Sheikh Gumi, Usman Yusuf, and the Dangerous Politics of Sympathizing With Terror in Nigeria

By Nasiru I. M. Jagaba

21 December 2025

jagabanasiru@gmail.com

For over a decade, Nigeria has endured an unrelenting wave of terrorism and large-scale banditry that has claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced millions, and devastated entire regions. From the abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok to mass killings in the Middle Belt and the bombing of the

Abuja-Kaduna passenger train, the victims have overwhelmingly been ordinary, unarmed citizens.

Nigeria’s tragedy is not rooted in a lack of military capability. The country possesses trained forces, intelligence assets, and international partnerships. What has consistently failed is political resolve, compounded by the role of influential voices who have normalized, justified, or indirectly shielded terrorists under the language of dialogue, ethnicity, or religious fraternity.

At the heart of this troubling pattern are Sheikh Ahmad Gumi and Professor Usman Yusuf, two public figures whose words, actions, and associations demand scrutiny rather than reverence.

Documented Presence With Terrorists in Their Havens

Before any discussion of motives or rhetoric, one foundational fact must be stated plainly: Sheikh Ahmad Gumi and Professor Usman Yusuf have, on multiple occasions, been seen in photographs and video footage holding court with armed terrorists inside their forest havens across several Nigerian states. These were not accidental encounters or second-hand claims; they were direct, documented meetings conducted deep within territories controlled by bandit and terrorist groups.

Such repeated access establishes an unavoidable reality: anyone who can consistently meet terrorists in their strongholds knows who they are, where they are located, and how to reach them. In a country where security agencies often cite intelligence gaps as a constraint, this level of familiarity raises grave questions. If these individuals possess such access and knowledge, Nigerians are entitled to ask why this proximity has not translated into the exposure, disruption, or dismantling of terror networks, but instead has coincided with public advocacy that appears to soften, excuse, or rationalize their violence.

From Mediation to Legitimization: The Gumi Question

Beginning around 2020, Sheikh Ahmad Gumi publicly ventured into bandit-controlled forests across Zamfara and neighboring states, presenting himself as a mediator. These visits were not clandestine; they were widely broadcast and documented by BBC Hausa (June 2021), Channels Television (July 2021), and Daily Trust (2021).

Crucially, these encounters produced photographs and video footage showing Gumi sitting openly with armed bandit leaders in their forest enclaves. These images carry unavoidable implications: anyone who repeatedly meets terrorists in their strongholds knows who they are, where they operate, and how to reach them.

Yet rather than use this access to expose terror networks, Gumi consistently positioned himself as their public interpreter, often describing them in collective, possessive language such as “our boys” or “our warriors” (mayakanmu) in televised interviews.

In any counter-terrorism doctrine, such language blurs the line between mediation and moral endorsement. It raises a fundamental question Nigerians deserve answered:

If these men know the terrorists so well, why has the nation never been told, clearly and unequivocally, why these groups attack villages, massacre civilians, and wage war on the Nigerian state?

Negotiating for Killers, Silence for Victims

Despite repeated “peace engagements,” violence did not decline; it escalated. Kidnappings expanded from remote villages to highways, schools, and rail infrastructure, culminating in the Abuja–Kaduna train attack of 28 March 2022.

Instead of disarmament, terrorists gained:

Public visibility

A sympathetic national voice

Political and ideological cover

If negotiations are conducted with murderers, a basic moral question arises: Who accounts for the blood already spilled?

When Sheikh Gumi and his allies speak of bandits using inclusive Hausa pronouns, “we” and “us”, they unintentionally frame mass atrocities as collective grievances rather than criminal acts.

Such framing risks converting terror into an ethnic or communal cause, rather than what it is: organized violent crime and war against civilians.

Associations That Deepen Concern

Public concern intensified with the arrest of Tukur Mamu, a close associate of Gumi and a self-described negotiator. On 7 September 2022, Mamu was arrested in Cairo, deported to Nigeria, and detained by security agencies. Authorities stated he was found with items allegedly linked to terrorist logistics (Premium Times, September 2022; Channels TV, September 2022).

Mamu had repeatedly appeared beside Gumi during “peace meetings” with bandits. Yet kidnappings continued unabated throughout this period. This inevitably raises a disturbing question:

Were these engagements aimed at ending terrorism, or managing it?

Earlier, Sheikh Gumi himself had drawn international attention. In 2010, Saudi authorities detained him following intelligence concerns linked to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian involved in the failed Christmas Day airline bombing (The New York Times, January 2010). More recently, in May 2025, Saudi Arabia reportedly denied him entry for Hajj.

Such actions by foreign governments may be disputed, but taken together they form a pattern that merits investigation, not dismissal.

Usman Yusuf and the Ethnicization of Terror

Professor Usman Yusuf, former Executive Secretary of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), has emerged as a vocal critic of military operations against armed terrorist groups.

In opposing decisive action, Yusuf has framed counter-terror efforts as an attack on “Fulani people.” This argument is not merely flawed; it is dangerous.

Northern traditional rulers, security briefings, and multiple media investigations have repeatedly acknowledged that a significant proportion of bandit groups identify as Fulani, without suggesting that Fulani identity itself is criminal.

Terrorism is not an ethnicity; it is a crime.

By Yusuf’s logic, opposing military action against armed militias because of their ethnic identity implies that such groups possess an implicit right to raid villages, displace other ethnic communities, and commit mass killings without resistance. This is a moral and legal absurdity.

Selective Compassion, Selective Justice

Professor Yusuf’s public record also invites scrutiny. During his tenure at NHIS, he faced allegations of financial mismanagement reported by Premium Times (October 2018) and The Punch (December 2018). While he denies wrongdoing and no final conviction has been recorded, these unresolved issues remain part of the public record.

It is therefore legitimate to ask: Why does a former public official, facing unresolved accountability questions, now position himself as a defender of armed groups, while civilians continue to die?

When Terror Becomes a Political Asset

Media investigations by Daily Trust (June 2020) and Premium Times (February 2021) documented state-level arrangements where bandit leaders were paid or settled in exchange for temporary ceasefires. Security analysts cited by The Guardian (August 2021) and the International Crisis Group (2020–2023) warned that such deals often preserved terror networks as political leverage, especially during election cycles. If armed groups are maintained as bargaining tools, terrorism ceases to be merely a security failure and becomes a political strategy, a profound betrayal of the Nigerian people.

Tinubu’s Moment of Truth

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu faces a defining test. Ending insecurity requires placing national survival above political calculations, resisting elite pressure from those threatened by peace, and supporting professional military leadership without equivocation.

The Defence leadership under General Christopher Musa emphasizes coordination, discipline, and results. Such efforts cannot succeed while influential voices undermine operations through ethnic or religious narratives.

A Call for Investigation and Accountability

Criticism alone is no longer sufficient. Investigation is imperative.

Nigeria’s security and justice institutions must examine:

Public advocacy that appears to normalize or defend armed groups

Financial and logistical networks sustaining terrorism

The role of intermediaries who claim peace while violence persists.

International partners should also review credible evidence under frameworks such as the Global Magnitsky Act and Leahy Laws, where terror facilitation is established.

Holy robes must not become shields for unholy alliances.

Conclusion:

Stop Bargaining With Violence

The victims of Nigeria’s terror war, schoolchildren, farmers, commuters, worshippers, were not combatants. They were citizens. This war will not be won by ethnicizing crime, romanticizing killers, or negotiating from moral weakness. It will be won by truth, accountability, and political courage.

Nigeria must stop bargaining with terror, and start defeating it.