus on their primary assignment and not betray their people in the pursuit of their political ambition.

The visit of the president to the Plateau betrayed how much the leadership in the Middle Belt is lacking. At least, someone would have insisted the president stayed back in Abuja and make a call to the victims or proceed on his trip to Ogun, instead of dragging mourners to the airport to meet him. Something reminiscent to his visit to another Middle Beltan state, Benue, over the Yelewata massacre.

Simply put, the massive decamping of the politicians of the Middle Belt to the APC seems to have no bargain for their people other than the very hope of those politicians to clinch a second term or benefit their ambitions, as the case may be. At least in terms of the massacre of Middle Beltans, the mass decamping of the political leaders of the region to the ruling party has been of no consequence whatsoever.

It is my sincere belief that if the government has failed in protecting the lives of the peoples of the Middle Belt or eliminating these Islamists who kill with impunity and always get away freely, then it must allow for the people to arm and organize at community levels to protect what seems to be the only thing they have left – their lives and those of their loved ones.

Gov. Uba Sani of Kaduna must suspend all antics about and against the 2027 elections, account for the security of his state and immediately attend to Kagarko, where over 13 people were killed, 10 wounded and 28 abducted. Silence about the security mess Kaduna state is in does not change the reality on ground.

The report from Kagarko is heartbreaking:

Killed:

1. Douglas John

2. Ado Yakubu

3. Mai Kano Aribi

4. John Dan Asabe

5. Williams Luka

6. Bako Danjuma

7. Joseph Yakubu

8. Victor Peter

9. Peter Williams

10. Dogara Markus

11. Francis Amadu

12. Zephaniah Alhaji

13. Name yet to be known.

Wounded:

1. Micah Tanko.

2. Fidelis Awuh

3. Samson Alhaji

4. Habila Bulus

5. Colonius Dauda

6. Lina samaila

7. Bello Alkali

8. Felix Erick

9. Francis Tanko

10. Doctor Solomon

Kidnapped:

1. Tanko Makeri

2. Jummai Victor

3. Tanko Madaki

4. Beauty Marshal

5. Mariya Dominic

6. Awede Tanko

7. Patience Bitrus

8. Thadious Augustine

9. Salome Danladi

10. Ephraim Monday

11. Kande Monday

12. Lucky Monday

13. Lidiya Benjamin

14. Gambo Benjamin

15. Najirgi Yakubu

16. Danladi Kagarko

17. Daniel Shehu

18. Talatu Ibrahim

19. Dauda Markus

20. Peace Waziri

21. Tanko Waziri

22. Promise Waziri

23. Asami Dauda

24. Awuh Adams

25. Bulus Sunday

26. Chibi Emmanuel

27. Peace Luka

28. Name not yet known

Enough of the bloodshed!

Credit for list of victims: David Dokuma

Australian Mining Executive Referred to Australian Federal Police as Kaduna Communities Allege Bribery and Corruption

By Biliyaminu Suraj

Fresh allegations of coercion, political interference and foreign bribery have emerged around one of Nigeria’s most promising lithium deposits, after community leaders in Kaduna State referred an Australian mining executive to the Australian Federal Police  for investigation.

The case centres on Colin Ikin, an Australian national linked to a cluster of companies — Atlantic Mining Techniques, Mystic Mining and Kings Mines — that have been attempting to secure community consent to operate on tenements discovered and developed by UK-registered Jupiter Lithium Ltd in the Kaninkon Chiefdom of Jema’a Local Government Area.

Community leaders say Mr Ikin and his associates sought to pressure them into granting access to the mine-ready project, despite Jupiter Lithium’s long-standing presence and development work in the area.

Community alleges high-level assurances

According to letters sent to Nigerian and Australian authorities and reviewed by this newspaper, representatives of the so-called “Atlantic group” met the Paramount Ruler in December 2025. The delegation, introduced through a village chief, allegedly told the ruler that they had the backing of  high level Nigerian government officials that Jupiter’s titles would be revoked or “cut into pieces” to allow new entrants – an assertion that, if verified, would raise serious concerns about political interference in the allocation of mining rights in a sector the government has repeatedly described as central to Nigeria’s economic future.

Community leaders say they rejected the overtures, citing Jupiter Lithium’s seven-year record of community development, local employment and a formal Community Development Agreement (CDA). “We refused to give consent to any of Mr Ikin’s companies,” the community wrote in one of several letters to the minister and the DG-NMCO.

A controversial figure resurfaces in Nigeria

Mr Ikin is a familiar figure in Australian mining circles. As head of the former ASX-listed Preston Resources, he presided over the Bulong laterite nickel project near Kalgoorlie — one of Western Australia’s most notorious mining failures. The project collapsed with estimated debts of about A$600 million and accumulated losses of roughly A$750 million.

Nigerian media have previously reported concerns about his activities in other African countries. Individuals familiar with the matter say Mr Ikin is employed by businessman Gilbert Chagoury, and that the companies involved in the Kaduna push are administered by associates linked to the Chagoury network.

Escalation to the Australian government

After receiving no response to multiple letters sent to Nigeria’s Minister of Solid Minerals and the DG-NMCO, the Kaninkon community escalated the matter to the Australian High Commission in Abuja, alleging that Mr Ikin’s conduct amounted to foreign bribery and corruption under Australian law.

When their first two letters went unanswered, the community wrote directly to Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. In January 2026, the Australian High Commissioner advised that allegations involving an Australian citizen should be referred to the Australian Federal Police, which has jurisdiction to investigate foreign bribery and grand corruption offences involving Australian nationals. The community subsequently submitted a formal referral to the AFP’s Taskforce Solaris in Canberra.

The AFP does not comment on ongoing assessments, but any inquiry would likely examine the alleged political assurances Mr Ikin is said to have cited, as well as the corporate structures behind Atlantic Mining Techniques and related entities.

A test for Nigeria’s mining reforms

The dispute comes at a sensitive moment for Nigeria’s mining sector, which the Tinubu administration has positioned as a cornerstone of its economic diversification agenda. Investors say the allegations highlight persistent weaknesses in licensing transparency, political interference and institutional oversight.

Jupiter Lithium Ltd, which has had several of its mining lease titles revoked, has been unable to commence mining on its remaining tenements despite completing exploration and development work. The company said the credibility of Nigeria’s mining reforms depends on adherence to due process. “Transparency and the rule of law must prevail,” a representative said.

For the Kaninkon community, the stakes are immediate. “We have worked with Jupiter for seven years,” a community leader said. “We cannot allow people to come with political backing to take what is ours.”

Whether the Australian Federal Police opens a full investigation may determine how far the allegations reverberate — in Abuja, in Canberra, and across a global critical minerals market increasingly shaped by governance risks.

China’s Increasing Control of Africa’s Mineral Resources

By Biliyaminu Suraj

biliyasuraj247@yahoo.com

Nigeria’s Minister for Mines prides himself on his recent re-election as Chairman of the newly formed Africa Minerals Strategy Group, established by African Ministers of Minerals and Mining to foster cooperation among African nations in the development of critical minerals. Minister Alake is a former journalist and close friend of President Tinubu. During Tinubu’s two terms as Governor of Lagos State it was Alake who managed Tinubu’s media as the Governor’s Commissioner for Information and Strategy.

It is this African Minerals Strategy Group that is leading the push for the introduction of the Madini Protocol, a blockchain platform which will be the Trojan Horse for Chinese control of the African minerals sector.

Since becoming Minister for Sold Minerals Development Alake’s primary focus has been on securing large-scale investments and fostering partnerships for local mineral processing. This has led to the development of several lithium processing plants in Nigeria, primarily backed by Chinese investment. Major Chinese companies such as Canmax Technology, Jiuling Lithium, Avatar New Energy, and Asba have announced investment in lithium processing facilities in Nigeria.

Since late 2025, Canmax has aggressively secured lithium ore to feed its expanding processing faciliies. Canmax Technologies is primarily owned and controlled by its founder and chairman, Mr Pei Zhenhua, alongside his wife, Rong Jianfen. Alake claims Canmax is investing US$200M to develop lithium mining operations in Nigeria, in line with Chinese aggressive moves to control African mineral resources and infrastructure such as ports and railways necessary to exploit the mineral reserves.

Chinese megafirm CATL announced plans to increase its stake in Canmax’s lithium subsidiaries. CATL holds approximately 40 percent of the global EV battery market and almost 70 percent of the NCM (Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese) battery market in China. China as a whole processes approximately 65 percent to 80 percent of the world’s lithium. As the dominant player in China, CATL effectively directs a majority of the lithium hydroxide refined within the country toward its own Gigafactories.

Minister Alake has become a frequent and strong advocate for China’s involvement in Nigeria’s minerals and infrastructure development which has been a hallmark of his many trips to China.

As Chairman of the Africa Minerals Strategy Group, Minister Alake has introduced the Madini Protocol, a Chinese backed blockchain-based platform for trading and digital financing. This hi-tech system is not only designed for tracking minerals from extraction to market but also tracking every person involved in the supply chain including local villagers who may be employed at the mine. The system converts unmined mineral reserves into tradable digital tokens.

In other central Asian countries China state-controlled tech companies are rolling out platforms that turn natural resources including water into digital tokens tradable on blockchain-based platforms and for digital financing. The Chinese companies rolling out deals with governments say there is no limit to what they can tokenize and make tradable on their platforms.

The Madini Protocol, made possible through a collaboration between David Chen (Founder of BLCP Capital, now Chairman of GTIF) and Chris Wong (CEO of LifeSite). LifeSite Inc., is fronted as the technology company behind the TokenX platform and the Madini Protocol. The background of Wong’s co-founders in this hi-tech digital software is interesting. Crystal Lee, a co-founder of LifeSite, was Miss California 2013 and runner-up in the Miss America 2014 pageant. YoonJin Chang, also a co-founder of LifeSite was a former Miss Korea runner-up in 2010.

Wong’s long term business associate is David Chen who founded and led Deloitte’s Chinese Services Group in Mexico. Chen’s experience is primarily with food, health, entertainment and real estate industries before moving into global esports and entertainment through FaZe Clan which achieved a valuation of $725 million via a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) merger in 2022 only to plunge to a 2026 estimate of $13 million.

Wong and Chen’s Madini Protocol is touted as a vehicle allowing African nations to raise capital via the Africa Mineral Token (AMT). In fact, it is a route for China to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources initially targeting Lithium and Gold. It is promoted by Minister Alake as a means of financing through the digital tokenisation to provide a way for Chinese funding for projects via smart contracts on the blockchain.

The Africa Minerals Strategy Group led by Minister Alake is China’s Trojan Horse to capture control of Africa’s mineral resources through mining infrastructure investment using the Madini Protocol to fund Chinese built and operated ore processing plants. All the while Nigerian officials turn a blind eye to the Chinese sourcing of lithium ore for their Nigerian processing plants from illegal miners, paying protection money to heavily armed militants, bandits and ISIS connected groups controlling increasingly larger areas of Nigeria’s North and Central regions. The extreme insecurity of these areas is a perfect cover for Chinese companies illegally mining who pay terrorists protection money rather than state royalties.

In the Year of the Horse Mines Ministers across Africa, like the people of ancient Troy, may welcome the gift brought to their gates by Minister Alake and his Chinese backed partners only to find it is a Trojan Horse which, once inside the gates, is uncontrollable.

WIKIPEDIA: JUKUN WAPAN LANGUAGE TO GET ITS OWN EDITION 

Not less than 50 Jukun Wapan speakers gathered on Friday, 20th February 2026, as the news of the Nenzit Wikimedians team coming to help start the Jukun Wapan Wikipedia was heard, to participate in the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach. The Wikimedia team, consisting of members of the Tyap Wikimedians User Group from Tyap-speaking background (Kambai Akau and Kuyet Friday Musa) and Jju-speaking background (Joshua Jacob Nzamah and Abukam Peter Adamu) on arrival, headed to see the Aku Uka of Wukari in his palace, to brief him of the reason for their visitation. The Aku Uka was very delighted and gave the team his blessings. The Wikimedia team was accompanied to the Aku Uka’s palace by members of the Jukun Wapan bible translation team, led by the coordinator, a retired clergyman and village head of Byepyi, Atando James Kinda Agbu, and another member of the team, Amos Jonathan Ajotsatutu, who made sure that the Wikimedia team was well taken care of. After the visit to the Aku Uka, the team headed back to meet the venue at Rohi Grand Suites, 20 Kwararafa Crescent/19 Agwabji Street, GRA, Wukari, where they began the first of the three-day session with the aspiring editors.

Image: L-R: Friday Kuyet Musa, Kambai Akau, Aku Uka of Wukari (Dr. Ishaku Adda Ali, Matakitswen I), Joshua Jacob Nzamah, and Abukam Peter Adamu. (File:Nenzit Wikimedians and the Aku Uka, Matakhitswen 02.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons.

The Jukun Wapan language, one of the about 17 Jukunoid languages in existence today, will be the first of them to have a Wikipedia edition in Taraba State, and maybe one of the few languages in the Middle Belt after the Tyap, Igala, Nupe, Jju, and Karekare Wikipedia editions. There are currently language editions like Bole, Berom, and Hyam Wikipedia editions being developed in the Wikimedia Incubator, and Jukun Wapan just got added to the list.

In 2022, the Tyap language, spoken in Southern Kaduna and Plateau States became the very first language in the Middle Belt to get its own Wikipedia. The Tyap Wikimedians User Group became an approved affiliate of Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (WMF), later in the same year, and the Tyap Wikimedians Organisation registered with the CAC in January 2023. Kambai Akau (Levi Kambai Timothy) leads the activities of the group and is supported by Kuyet Friday Musa and other community volunteer staff. Nenzit Wikimedians is a tag for all editors of Central Nigerian (Nenzit or Platoid) languages, consisting of the likes of Tyap, Jju, Berom, Hyam, Jukun, Tarok, Tsuvadi, and many more belonging to the Plateau, Kainji, and Jukunoid subbranches.

The Nigerian Middle Belt boasts of over 200 languages, but most of them are underdeveloped and endangered. The bigger languages spoken in Nigeria, namely: Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, including English and Nigerian Pidgin languages, are dominant. These languages tend to have more attention from the Nigerian government at the expense of the minoritized languages. Through the support from the WMF, the Nenzit Wikimedians hope to change that narrative, and document, preserve, and promote the wealth of the cultures of the Middle Belt for posterity’s sake and to instill the needed confidence for the natives of these languages to continue speaking their languages and developing their identity, especially the youths.

Image: Participants on the second day of events (File:Attendees during the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach 02.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons. 

The Jukun Wikipedia Outreach was a success. It lasted from Friday, 20th to Sunday, 22nd February, 2026, with Kambai taking most of the workshop sessions, supported by Kuyet and Joshua. Prior to the program’s kick-off, many participants followed the guidelines on the Event:Jukun Wikipedia Outreach page on Meta-Wiki to create their user accounts. In the program, they learned about the Wikimedia sister projects and were shown how to navigate and create their first articles and edit them in the Wikimedia Incubator, where new Wikimedia language editions are developed before being launched publicly. At the end of the event, not less than 140 articles were created by the participants, among which was one of the sons of Dr. Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi (Kuvyon II), the previous Aku Uka of Wukari, Prince Ajifada Shekarau, who was an event co-organizer alongside Amos Jonathan Ajotsatutu, Peter Agan, and Sike-Uwbu Daude Gbana. Many writers and scholars of Jukun Wapan extraction were present, and books written in Jukun Wapan were donated to the Nenzit Wikimedians, and others were purchased. The Nenzit Wikimedians were fed with huge wraps of pounded and fish from the Benue River, experiencing the Jukun hospitality at its utmost!

Day 3’s group picture (File:A group photograph on the Day 3 of the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach 2026.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons.

The top editors in the outreach program were gifted with souvenirs on the last day of the event, with Joseph Atebo N. Afyenakun, Yavini Ladi, and Jibo Paul Aten-wunu topping the first three highest editor ranks. Others were also encouraged to keep editing even after the event, to enable the project to move out of the Wikimedia Incubator within the next couple of months.

The Nenzit Wikimedia team travelled all the way from Kaduna and Zonkwa to attend the program in Wukari, and had to cross the Benue River at Ibi, where the a bridge is yet to be constructed, for the sake of bringing more underrepresented languages in the Middle Belt into lamplight because they take it s a responsibility which they owe the next generations unborn, for the preservation of the identity of the peoples of the region through online open source documentation on Wikimedia sister projects like Wikipedia, Wikidata, and Wikimedia Commons.

The group seeks the partnership of non-governmental organizations working along the same terrain to boost synergy and increase the momentum needed to preserve and enhance the linguistic identity of the underrepresented in the Middle Belt.

Court of Appeal Reserves Judgment on Elrufai’s Order That Scrapped Friday Work and School Days in Kaduna

By Steven Kefas

A significant legal battle over the constitutional validity of a controversial executive order that effectively eliminated Fridays as a working and school day in Kaduna State moved a step closer to resolution on Wednesday, as the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, reserved judgment in the matter of Gloria Mabeiam Ballason v. Governor of Kaduna State and 3 Others, Appeal No: CA/K/104/2023.

The three-man panel, comprising Hon. Justice Onyekachi Aja Otisi, Hon. Justice Abimbola Osarugue Obaseki-Adejumo, and Hon. Justice Sybil Onyeji Nwaka-Gbagi, heard arguments from both sides on 11 March, 2026, before reserving the appeal for judgment.

The case centres on an executive order issued by former Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir Ahmad Elrufai, which took effect on 1 December, 2021, reducing the official working and schooling week from five days to four. Under the order, Fridays ceased to be working days for civil servants and school days for pupils across the state. Remarkably, despite El-Rufai’s departure from office, the policy has remained in force to this day, making it over four years since Kaduna residents lost the Friday workday.

Gloria Mabeiam Ballason, a prominent human rights lawyer and the appellant in this matter, argues that the executive order is unconstitutional and has caused measurable harm to workforce productivity, school children’s education, and her own professional legal work. Appearing in person to argue her case, Ballason adopted her filed briefs and urged the appellate court to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the lower court, which had previously ruled against her position.

Appearing for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents was Dr. J.A. Kanyip, the Attorney General of Kaduna State, who was accompanied by a legal team including A.A. Aku Esq., S.M. Gamaliel Esq., M.P. Danjuma Esq., and Koni Tauna Esq. The respondents similarly adopted their briefs and urged the court to uphold the lower court’s ruling and dismiss the appeal.

Notably absent was any representation for the Minister of Interior, named as the 4th Respondent in the suit, despite evidence presented to the court confirming that the Minister’s office had been properly served with hearing notices. The court took note of this absence.

Background to the Matter

When Elrufai announced the four-day work week in late 2021, it was one of several sweeping administrative decisions that defined his controversial second term as governor. The order applied to civil servants and public schools across Kaduna State, with Fridays effectively becoming a non-working day. Proponents of the policy argued it could reduce overhead costs for the state government and offer workers an extended rest period. Critics, however, raised immediate alarm about the impact on service delivery, the disruption to children’s schooling calendars, and whether a sitting governor possessed the executive authority to unilaterally restructure the working week without legislative backing.

Ballason’s case strikes at exactly that question of constitutional authority. Her suit contends that an executive order of this scope, one altering the fundamental structure of public employment and public education, exceeds the powers of a state governor acting alone, and that the policy as implemented violates applicable constitutional provisions.

What makes the case particularly striking is its longevity. Elrufai left office in May 2023, and yet his successor’s administration has allowed the four-day order to stand, meaning the policy has now outlasted the man who created it. Workers, schoolchildren, and professionals across Kaduna State continue to operate under an arrangement that was never subjected to legislative debate or public consultation.

With judgment now reserved, the Court of Appeal’s decision will carry far-reaching implications, not only for Kaduna State, but potentially setting a precedent on the limits of gubernatorial executive power across Nigeria’s northern states.

Middle Belt Times will report the judgment as soon as it is delivered.