WIKIPEDIA: JUKUN WAPAN LANGUAGE TO GET ITS OWN EDITION 

Not less than 50 Jukun Wapan speakers gathered on Friday, 20th February 2026, as the news of the Nenzit Wikimedians team coming to help start the Jukun Wapan Wikipedia was heard, to participate in the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach. The Wikimedia team, consisting of members of the Tyap Wikimedians User Group from Tyap-speaking background (Kambai Akau and Kuyet Friday Musa) and Jju-speaking background (Joshua Jacob Nzamah and Abukam Peter Adamu) on arrival, headed to see the Aku Uka of Wukari in his palace, to brief him of the reason for their visitation. The Aku Uka was very delighted and gave the team his blessings. The Wikimedia team was accompanied to the Aku Uka’s palace by members of the Jukun Wapan bible translation team, led by the coordinator, a retired clergyman and village head of Byepyi, Atando James Kinda Agbu, and another member of the team, Amos Jonathan Ajotsatutu, who made sure that the Wikimedia team was well taken care of. After the visit to the Aku Uka, the team headed back to meet the venue at Rohi Grand Suites, 20 Kwararafa Crescent/19 Agwabji Street, GRA, Wukari, where they began the first of the three-day session with the aspiring editors.

Image: L-R: Friday Kuyet Musa, Kambai Akau, Aku Uka of Wukari (Dr. Ishaku Adda Ali, Matakitswen I), Joshua Jacob Nzamah, and Abukam Peter Adamu. (File:Nenzit Wikimedians and the Aku Uka, Matakhitswen 02.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons.

The Jukun Wapan language, one of the about 17 Jukunoid languages in existence today, will be the first of them to have a Wikipedia edition in Taraba State, and maybe one of the few languages in the Middle Belt after the Tyap, Igala, Nupe, Jju, and Karekare Wikipedia editions. There are currently language editions like Bole, Berom, and Hyam Wikipedia editions being developed in the Wikimedia Incubator, and Jukun Wapan just got added to the list.

In 2022, the Tyap language, spoken in Southern Kaduna and Plateau States became the very first language in the Middle Belt to get its own Wikipedia. The Tyap Wikimedians User Group became an approved affiliate of Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (WMF), later in the same year, and the Tyap Wikimedians Organisation registered with the CAC in January 2023. Kambai Akau (Levi Kambai Timothy) leads the activities of the group and is supported by Kuyet Friday Musa and other community volunteer staff. Nenzit Wikimedians is a tag for all editors of Central Nigerian (Nenzit or Platoid) languages, consisting of the likes of Tyap, Jju, Berom, Hyam, Jukun, Tarok, Tsuvadi, and many more belonging to the Plateau, Kainji, and Jukunoid subbranches.

The Nigerian Middle Belt boasts of over 200 languages, but most of them are underdeveloped and endangered. The bigger languages spoken in Nigeria, namely: Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, including English and Nigerian Pidgin languages, are dominant. These languages tend to have more attention from the Nigerian government at the expense of the minoritized languages. Through the support from the WMF, the Nenzit Wikimedians hope to change that narrative, and document, preserve, and promote the wealth of the cultures of the Middle Belt for posterity’s sake and to instill the needed confidence for the natives of these languages to continue speaking their languages and developing their identity, especially the youths.

Image: Participants on the second day of events (File:Attendees during the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach 02.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons. 

The Jukun Wikipedia Outreach was a success. It lasted from Friday, 20th to Sunday, 22nd February, 2026, with Kambai taking most of the workshop sessions, supported by Kuyet and Joshua. Prior to the program’s kick-off, many participants followed the guidelines on the Event:Jukun Wikipedia Outreach page on Meta-Wiki to create their user accounts. In the program, they learned about the Wikimedia sister projects and were shown how to navigate and create their first articles and edit them in the Wikimedia Incubator, where new Wikimedia language editions are developed before being launched publicly. At the end of the event, not less than 140 articles were created by the participants, among which was one of the sons of Dr. Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi (Kuvyon II), the previous Aku Uka of Wukari, Prince Ajifada Shekarau, who was an event co-organizer alongside Amos Jonathan Ajotsatutu, Peter Agan, and Sike-Uwbu Daude Gbana. Many writers and scholars of Jukun Wapan extraction were present, and books written in Jukun Wapan were donated to the Nenzit Wikimedians, and others were purchased. The Nenzit Wikimedians were fed with huge wraps of pounded and fish from the Benue River, experiencing the Jukun hospitality at its utmost!

Day 3’s group picture (File:A group photograph on the Day 3 of the Jukun Wikipedia Outreach 2026.jpg. (2026, March 17). Wikimedia Commons.

The top editors in the outreach program were gifted with souvenirs on the last day of the event, with Joseph Atebo N. Afyenakun, Yavini Ladi, and Jibo Paul Aten-wunu topping the first three highest editor ranks. Others were also encouraged to keep editing even after the event, to enable the project to move out of the Wikimedia Incubator within the next couple of months.

The Nenzit Wikimedia team travelled all the way from Kaduna and Zonkwa to attend the program in Wukari, and had to cross the Benue River at Ibi, where the a bridge is yet to be constructed, for the sake of bringing more underrepresented languages in the Middle Belt into lamplight because they take it s a responsibility which they owe the next generations unborn, for the preservation of the identity of the peoples of the region through online open source documentation on Wikimedia sister projects like Wikipedia, Wikidata, and Wikimedia Commons.

The group seeks the partnership of non-governmental organizations working along the same terrain to boost synergy and increase the momentum needed to preserve and enhance the linguistic identity of the underrepresented in the Middle Belt.

 

 

 

 

Court of Appeal Reserves Judgment on Elrufai’s Order That Scrapped Friday Work and School Days in Kaduna

 

By Steven Kefas

A significant legal battle over the constitutional validity of a controversial executive order that effectively eliminated Fridays as a working and school day in Kaduna State moved a step closer to resolution on Wednesday, as the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, reserved judgment in the matter of Gloria Mabeiam Ballason v. Governor of Kaduna State and 3 Others, Appeal No: CA/K/104/2023.

The three-man panel, comprising Hon. Justice Onyekachi Aja Otisi, Hon. Justice Abimbola Osarugue Obaseki-Adejumo, and Hon. Justice Sybil Onyeji Nwaka-Gbagi, heard arguments from both sides on 11 March, 2026, before reserving the appeal for judgment.

The case centres on an executive order issued by former Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir Ahmad Elrufai, which took effect on 1 December, 2021, reducing the official working and schooling week from five days to four. Under the order, Fridays ceased to be working days for civil servants and school days for pupils across the state. Remarkably, despite El-Rufai’s departure from office, the policy has remained in force to this day, making it over four years since Kaduna residents lost the Friday workday.

Gloria Mabeiam Ballason, a prominent human rights lawyer and the appellant in this matter, argues that the executive order is unconstitutional and has caused measurable harm to workforce productivity, school children’s education, and her own professional legal work. Appearing in person to argue her case, Ballason adopted her filed briefs and urged the appellate court to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the lower court, which had previously ruled against her position.

Appearing for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents was Dr. J.A. Kanyip, the Attorney General of Kaduna State, who was accompanied by a legal team including A.A. Aku Esq., S.M. Gamaliel Esq., M.P. Danjuma Esq., and Koni Tauna Esq. The respondents similarly adopted their briefs and urged the court to uphold the lower court’s ruling and dismiss the appeal.

Notably absent was any representation for the Minister of Interior, named as the 4th Respondent in the suit, despite evidence presented to the court confirming that the Minister’s office had been properly served with hearing notices. The court took note of this absence.

Background to the Matter

When Elrufai announced the four-day work week in late 2021, it was one of several sweeping administrative decisions that defined his controversial second term as governor. The order applied to civil servants and public schools across Kaduna State, with Fridays effectively becoming a non-working day. Proponents of the policy argued it could reduce overhead costs for the state government and offer workers an extended rest period. Critics, however, raised immediate alarm about the impact on service delivery, the disruption to children’s schooling calendars, and whether a sitting governor possessed the executive authority to unilaterally restructure the working week without legislative backing.

Ballason’s case strikes at exactly that question of constitutional authority. Her suit contends that an executive order of this scope, one altering the fundamental structure of public employment and public education, exceeds the powers of a state governor acting alone, and that the policy as implemented violates applicable constitutional provisions.

What makes the case particularly striking is its longevity. Elrufai left office in May 2023, and yet his successor’s administration has allowed the four-day order to stand, meaning the policy has now outlasted the man who created it. Workers, schoolchildren, and professionals across Kaduna State continue to operate under an arrangement that was never subjected to legislative debate or public consultation.

With judgment now reserved, the Court of Appeal’s decision will carry far-reaching implications, not only for Kaduna State, but potentially setting a precedent on the limits of gubernatorial executive power across Nigeria’s northern states.

Middle Belt Times will report the judgment as soon as it is delivered.

Soldiers Not Protecting Middle Belters But Protecting Cows

By Mike Odeh James

A recent Punch report celebrated Nigerian soldiers for foiling a cattle-rustling attempt in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State, complete with photographs of arrested men proudly displayed like trophies. The comments section was having none of it.

“This is the only thing the Nigerian Army knows how to do — guide Fulani terrorists to kill Benue citizens, then arrest innocent Benue youths and parade them as cattle rustlers to justify the killings,” one reader wrote.

That is not an exaggeration. That is a pattern.

The men arrested are not criminals by disposition — they are indigenes of a land soaked in the blood of their own people; survivors of years of Fulani terrorist massacres who have buried neighbours, fled burning homesteads, and watched their farmlands annexed by armed herders. The military knows this. It does not care.

These same soldiers — fully aware that Benue State has a legally operational anti-open grazing law — have deliberately looked the other way as Fulani herders brazenly violate that law, driving cattle across cultivated farmlands, destroying harvests and livelihoods, without a single arrest, a single query, or a single apology.

The selectivity is not incompetence. It is policy.

In Amadu, Taraba, soldiers ignored repeated community distress calls about Fulani attacks — then swooped in to arrest local men the moment Fulani complainants pointed fingers. In Abaji Kpav, troops deployed ostensibly against militants instead turned their boots on the very villagers they were sent to protect, beating elders and humiliating residents.

The Nigerian Army owes the Middle Belt an explanation. Who exactly are these soldiers serving — the Nigerian constitution, or the herdsmen’s cattle?

Southern Kaduna: Three Christian vigilantes detained after helping troops rescue kidnap victim from terrorists

…Community security volunteers held atCID as families demand their release, citing cooperation with military forces

KADUNA– Three Christian vigilante members from Kajim village in Kaura Local Government Area of Kaduna State have been held in Criminal Investigation Department (CID) detention since Monday, 16 February 2026, sparking allegations of religious persecution and raising questions about community security participation in Nigeria’s troubled Middle Belt region.

The detained men – Habila Yaro Umaru (aka ‘Yaro’), Philibus Ninyioh (aka ‘MC Filibus’), and Augustine Tinat (aka ‘Election’) – are volunteer vigilantes who assisted military personnel during an anti-terrorism operation on 13 January 2026. As of Ash Wednesday, 18 February 2026, they remain in custody.

The January 13 Incident

According to a military statement released on 14 January 2026 by Captain Joshua Atu John, Acting Media Information Officer for Joint Task Force Operation Enduring Peace (JTF OPEP), troops from Sector 7 responded to reports of terrorist activity on the Jos-Kaduna road between Manchok and Jankasa.

The military reported that Fulani terrorists had blocked the road, kidnapped several persons including a young woman from Kajim who was allegedly raped. In the ensuing firefight, troops neutralized three individuals and rescued the victim.

Community sources indicate the three vigilante members were part of the joint operation, working alongside military personnel in accordance with established security cooperation protocols in the area.

Allegations of Targeting

Approximately one month after the military operation, community members learned that associates of the neutralized terrorists had submitted a petition to authorities in Kaduna, allegedly facilitated by the state government, seeking action against the vigilante members.

One community contact alleged the petition was coordinated by Ardo Hari, a Fulani migrant from Bauchi now residing in Manchok. Community sources claim Ardo Hari has been previously arrested in connection with attacks, kidnappings, and the abduction and assassination of Catholic priest Rev. Fr. Sylvester Okechukwu on Ash Wednesday, 5 March 2025.

A video circulating on social media allegedly shows Governor Uba Sani standing with Ardo Hari in Manchok on 15 June 2025, with the governor heard saying, “there is no indigene or visitor, Fulanis should feel free to herd their cattle while farmers go about their agricultural activities.”

Pattern of Violence

Community members report escalating security challenges since mid-2025, including:

– Systematic destruction of crops by cattle sent into farmlands

– Multiple cases of rape, abductions, and killings

– A Christmas Day attack on 25 December 2025 that resulted in the death of Istifanus Stephen, a young man from First Baptist Church Kwarga who died attempting to defend a young woman from abduction

Five days after the 13 January incident, a public notice circulated on social media warning of “a planned attack by Fulani youth any moment from this night on Kajim village close to Manchok in Kaura LGA of Kaduna State.” The alleged attack did not materialize.

Timing and International Context

The detention coincides with the US Congress advancing the Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act 2026 (HR 7457), which specifically identifies Fulani terrorists and Miyetti Allah in connection with patterns of religious persecution in Nigeria.

Community members question why vigilantes who cooperated with federal military forces are now in detention while alleged terrorist associates remain free. They also note the irony that the immediate past Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Gwabin Musa – now Minister of Defence – hails from Southern Kaduna.

Reports indicate a meeting was held in Manchok on 18 February involving the local chief and alleged members of Miyetti Allah from Jos, though the purpose of this meeting has not been confirmed.

Official Response

As of press time, neither the Kaduna State Government, the Nigeria Police Force, nor military authorities have issued statements regarding the detention of the three vigilante members.

Community members are calling for the immediate release of the detained men, arguing they were fulfilling their lawful duties as community security volunteers in cooperation with federal security forces.

 

The situation remains developing.

Kaduna Survivors Unite: Coalition Demands Justice for Victims of El-Rufai Era Abuses

A powerful coalition of survivors, victims’ families, and civil society groups has emerged to demand full accountability for alleged human rights violations during the eight-year governorship of Nasir el-Rufai in Kaduna State, vowing “no more impunity, no more silence.”

The Kaduna Victims’ Coalition, comprising community leaders, traditional rulers, academics, lawyers, journalists, and other professionals, issued a press statement on Monday calling for thorough investigations and prosecutions of alleged crimes committed between 2015 and 2023.

At the heart of their demands are high-profile cases that have come to symbolize what the coalition describes as an era of unchecked impunity. Among them is the October 2018 abduction and brutal murder of HRH Dr. Maiwada Raphael Galadima, the Agwam Adara (paramount ruler of the Adara Chiefdom), who was killed despite a ransom payment. The coalition notes that suspects arrested for his murder have yet to be successfully prosecuted, and their whereabouts remain unknown.

Equally prominent is the case of Abubakar Idris, popularly known as Dadiyata, a lecturer at Federal University Dutsenma and social media commentator who was abducted from his Barnawa residence in Kaduna on August 2, 2019. Nearly seven years later, his whereabouts remain unknown. August 2026 will mark the seventh anniversary of his disappearance, triggering a statutory presumption of death under Nigerian law.

The coalition highlighted a controversial tweet posted by Bashir el-Rufai, son of the then-Governor, on December 23, 2019, shortly after Dadiyata’s abduction, which was “widely perceived as gloating over the incident and dismissing calls for his safe return.”

“We speak today as representatives of countless individuals, families, and communities who endured eight years of profound hardship, terror, fear, and loss,” the coalition stated. “These acts bypassed constitutional safeguards and Nigerian law, turning gubernatorial immunity into unchecked impunity.”

The coalition accused the former governor of presiding over “a pattern of indiscriminate actions: arbitrary abductions, persecution of critics, reprisal violence, unlawful demolitions of homes, mass dismissals of workers without due process, forced sackings by employers of perceived opponents, and the displacement of citizens into exile.”

Expressing concern over recent attempts to “reframe this history, portraying Nasir el-Rufai as a champion of due process and human rights,” the coalition insisted that survivors and families continue to seek truth and justice.

“On behalf of ourselves, and in solemn memory of those killed or disappeared who cannot speak, we have a moral and civic duty to bear witness,” the statement read. “Our sole demand is accountability under the rule of law: thorough, independent investigations; prosecutions where evidence warrants; and closure for traumatized victims and families.”

The coalition pledged full cooperation with law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, and human rights institutions, offering to provide testimonies, evidence, and material assistance to support inquiries.

The statement was accompanied by hashtags #JusticeToElrufai, #JusticeForKadunaVictims, #WhereIsDadiyata, and #AccountabilityNow.

The statement was signed by the following individuals and organizations on behalf of the coalition:

1. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu
2. Audu Maikori, Esq
3. Gloria Ballason, Esq
4. Steven Kefas
5. Luka Binniyat
6. Midat Joseph
7. Segun Onibiyo
8. House of Justice
9. Community Development & Rights Advocacy Foundation
10. Resilient Aid and Dialogue Initiative
11. Southern Kaduna Indigenous Progressive Forum (SKIPFo)
12. Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA)

The coalition’s emergence represents a significant moment in the quest for accountability in Kaduna State, as victims and their families publicly break their silence on alleged abuses that have long remained unaddressed.

ONLY THE FULANI JIHADIST–IMPERIAL AGENDA FEARS A UNITED MIDDLE BELT

 

Barr. John Apollos Maton
9th February 2026

 

A REBUTTAL TO A SAD JOKE MASQUERADING AS POLITICAL ANALYSIS

I don’t know who the recent Fulani stooge Cham Faliya Sharon is, but his/her writeup “IS THE CONFUSION OF THE MIDDLE BELT COMING FULL CIRCLE TO BITE THE MIDDLE BELT” is such a ridiculous piece I was ashamed for the writer when it opened with a quote from Thomas Paine. I mean, it takes a special pompous type of clown to not only go through writing this but even have it reshared on public platforms by the Fulani Immigrants Nigeria should be sending packing.

The joke of an article under review is not analysis but performance—an exercise in ideological ventriloquism by a writer who mistakes obedience for insight. It reads like a brief written to order, not a position arrived at through honest inquiry. Like Judas Iscariot, the author appears to have concluded that selling one’s intellectual integrity for proximity to power is a rational transaction. History, however, records such bargains not as cleverness but as cowardice.

We are told, with great theatrical confidence, that the Middle Belt is a confusion: a geographical impossibility, a political contradiction, a manufactured identity sustained by ignorance and manipulation. Yet what is truly confused is an argument that elevates imposed constitutions to divine scripture while dismissing lived history as irrelevant; that treats maps as sacred while treating people as disposable; and that assumes identity must first be approved by dominant blocs before it can exist. This is not reason—it is authoritarian logic wrapped in the language of common sense.

Let us nonetheless grant the author every imaginable concession. Let us ignore, for the moment, the extensive scholarly work of Dr. Bitrus Pogo and numerous historians, sociologists, and political scientists who have rigorously documented the Middle Belt as a historical and political reality. Let us assume—without conceding—that they are wrong. Let us even accept the childish claim that because the phrase “Middle Belt” does not appear verbatim in the 1999 Constitution, the identity itself must therefore be fraudulent. Even under these generous assumptions, the argument collapses completely.

For even if the Middle Belt were nothing more than a political consciousness emerging from shared experiences of marginalization, violence, and exclusion, that alone would make it real. Peoples are not born fully mapped and notarized; they are forged through history, memory, and struggle. And it is precisely this process—now ripening into collective clarity—that terrifies the imperial imagination animating the essay.

 

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION ARE NOT GIFTS FROM ANY HEGEMON

At the most elementary level, the argument fails because it assumes identity is something granted rather than asserted. Under Nigeria’s own Constitution, this assumption is indefensible. Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution explicitly guarantees every citizen the right to assemble freely and associate with others for the protection of their interests. Section 39 guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart ideas. These provisions are not decorative—they are foundational.

Beyond domestic law, Nigeria is a signatory to binding international instruments that go even further. Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the unequivocal right of all peoples to self-determination and to freely pursue their political, economic, and social development. Article 22 reinforces this by recognizing the collective right to development. These are not abstract ideals; they are enforceable norms incorporated into Nigerian law by domestication of the Charter.

At the global level, the principle is even clearer. Common Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states plainly that all peoples have the right to self-determination and to freely determine their political status. Nowhere in international law is there a requirement that a people must first satisfy the cartographic preferences of their detractors before asserting this right.

The demand that the Middle Belt must “draw a perfect map” before it may exist is therefore not legal reasoning; it is imperial obstruction. Colonial borders across Africa were drawn arbitrarily, yet no one questions their legitimacy on the grounds of incoherence. To suddenly demand mathematical neatness only when marginalized peoples organize themselves is not intellectual rigor—it is selective skepticism deployed as a weapon.

 

THE MIDDLE BELT POSSESSES ANCESTRAL LAND, HISTORY, AND MEMORY—IT IS NOT A FICTION

While totally excusing the Fulani Immigrants who have made the lives of true natives and real Indigenes of Nigeria a living hell, one of the most dishonest maneuvers in the essay is its deliberate avoidance of ancestry. We are invited to obsess over lines on a map while ignoring the more uncomfortable question of who has lived where, for how long, and under what conditions. The communities commonly described as Middle Belt peoples are not recent arrivals, nor are they abstract categories invented in conference halls. They are indigenous populations rooted in specific territories long before colonial intrusion.

Unlike the Fulani Immigrants who don’t belong in Nigeria, these communities possess traceable genealogies, distinct languages, religious traditions, and systems of governance that predate both British colonial rule and the later Nigerian state. Historical records—from colonial archives to oral histories—document repeated episodes of subjugation, forced incorporation, and indirect rule imposed upon them. To pretend that these histories dissolve simply because a constitution failed to name them explicitly is not ignorance; it is historical vandalism.

International law has long rejected the notion that identity disappears because it is inconvenient to power. The United Nations’ recognition of indigenous peoples worldwide—culminating in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007—affirmed that historical continuity with pre-colonial societies is a valid basis for collective rights, regardless of later political rearrangements. Identity survives conquest; memory survives subjugation.

What unsettles the Fulani and their stooge — the essay’s author is that this memory is now politically articulate. The Middle Belt is not asking to be invented; it is insisting on being recognized on its own terms, not as an appendix to someone else’s empire. And once ancestry and land are acknowledged, violence can no longer be dismissed as “misunderstanding,” nor dispossession reframed as inevitability.

 

POLITICAL DIVERSITY DOES NOT NEGATE COLLECTIVE EXISTENCE

Perhaps the most intellectually hollow claim advanced is that internal political diversity invalidates Middle Belt identity. By this logic, Nigeria itself—fractured by ethnic, religious, and ideological divisions—should not exist. The argument collapses the moment it is applied consistently.

Political disagreement is not evidence of non-existence; it is evidence of political life. Only caricatures are uniform. Real peoples debate leadership, disagree on strategy, and pursue competing interests while still recognizing shared historical experiences and structural threats. To demand absolute unanimity as the price of recognition is to demand silence, not coherence.
International practice confirms this reality. From Catalonia to Kurdistan, from Quebec to Scotland, political plurality has never been treated as proof that a people does not exist. On the contrary, it is often cited as evidence of democratic maturity. The insistence that the Middle Belt must be perfectly homogeneous before it can claim identity is therefore not a standard—it is a pretext.

What truly disturbs the essay’s author is not contradiction but consolidation. As long as Middle Belt communities were forced to negotiate individually, they could be managed and ignored. A shared political vocabulary changes that balance. Patterns can be named, responsibilities assigned, and demands articulated collectively. That shift, not geography, is the real provocation.

 

IDENTITY ERASURE AS A CLASSIC IMPERIAL STRATEGY

The structure of the essay follows a script as old as the attempted Immigrant Fulani empire in Nigeria itself. First, deny that the people exist. Next, ridicule their attempts at self-definition. Then, frame their resistance as manipulation by outsiders. Finally, present continued domination as common sense and stability. This pattern has been documented across colonial history, from the Americas to Africa to Asia.

International law evolved precisely to dismantle this logic. The post-World War II order—reflected in the UN Charter’s emphasis on self-determination—was a direct response to the catastrophic consequences of identity denial and imperial domination. The decolonization movements of the twentieth century did not succeed because empires suddenly became benevolent; they succeeded because peoples insisted on naming themselves.

By portraying Middle Belt consciousness as a southern plot or a geographical error, the essay avoids confronting the structural realities of exclusion and violence. Identity erasure here is not accidental; it is instrumental. If a people do not exist, then nothing done to them can be legally or morally framed as injustice.
What the Fulani and author fears, ultimately, is accountability. A people who know who they are can trace how they arrived at their present condition. They can distinguish accident from policy, conflict from campaign. Once that distinction is made, the old excuses collapse, and the Immigrants who have long overstayed their welcome will be evicted.

 

CONCLUSION: MIDDLE BELT UNITY IS THE THREAT TO FULANI IMPERIALISM, NOT CONFUSION

Strip away the sarcasm, selective geography, and performative concern, and one truth remains unmistakable: a united Middle Belt disrupts long-standing arrangements of Fulani immigrant domination. It replaces silence with memory and fragmentation with demand for what we as a native people are due. It transforms suffering and genocide under the Fulani Islamic Terrorist Jihadists agenda into political clarity, self determination and intolerance for foreign terrorist influence.

The Middle Belt does not require validation from those Fulani invested in its marginalization and destruction. It does not need permission to associate, to name itself, or to pursue its collective interests. Even the fake Nigerian constitutional law made to further Fulani agenda in Nigeria protects this right. African human-rights law affirms it. International law enshrines it.

The joke of an article I was sent and repeatedly asked to consider is therefore not a warning to the Middle Belt but a confession from Fulani and their stooges. It reveals anxiety, not authority—fear, not confidence.

Like with the Fualni’s who through the Genocide of Christians and Indigenes of Nigeria hope to continue the Fodio Caliphate agenda, empires are never threatened by confusion. They are threatened by clarity.

And clarity is precisely what is emerging.

THE MIDDLE BELT QUESTION: HISTORY, POWER, AND THE CURRENT REALITY

 

By: Dr. Pogu Bitrus

 

It has become imperative to respond decisively to a mischievous and intellectually dishonest article circulating under the headline “The Manufactured Middle Belt: The Untold History, Foreign Backing and the Agenda to Fracture Northern Nigeria,” authored under the pseudonym Safyan Umar Yahaya. Far from being a work of history and of social concern, the piece is an alarmist pamphlet—animated by fear and bigotry not facts, all aimed at delegitimizing the rising social and political

consciousness of the Middle Belt.

 

The anxiety beneath the essay is unmistakable. For over a century, certain ruling blocs have exploited the Middle Belt economically, subordinated it politically, and tried to diminish it culturally. Today, as the people of the region reclaims its history, pride and asserts its unity, anger and blackmail is the response of the losers.

 

The central claim—that the Middle Belt is a recent political fabrication without historical roots—is not merely false; it is a deliberate distortion built on colonial convenience and selective amnesia.

 

WHAT THE MIDDLE BELT ACTUALLY IS

 

The Middle Belt refers to the vast geographical and cultural zone inhabited by indigenous ethnic nationalities of the former Northern Region—now spanning 19 Northern states and the Federal Capital Territory—who were never conquered or where never largely ruled by the Sokoto Caliphate or the Kanem-Borno Empire prior to British colonisation.

Put plainly: the Middle Belt consists of the autochthonous peoples of Northern Nigeria who are neither Hausa, Fulani, nor Kanuri, and who historically existed outside the authority of Islamic caliphates, notwithstanding some pockets of Emirate enclaves among it. This is not opinion; it is an established historical fact.

 

Long before colonial rule, the Middle Belt was home to sovereign empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms, and complex stateless societies whose political systems predated the 19th-century jihads by centuries. Among the most prominent was the Kwararafa Confederacy, centred in the Gongola – Benue Valley. Between the 18th and 19th centuries, Kwararafa repeatedly defeated and humiliated Hausa city-states such as Kano and Zaria and even challenged Kanem-Borno—long before Usman dan Fodio’s jihad of 1804.

 

Other well-documented polities include the Igala Kingdom, Jukun states, Nupe Kingdom, and countless Tiv, Idoma, Gbagyi, Birom, Angas, Lelna, Bwatye, Eggon, and Goemai societies among hundreds of others — each with distinct political traditions, land tenure systems, and military histories. They had a common solidarity hinged on wading off Islamisation and genocidal slave raids.

 

COLONIAL CONQUEST AND FORCED SUBORDINATION

 

The author inadvertently exposes his argument’s weakness when he ignores a crucial colonial reality: the British conquered the Muslim emirates with relative ease, largely by co-opting existing centralized hierarchies. In contrast, Middle Belt societies resisted British conquest fiercely.

 

British colonial records—by administrators such as Frederick Lugard and C.L. Temple—document prolonged military campaigns, punitive expeditions, and scorched-earth tactics used against Middle Belt communities from the early 1900s to the 1920s. This resistance is precisely why the British imposed Indirect Rule by force, subordinating Middle Belt peoples to Fulani and Kanuri emirs they had never known, accepted, or recognized.

That imposition,nnot foreign conspiracy, is the historical root of Middle Belt political consciousness.

 

THE COLONIAL FALLACY OF “NON-EXISTENCE”

 

The article’s reliance on colonial maps and constitutions to argue that the Middle Belt did not exist before the 1940s is intellectually indefensible. Colonial documents recognized what served imperial administration, not indigenous reality. By that logic, countless African nations and identities would vanish simply because Europeans failed—or refused—to acknowledge them.

Even then, the claim is factually weak. The term “Middle Belt” appears descriptively in colonial correspondence as early as the first decade of the 20th century, used by administrators and missionaries to describe the non-emirate central zone of Northern Nigeria. The British deliberately refused to create a Middle Belt Region, not because it lacked coherence, but because doing so would weaken the numerical and political dominance of the Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri oligarchy that sustained Indirect Rule.

The agitation for recognition therefore predates independence; it merely became organized in the 1950s.

 

THE UMBC AND THE MYTH OF FOREIGN MANIPULATION

 

The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) under Joseph Sarwuan Tarka did not invent the Middle Belt identity. It articulated long-standing grievances: land dispossession, political exclusion, cultural suppression, force labour, and religious discrimination.

To dismiss the UMBC as a tool of missionaries or foreign interests is not only false but insulting. Middle Belt people and leaders were among the most educated and politically sophisticated Nigerians of their generation, many trained in Britain and elite Nigerian institutions well before independence. They required no NGO or missionary to understand injustice they lived daily.

 

The historical record—petitions against Native Authority abuses, resistance to emirate taxation, land struggles, and demands for self-rule—is open to anyone willing to read honestly.

 

THE CONTEMPORARY MOMENT

 

Today’s Middle Belt movement is neither separatist nor violent. It is a demand for recognition, equity, and freedom from an imposed Arewa identity that neither reflects its history nor aligns with its values. The Middle Belt does not deny the existence of Northern Nigeria; it rejects the falsehood that Northern Nigeria is synonymous with the Middle Belt.

What has long been marketed as “Northern unity” has, in truth, been a forced political marriage, sustained by coercion rather than consent.

Increasingly, the Middle Belt is stating what history has always known: this union was never voluntary!

If language must be blunt, then so be it—this relationship has often resembled political rape, and the survivors have finally found their voice.

 

2027 AND THE PANIC OF DECLINING HEGEMONY

 

The fear driving this revisionist essay is understandable. The once-boasted “monolithic Northern voting bloc” is fracturing. Demographics, political awareness, and historical truth are converging.

For the first time, Nigeria’s political establishment is confronting an uncomfortable reality: the Middle Belt is the decisive factor in national politics.

 

THE MIDDLE BELT, RELIGION, AND THE COLLAPSE OF OLD MYTHS

 

A recurring propaganda tactic is to label the Middle Belt a “Bible Belt,” as though its political awakening is a sectarian religious project. This claim is demonstrably false. The Middle Belt has always been religiously plural, home to Christians, Muslims, and adherents of African traditional religions for centuries. Even institutionally, the Middle Belt Forum (MBF) disproves this caricature: its Board of Trustees and National Working Committee include Muslims, reflecting the region’s inclusive ethos. While it is true that the Middle Belt today is predominantly Christian—largely due to historical resistance to jihadist conquest and the voluntary embrace of Christianity—majority faith does not translate into religious extremism. The Middle Belt struggle is not about imposing religion; it is about ending political subjugation, cultural erasure, and systemic inequality. Reducing this legitimate quest to sectarianism is not analysis but propaganda.

 

Demise of the Hausa/Fulani Amalgam.

 

Equally misleading is the continued use of the term “Hausa-Fulani” as though it remains a coherent political or cultural bloc. Increasingly, Hausa intellectuals and opinion leaders reject this forced amalgam, insisting that there is Hausa land and there is the Middle Belt, but no natural or “Arewa” identity. The very terms “Northern Nigeria” and “Arewa” now irritate many enlightened Hausa voices who recognize them as tools historically used to sustain Fulani political dominance and economic exploitation. Recent events have further exposed this fracture: widespread violence by Fulani bandits against Hausa rural communities has shattered the illusion of a shared destiny. For decades, the Hausa masses were mobilized as demographic instruments against Middle Belt minorities; today, they are confronting the reality that they too have borne the costs of an unjust hierarchy. What is unfolding is not a Middle Belt conspiracy, but the collapse of an artificial political fiction. History, not agitation, has caught up with it.

 

Dr: Pogu Bitrus is the President of the Middle Belt Forum (MBF) and hails from Chibok, Southern Borno.

EVALUATING THE HOUSE OF JUSTICE IMPACT AT IBA 

 

The Aircraft glided its descent into Toronto Pearson International Airport at 20:02hrs – twelve minutes behind the estimated arrival time. The temperature outside was 9°C , the sun had set. Gloria Mabeiam Ballason Esq, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of the House of Justice set foot on the Great White North for the 2025 International Bar Association Conference which held at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre.

For the House of Justice, the purpose was beyond attending a conference to keep up with global legal trends or networking; it was for a mission much nobler: consolidating the public’s access to justice and finding effective methods of accountability against mass atrocities. The starting point for the intervention is Nigeria, her home country where political operations frequently affect terror crimes victims’ access to justice.

Building it Better Through Magnitsky Proceedings.

For a society that continues to evolve, it is imperative that accountability measures keep pace – and what better way than to explore the Magnitsky procedure.

After the death of Sergei Magnitsky, Sir Bill Browder, KCMG, curated the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign.

Browder’s lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, had uncovered a massive tax fraud of $230million by the Russian government. The innovative legal procedure which is named in honour of Browder’s lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, enables accountability measures like asset freezes, disruption of access to western financial systems, restrictions on travel, banking, or ability to conduct businesses globally. The procedure creates significant personal and financial consequences and deterrence for sanctioned individuals.

The Global Magnitsky Act (2016) expanded its reach to target abusers worldwide with similar laws enacted by the EU, UK, Canada, and Australia. Time for the House of Justice to pitch in: ‘What is the legal framework and success rate of the Magnitsky procedure?’

Browder in reply said the Global Magnitsky Act had since sanctioned individuals from various countries including former Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh who was convicted for corruption and human rights abuses, Dan Gertler, an Israeli businessman, for corrupt mining deals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Abdulaziz al-Hasawi who was implicated in the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,

Chen Quanguo and other Chinese officials sanctioned in 2020 for human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China and

Filipos Woldeyohannes, the Eritrean military leader, sanctioned in 2021 for war crimes in Tigray.

If Eritrea’s Filipos Woldeyohannes could be sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for leading an entity accused of “despicable acts” then surely, there could be individual accountability for terrorism and Mass Atrocities in the Sahelian states.

Ballason raised the stakes higher: In a private conversation with Sir Browder, she proposed an extension of Magnitsky accountability alongside International Criminal Law justice to terrorism and Mass Atrocities in Africa’s Sahelian countries. ‘Oh, brilliant! pleased to work on that; Browder replied, handing his contact card to Ballason for the continuation of engagement to actualize the idea.

In the course of the conference, the War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association also explored the question of accountability.

Terrorism and war crimes continue in the 21st century despite a plethora of alternatives for war prevention and war crimes accountability. Ballason, whose life story is shaped by religious crisis that marred her childhood and terrorist attacks that have shaped much of her work as advocate, consultant and regional justice and peace worker, was fully engaged in the brainstorming:

‘The ultimate goal is to ensure war and terrorism do not take root as accountability cannot match the irreparable damage on humanity or resources; ‘ said Ballason. In the session which had in attendance Nigeria’s Dr. Babatunde Ajibade, SAN, Chair of the International Bar Association’s Section on Public and Professional Interest,

Ballason explained that the House of Justice position requires that governments unable to prevent war or terrorism have a duty to frame conflicts and crises for what they are: ‘ Call it ‘terrorism’ not ‘Farmer-Herder, Religious or Communal clashes’ if there is unlawful use of violence or threats that create widespread fear and intimidates government or civilian populations for the achievement of political, religious, or ideological goals; and by all means, call it ‘Genocide’ when there are killings and serious harm that inflict life conditions, prevents births, destroys in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. No government should sugar coat it. If it smells, feels, tastes, looks or is perceived as it, then it is it;’ Ballason said, her voice searing the room.

House of Justice: Rejecting Justice Rollback on Terrorism.

Why is House of Justice moving for justice for victims of Terrorism and Mass Atrocities?

Nigeria and the Sahelian countries fit Maximilien de Robespierre, the French revolutionary leader and political philosopher’s, description when he said: ‘when a person is killed, it is termed murder; when tens are killed, the killers are seen as lunatics and when thousands are killed, the killers are invited to the negotiation table.’

The psychic numbing illustrates how state accountability does not scale proportionally instead it often decreases with the scale of atrocities floating over politically transcendent or conventional laws.

The House of Justice galvanises the public to elevate their anger at injustice beyond their fears, to be uncomfortable with despots and to hold to criminal sanctions officials who through commission or negligence, are responsible for mass casualties.

The Only Way is Justice.

Since 2014, The House of Justice has continued to work on accountability measures against terrorism and Mass Atrocities through litigation, stripping corrupt leaders off public engagement and submitting petitions to ensure enablers and sponsors of terrorism are not appointed to political offices. One of such high ranking officials is Mallam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai whose tenure as Governor of Kaduna state, Nigeria’s third largest state, was characterized by numerous murders, enforced disappearances, wilful destruction of cultural heritages, brutal persecution of critics and journalists and mass illegal destruction of houses and means of livelihood. President Muhammadu Buhari who led Nigeria, Africa’s largest country between 2015-2023 was egregiously negligent as Nigeriacontinued to feature in the rating of the top most terrorized countries in the world accounting for two top terrorist groups: Boko Haram and Herdsmen Terrorists – two groups the President was reluctant to declare as terrorists until the global community affirmed them as such.

The House of Justice continues to call for global collaboration in addressing root causes, provision of alternative narratives, terror and war financing disruption, actionable intelligence and multi-sector collaboration in preventing terror and where there are war and terror victims, that victims’ justice and resettlement should be prioritized by the state while those in the ecosystem of wars such as financiers, instigators, collaborators or executors of terrorism are held to account.

For the House of Justice, the mission is more than Law and Justice. The end point is the supremacy of the Rule of Law so there can be just societies and a safe world.

The Bombs That Had to Fall: America’s Christmas Day Strike on Jihadist Camps in Sokoto, Seat of the Caliphate

 

In the early hours of December 26, 2024, as most Nigerians slept off Christmas festivities, the skies over Tangaza Local Government Area in Sokoto State erupted with the thunderous roar of precision airstrikes. For 45 minutes, from 11:45 PM on December 25 to 12:30 AM, United States military aircraft unleashed what President Donald Trump described as “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS Terrorist Scum in Northwest Nigeria.”

The operation, estimated by experts to have cost between $1 million and $3 million, marked a significant escalation in international counterterrorism efforts within Nigeria’s borders. Both the U.S. Department of War and Nigeria’s Foreign Minister confirmed that the strikes were a coordinated operation between the two nations, targeting a terrorist base hosting key jihadist affiliates in the Bouni axis of Tangaza.

Yet, predictably, the strikes have sparked intense debate across Nigeria. Skeptics have questioned everything from the existence of ISIS in Sokoto to the legitimacy of American military intervention on Nigerian soil. Kaduna-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmed Gumi went as far as calling the operation symbolic of a “neo-Crusade war against Islam,” urging Nigeria to halt all military cooperation with the United States and seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead.

But as someone who has reported extensively from Tangaza and witnessed firsthand the creeping menace of transnational jihadism in Nigeria’s Northwest, I can say with confidence: these airstrikes were not only necessary, they were overdue.

The Lakurawa Threat: A Clear and Present Danger

In November 2024, my colleague Segun Onibiyo and I published an exclusive investigation into Tangaza and the alarming influx of foreign Islamist terrorists from the Sahel region into Nigeria through its porous northwestern borders. What we found was chilling: the Lakurawa terrorist group, a coalition of jihadists with ambitions to establish Islamic caliphates stretching from the Sahel down to the coast of Ghana, had been actively recruiting local fighters, including Fulani militias, across Sokoto and Kebbi states.

Tangaza, situated along Nigeria’s border with Niger Republic, has become a critical transit and operational hub for these jihadists. The porosity of this border facilitates the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and ideology between the Sahel’s conflict zones and Nigeria’s increasingly vulnerable Northwest. This isn’t speculation, it’s documented reality.

The Lakurawa aren’t merely bandits or cattle rustlers. They represent a sophisticated, ideologically driven terror network affiliated with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating across the Sahel. Their objectives are clear: destabilize governments, impose harsh interpretations of Sharia law, and expand their territorial control. Their methods are equally clear: targeted assassinations, mass kidnappings, extortion, and brutal attacks on anyone who resists their authority, including Muslims.

Why Sokoto? Understanding the Strategic Significance

Critics have questioned why Sokoto, the historic seat of Nigeria’s caliphate and a region perceived as peaceful, would be targeted. This question betrays a dangerous ignorance of contemporary jihadist strategy.

Sokoto’s symbolic importance cannot be overstated. For groups like Lakurawa and their Sahel-based allies, controlling or influencing territories with deep Islamic heritage lends them religious legitimacy. Tangaza’s strategic location along smuggling routes and its proximity to ungoverned spaces in Niger Republic make it an ideal staging ground for operations deeper into Nigeria.

Furthermore, the U.S. military doesn’t invest millions of dollars in precision airstrikes based on hunches. In recent weeks, American forces have conducted intensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations across the Sahel region of Nigeria. These missions undoubtedly revealed credible intelligence about the presence of high-value terrorist targets in Tangaza, likely including senior commanders planning coordinated attacks across multiple Nigerian states.

The Sokoto State Government has confirmed that terrorist locations were indeed bombed. Reports from Niger indicate that Nigerien soldiers observed fleeing Lakurawa fighters escaping Tangaza after the strikes. The operation targeted a terrorist base where top jihadist commanders were reportedly meeting to strategize large-scale attacks. No civilian casualties were recorded, a testament to the precision and coordination involved.

Trump’s “ISIS” Rhetoric: Politics Meets Reality

President Trump’s characterization of the targets as “ISIS Terrorist Scum” warrants clarification. While Lakurawa is primarily affiliated with JNIM and Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS, the distinction may be more relevant to terrorism analysts than to practical counterterrorism operations. Both organizations share overlapping ideologies, tactics, and objectives. Both seek to establish Islamic caliphates through violence and terror. Both recruit from the same radicalized populations and exploit the same governance vacuums.

Trump’s reference to ISIS likely serves a dual purpose: it resonates with American audiences familiar with ISIS’s atrocities, and it simplifies a complex security landscape into terms that justify decisive action. For Nigerians living under the threat of these groups, whether the terrorists pledge allegiance to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or JNIM matters far less than whether they’re being effectively neutralized.

The Broader War: Why This Strike Matters

This operation represents more than just a tactical victory, it signals a renewed international commitment to confronting transnational terrorism in West Africa. For too long, Nigeria has faced these threats with insufficient resources, inadequate intelligence capabilities, and an overstretched military. The involvement of U.S. military assets, with their advanced surveillance technology, precision strike capabilities, and real-time intelligence, provides a force multiplier that Nigeria desperately needs.

The Lakurawa threat extends beyond Sokoto and Kebbi. Their influence has been felt in Zamfara, and increasingly in parts of Niger and Kwara States. They operate with impunity in areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. They impose taxes on communities, recruit disaffected youth, and coordinate with local bandits to create a complex web of criminality and ideological extremism.

Sheikh Gumi’s concerns about sovereignty and the symbolism of American intervention are not without merit in principle. No nation should casually cede control of military operations within its borders. However, his suggestion that “terrorists don’t fight terrorists” ignores the fundamental difference between legitimate counterterrorism operations conducted with host-nation consent and the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by jihadist groups.

His recommendation that Nigeria seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead raises its own questions. Are these nations better positioned to provide the sophisticated ISR capabilities, precision strike assets, and actionable intelligence that this operation demonstrated? The evidence suggests otherwise.

Looking Forward: Recommendations for Sustained Action

While the Tangaza strikes represent a significant achievement, they cannot be a one-off event. Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy must evolve to address the full spectrum of jihadist threats across the country.

The next priority should be the systematic dismantling of known terror cells in the Middle Belt, particularly in Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue, and Taraba states. These cells serve as planning and staging grounds for attacks on farming communities that have displaced thousands and devastated agricultural production. Precision airstrikes targeting these locations, combined with ground operations to clear and hold territory, would significantly degrade their operational capacity.

Nigeria must also invest in border security infrastructure along its northern frontiers. Technology, surveillance drones, biometric checkpoints, rapid response units, must replace the current patchwork of undermanned outposts. Regional cooperation with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon needs strengthening to create a coordinated response to groups that exploit national boundaries.

Finally, Nigeria must address the governance vacuums that make communities vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. Where the state is absent, in providing security, justice, education, and economic opportunity, extremist groups fill the void. Long-term victory against terrorism requires not just military action but the restoration of effective governance.

Conclusion: A Necessary Strike in a Long War

The Christmas Day airstrikes in Tangaza were not an American crusade against Islam, as some have claimed. They were a necessary surgical intervention against a metastasizing terrorist threat that endangers Muslims and Christians alike. The Lakurawa and their affiliates have killed indiscriminately, enslaved communities, and sought to drag Nigeria into the chaos consuming the Sahel.

Those who doubt the necessity or success of these strikes should ask themselves: Would they prefer that the terrorists meeting in that Tangaza forest had been left to execute whatever atrocities they were planning? Would they prefer that Nigeria face these transnational threats entirely alone, without the intelligence and capabilities that international partnerships provide?

The war against terrorism in Nigeria is far from over. But on December 25, 2025, in the skies over Sokoto, a significant battle was won. Now comes the harder work: sustaining the pressure, expanding operations to other terrorist strongholds, and building the state capacity necessary to ensure that when terrorists are eliminated, they cannot simply be replaced.

The strike in Tangaza matters because it demonstrates that Nigeria is not alone in this fight, and that those who wage jihad against innocent Nigerians, regardless of their religious affiliation or international backing, will face consequences.

The question now is whether Nigeria has the political will to build on this success or whether the Tangaza strikes will remain an isolated event in an otherwise reactive and inadequate counterterrorism strategy.

For the sake of every Nigerian farmer, trader, student, and family living under the shadow of these groups, we must choose the former.

 

…Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over a decade.

WHO IS THE GENOCIDE CULPRIT IN NIGERIA?

 

A Critical Examination of the Claim That “Muslims Are Also Killed” as a Response to the Genocide of Christians and Indigenes/Natives of Nigeria

by

Barr. John Apollos Maton

20th December 2025

INTRODUCTION: THE DANGEROUS SIMPLICITY OF FALSE BALANCE

In every conflict marked by sustained violence against a particular group, there emerges a predictable rhetorical maneuver: false equivalence. When the subject of mass killings of Christians is raised, especially in locations plagued by sectarian violence, a familiar refrain is deployed; “Muslims are also killed.” This statement is often presented not as a call for universal justice, but as a rhetorical shield meant to dilute, deflect or delegitimize the claims of targeted persecution. The purpose is not to mourn all victims or empathise with survivors, but to suspend moral urgency, silence advocacy and neutralize accountability.

The unanswered questions by the protagonists of “Muslims are also killed” despite repeatedly asking is a simple but uncomfortable one: Who is the culprit of the gangster killing spree in Nigeria?

When Christians are being killed systematically, and the response is that ‘Muslims are also killed’, then logic demands further inquiry; Who is killing whom? Under what circumstances? With what intent? And in whose name? These are not questions of sentiment but of truth, evidence and responsibility. To refuse to ask these questions is not neutrality, it is complicity in obscuring reality.

DEFINING GENOCIDE AND TARGETED VIOLENCE

Genocide is not defined merely by the existence of death inflicted by gangster and selective violence; it is defined by domestic cum international law based on observed pattern, intent and identity. The killing of members of a group because they belong to that group constitutes a crime of a fundamentally different moral and legal category than killings resulting from crime, collateral conflict or intra-group violence (eg. arising from boundary disputes).

When Christian communities are attacked and killed in their bedrooms while asleep, in their villages, churches, farmlands and market places, often without reprisal aggression, the issue is not about quantum numbers alone. It is targeting. It is the selection of victims based on ethnoreligious identity. It is the destruction of lives, livelihoods, properties, sacred spaces and communal continuity. To respond to such evidence with the vague assertion that “others are also killed” is to evade the definition of genocide entirely.

No serious moral framework allows the suffering of one group to be dismissed simply because suffering exists elsewhere.

THE “MUSLIMS ARE ALSO KILLED” ARGUMENT: A LOGICAL AUTOPSY

At first glance, the claim that “Muslims are also killed” appears humane. Who would deny that all lives matter? Yet when examined closely, the argument collapses under its own contradictions.

If Muslims are also killed, then by who and why? Are they killed by Christians acting collectively? Are Christian militias invading Muslim villages? Are churches mobilizing armed groups to attack mosques? What is the evidence, public declarations or ideological manifestos supporting such claims?

The answer, based on available historical records including data, is unequivocal: No. Christians, as a collective religious group, have not organized, celebrated, or justified mass attacks on Muslims in the territorial locations under discussion. There are no evidential records and data of Christian mobs chanting religious slogans while burning Muslims or their settlements, worship places, livelihoods and markets. Nor are there such records and data of sermons by Christian clerics calling for the extermination of Muslims. No coordinated religious campaigns encouraging violence or crime. This absence of evidence is not accidental. It reflects a fundamental asymmetry that the claims in “both sides” narrative refuses to confront.

THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE: RECORDINGS, ADMISSIONS, AND PATTERNS

One of the most damning aspects of modern conflicts is that they are often documented by the perpetrators themselves. Videos, photographs, statements and social media posts have become tools of intimidation and ideological signaling.

In the cases under discussion on genocides against Christians, there exist repeated instances where attackers openly identify themselves, invoke religious language, and frame their violence as justified or divinely sanctioned. These are not anonymous accidents. They are ideological acts. When individuals proudly record and disseminate evidence of their crimes, they remove ambiguity about intent.

By contrast, there is no comparable archive of Christians collectively boasting about religiously motivated mass violence. This is not a claim of moral perfection, but of empirical reality. Individual crimes exist everywhere. Organized religious extermination by Christians in these contexts does not exist. Thus, when Muslims are killed, the crucial question remains unanswered by deflection: who killed them, and why?

COLLATERAL DEATH VERSUS TARGETED EXTERMINATION

Another deliberate confusion lies in the failure to distinguish between collateral deaths and targeted killing for extermination. In territorial locations affected by insurgency, banditry, and terrorism, civilians of all identities may tragically die. But not all deaths are equal in meaning.

When a Christian farmer is killed because his farmland is trespassed and crops ravaged, his homestead is seized, his church burned, and his village erased, the motive is clear. When worshippers are massacred during religious services, the symbolism is undeniable. When survivors are told to convert, flee, or die, the intent is explicit.

If Muslims are killed in clashes between armed groups, criminal networks, or internal disputes, those deaths are tragic and demand justice, but they do not negate evidence of a parallel, targeted campaign against Christians. Conflating the two is not analysis; it is obfuscation. Yet, the question remains; who killed the Muslims and why?

WHY THE FALSE BALANCE IS POLITICALLY USEFUL

The insistence on “both sides suffer” serves powerful political interests. It allows governments to avoid naming perpetrators. It enables international actors to maintain diplomatic comfort. It shields extremist ideologies from scrutiny by dissolving them into generalized chaos.

Most dangerously, it gaslights victims including survivors. It tells survivors that their suffering is exaggerated, their fear misplaced, and the death of their kinsfolk is a mere statistic in a symmetrical tragedy. This rhetorical strategy does not promote peace—it perpetuates silence. History shows that genocide is rarely denied outright in its early stages by the perpetrators and supporters of the evil. Instead, it is minimized, relativized, pacified and buried under calls for patience and restraint, so the voices of the victims are lost and the true agenda hidden. In Plateau State and many parts of Nigeria, the strategy denying cries against this Genocide is to have even the government misnormered it as being “Insecurity” or the infamous “Farmer-Herder Clash”.

THE MORAL FAILURE OF SILENCE AND DEFLECTION

There is a profound ethical failure in responding to cries of persecution with deflection. Moral seriousness requires specificity. Justice requires naming crimes accurately. Peace requires confronting uncomfortable truths. To acknowledge that Christians are targeted does not require hatred of Muslims. To demand accountability does not require collective blame. But to refuse acknowledgment because it disrupts a preferred narrative is to abandon both truth and humanity. The question is not whether Muslims are also killed. The question is whether Christian deaths are being used as a bargaining chip in a moral shell game designed to avoid responsibility.

WHY CONDEMN THE AID COMING FOR CHRISTIANS?

1. The Moral Contradiction at the Heart of the Objection

The first question that must be confronted honestly is this: why would any morally serious person oppose humanitarian aid to civilians facing mass violence, regardless of their faith? Aid is not a theological endorsement; it is a response to human suffering. Condemning assistance to Christian communities under attack does not reduce violence, save Muslim lives, or advance justice—it merely withholds relief from victims. When opposition to aid becomes louder than condemnation of the killings themselves, priorities are exposed. Humanitarian intervention should never be framed as a zero-sum competition between communities, especially in a context where civilians of multiple faiths are being brutalized by armed groups.

2. The Missed Opportunity for Collective Advocacy

Nigeria’s insecurity has attracted rare international attention, and this moment could have been used constructively to amplify all civilian suffering. Instead of rejecting the framing of Christian victimhood outright, critics could acknowledge it while simultaneously presenting evidence of Muslim civilian casualties and calling for inclusive protection. International actors are capable of responding to multiple crises at once. Denial does not broaden concern; it narrows it. By rejecting the language of “Christian genocide” rather than supplementing it with documented accounts of Muslim suffering, critics inadvertently weaken the overall case for international engagement against terrorism.

3. Denial as a Strategy—and Its Consequences

There is a profound difference between contextualizing violence and denying it. When denial becomes the dominant response, it signals that controlling the narrative matters more than protecting lives. If Christians are being targeted in identifiable patterns—through church attacks, village raids, forced displacement, or selective killings—then disputing terminology should never take precedence over stopping the violence. The insistence on denial, especially when paired with hostility toward aid, creates the impression that reputational defense of a group or ideology has eclipsed compassion for victims. This perception, whether intended or not, damages trust and deepens communal suspicion.

4. If the Culprit Is the Same, Why Resist Intervention?

If both Christians and Muslims are suffering at the hands of the same armed actors—terrorist groups, criminal militias, or transnational extremists—then logic demands a united civilian front. Aid, investigations, and security interventions aimed at dismantling those networks should be welcomed, not resisted. Shielding perpetrators indirectly—by downplaying their impact on one community—undermines the safety of all communities. Terrorist violence does not respect religious boundaries; it exploits them. Any response that fragments civilian solidarity only strengthens the attackers.

5. The Responsibility of Muslims in Indigenous Communities

Muslims who are of the Indigenous tribes of Nigeria, like indigenous Christians, have deep historical, cultural, and communal ties to their regions. Their interests are aligned with peace, stability, and the protection of ancestral lands—not with violent actors who destabilize societies and invite external chaos. Standing against terrorism does not mean standing against Islam; it means standing for life, dignity, and coexistence. When indigenous Muslim voices openly support interventions that protect all civilians, they reclaim moral leadership and make it harder for extremists to masquerade as defenders of faith.

6. Aid Is Not the Enemy—Violence Is

Ultimately, the question is not whose suffering counts more, but whether suffering is allowed to continue unchecked. Humanitarian aid for Christians under attack does not negate Muslim suffering; it establishes a precedent that civilian lives matter. The appropriate response to selective attention is not obstruction, but expansion—demanding broader protection, deeper investigations, and comprehensive aid for all affected communities. Condemning aid aimed at one group risks normalizing cruelty. Supporting aid, while insisting on inclusivity, affirms a shared commitment to justice and human life above sectarian rivalry.

WHO, THEN, IS THE CULPRIT?

If Christians are not attacking Muslims as a religious collective, yet Muslims are also among those killed, then the perpetrators must be clearly and explicitly identified: armed extremist groups, criminal militias, terrorist organizations, or ideological movements that exploit religion for power and violence. Historical and contemporary data suggests the Islamist Fulani jihadists as the only group that fits this narrative; immigrants whose pristine motive from their first incursion to some territories that are constituent parts of what comprise present-day Nigeria was an Islamic jihad aimed at conquest and displacement of native people and institutions.

The refusal to distinguish between Islam as a faith and the Fulani violent actors who profess Islam harms everyone. It allows the Fulani settler immigrants and extremists to hide behind populations of indigenous ethnic groups and critics to be accused of bigotry for asking legitimate questions. Precision is not prejudice; it is the foundation of justice.

CONCLUSION: TRUTH IS NOT HATRED

Asking “Who is the culprit?” is not an act of hostility. It is an act of moral responsibility.

The lives of Christians lost to targeted violence cannot be erased by the rhetorical symmetry of the culprits. Nor can justice be achieved by pretending that all deaths arise from the same causes or carry the same intent.

If Muslims are killed, they deserve justice. If Christians are targeted for extermination, they also deserve justice, recognition and protection. These truths are not mutually exclusive. What is unacceptable is the weaponization of one tragedy to silence another. Truth demands clarity. Justice demands courage.

And, history will judge not only those who killed, but those who refused to ask who did it, and those who keep pretending not to know it’s the continuation of the genocidal campaign of the immigrant Islamist Fulani jihadists against the Native Indigenous Ethnic People and Christians of Nigeria.