The Middle Belt people of Zaar in Southern Bauchi

By Patrick Anum

Recently, we have heard a lot about the killings in Southern Kaduna, but the media has once again seemed to ignore the killings in Southern Bauchi, where armed herdsmen attacks are responsible for scores of deaths every day. Only a few media outlets have been able to report on the atrocities taking place in the area.

The most recent incident that inspired this article occurred on January 22, 2023, at Gambar Sabon Layi in Tafawa Balewa local government of Bauchi State, where Daniel Dabwa was abducted and where four victims were gruesomely murdered.

But to understand the issues in Bauchi, there is a need to take a historic look at Bauchi State as a whole and the issues plaguing the Zaar people, where the former speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara hails from.

Bauchi was founded in 1809 by Mallam Yakubu one of the flag bearers of the Sokoto Jihad and was the first emir of Bauchi. They waged war on the non-Muslim groups in the area as they resisted subjugation.

In recent times, questions of indigeneity have risen as the indigene/settler narrative continues to cause tensions. The Zaar through their historical account settled in the region from before 1345. When the Jihads begun in the 1800’s, they had a peace treaty with Yakubu, the founder of Bauchi however after the passing of Yakubu, the peace treaty was broken by Yakubu’s successors which led to oppression and in some circumstances enslavement of some of the people by the Bauchi emirate. This led to a hostile relationship between the Bauchi emirate and the Zaar people which is still ever present in Zaar consciousness according to Jimam Lar, a scholar and researcher on post-colonial Nigerian history at the University of Jos.

In recent times, in the area known as Southern Bauchi, the Zaar, are the largest Christian group in Bauchi State and their population is concentrated in the Tafawa Balewa, Bogoro and Dass federal constituency.

The first problem which is very obvious as is the case with other Middle Belt areas is that there has been intent to rename their areas to those of other ethnicities (particularly Fulfude and Hausa names). Tafawa Balewa means “black stone” in Fulfude – with Fulfude being the language of the Fulani ethnic group located in a few states in northern Nigeria.
The Zaar instead call their local government “Puji” instead of Tafawa Balewa which also means black stone but in their language.

We see this trend in other parts of the Middle Belt like Adamawa – where the name of the state was renamed to that of the Fulani jihadist “Modibo Adama” who was responsible for slaughtering the people of Adamawa in large numbers during the Jihad of 1804. And it is unimaginable that in the 21st century, mini colonialism is still ever present where others would try to dominate and rename the lands of others. This is the case of Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State.

Reasons for the conflict have historic roots with the first being a breach of the peace treaty during the pre colonial period in Bauchi which led to conflict between Yakubus successors in the Bauchi emirate and the Zaar people.

The second arose during the colonial era according to Johannes Harnischfeger – when the British occupied Northern Nigeria and preserved the Islamic structure of the Hausa and Fulani groups in the old Northern region but attached the Non-Muslim groups (in this case the Zaar) to the emirate structure under the Fulani.

Other researchers like Adam Higazi and Jimam Lar have articulated that in recent times, Zaar leaders and organizations like the Sayawa council of elders and traditional rulers accuse the Bauchi state government of discrimination against the people of Southern Bauchi.

The problem persisted all through the colonial era since the Emirs had unlimited powers, as well as the right to distribute land and to collect taxes – this was another cause of conflict between the Zaar and the Emirates

Thirdly, in these emirates, the citizens were subject to Islamic courts despite being heathen/pagan (in the words of the British). This meant that Zaar were discriminated against in the old emirates.

It was so bad that a government commission in 1958 ascertained that Fulani judges dealing with criminal cases only admitted testimonies of male Muslim witnesses and in terms of compensation, christians and traditionalists were given only half or one-fifteenth of the amount that a Muslim could expect (Willink commission report)

By the 1950s, the Zaar had joined the UMBC – United Middle Belt Congress, the party of Northern Nigerian minority groups which had gone into an alliance with Awolowo’s Action Group (AG) and which was built on the quest to liberate ethnic minorities from the Emirate system – a move that the Hausa leaders point to as a cause for the Zaar’s recalcitrance.

The Zaar have largely remained more culturally and politically oriented towards the Non-Muslim groups of Plateau and Southern Kaduna than towards the Bauchi Emirate. Due to this reason among others, they have therefore advocated for the creation of a lowland state which will encompass Southern Bauchi and Plateau States.

On the issue relating to disturbances plaquing the area, Southern Bauchi has witnessed violence at different times in Nigeria’s history.

Violence occurred in 1959, 1977, 1991, 1995, 2001 and 2011. The first case of conflict happened in 1959 which was low in scale but since the creation of Bauchi State in 1976 by the late General Murtala Mohammed, the conflicts quickly escalated and issues as to indigeneity arose.

Since then, the Zaar accuse the Bauchi state government of stripping social amenities away from their areas during interviews with members of the community. To emphasize this point, we were able to confirm that Tafawa Balewa was stripped of its status as a local government headquarters where it was relocated to Bula, the main centre of the Hausa – Muslim district.
The police divisional headquarters was also relocated to Bununu as unjustifiable reasons were given for this move.

In sum, the Tafawa Balewa conflict is defined by two key factors – the historic evolution of the relationship between the Zaar and the Bauchi emirate, a relationship they believe has made them second-class citizens on their land – and secondly, issues over indigeneity and the founding of Tafawa Balewa.

In the wake of the riots in 1991, the Babalakin commission of inquiry was set up by the then Military administration to look into the conflict. It made recommendations of which some have still not yet been implemented in totality. The first being the creation of a chiefdom for the Zaar people of Tafawa Balewa and secondly, the prosecution of the perpetrators of the violence during that period.

Since 1991, there have been 10 governments in Bauchi and all, up to date have not implemented the recommendations of the commission of inquiry holistically. This has led a lot of analysts to see credence in what some of the Zaar people have said regarding the Bauchi State Government.

The former Governor Isa Yuguda created a Chiefdom but put its headquarters at Zwall and not Tafawa Balewa which was rejected by the Zaar people as not having complied with the recommendation of the various commissions of inquiry.

Of recent, the present Governor of Bauchi State, Bala Mohammed made the news for setting up a committee to look into the issue yet, like all governments before him, those words have been all smoke without fire.

The Zaar people in 2023 are still seeking the Chiefdom of their people and this issue is not unique to this area of the Middle Belt. We see the issue of chiefdoms as an important weapon that has been used to subjugate the Middle belt people by continuing age-long colonial policies where diverse groups instead of being granted their chiefdoms are being attached to emirates and even if they are being granted, are granted in part – and in areas away from where there are huge settlers which means that those settlers in the future could lay claim to these lands.

Another example is in Nasarawa where many groups such as the Tiv who have a whooping 11 wards have been deprived the right to have their traditional structures or chiefdoms. What this means is that they have to be under emirate rule in the state despite being largely traditionalists and christian.

We can also witness this unfolding in Southern Kaduna (the region of former Southern Zaria and not the Southern Kaduna senatorial district) where the current governor of Kaduna State has watered down most of the traditional institutions of other ethnicities whilst reinforcing his – or in specific instances where he has sent people from his ethnicity to be district heads to people of different ethnicities. As such, there must be a conscious effort to reject these attempts to deny or infiltrate the traditional structures of the Middle Belt people.

In conclusion, the most recurring theme in Nigerian political discourse is identity, ethnicity, traditional structures and land ownership. It is strange that settlers choose to have these debates with indigene Middle Belt groups when the 1958 Willink commission report showed the areas consisting of the different ethnic nationalities in present day Nigeria with little to no disagreement at that time. Infact, the then Northern regional government agreed with those mappings.

In the coming years, Nigeria will have to answer the indigene/settler question and the issue of minority rights as a whole. As for colonial documents and the intent behind migration during the colonial period, the British have clearly stated their reasons for importing groups into the geographical spaces of others. They site administrative expediency as the major reason.

The truth is that even the colonialists had a clear policy regarding the indigene/settler question and this could be used as a starting point when proffering solutions to these issues going forward.

As for the Zaar people in Southern Bauchi, the short-term solution should be the implementation of all commissions of inquiry reports holistically, a referendum regarding which State the Zaar people should belong to and the adoption of the said referendum.

From a regional perspective, a progressive step would be to adopt the Willink commission report regarding the creation of a Middle Belt region and the granting of autonomy to each ethnic nationality in the region.

Calls for State Police – A Middle Beltan Perspective

By Patrick Anum

Dr. Ifeanyi Okowa, governor of Delta State and vice-presidential candidate for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), recently spoke at the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria’s (ICAN) 2022 annual conference in Abuja and offered a familiar position on the state of insecurity in Nigeria.

He recommended the adoption of state police as the solution for the growing insecurity in the country. The call for the creation of state police is not new. In September, the Northern Governors Forum along with the traditional leaders, made a strong case for the establishment of state police. They explained that it was the only way to effectively tackle the lingering terrorism, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and wanton destruction of lives and property in the region.

In the past Southern Governors have also reiterated that State police is the only solution to solve the country’s security challenges. Rotimi Akeredolu, governor of Ondo and chairman of the forum, has said in the past that the forum would continue to demand the devolution of powers to the states.

To stress this need, there has been National dialogue to this effect. During the National Confab, Delegates on the June 26, 2014, adopted the resolution in support of the establishment, funding and operation of state and community police based on state laws. Of course, none of the confab resolutions were implemented.

From a Middle Beltan perspective, purposeful consideration needs to be given regarding the establishment of state police because unless that is done, the conflict would only be partially resolved in various Middle Belt regions notably Benue, Kogi, Adamawa, Plateau, Taraba, and Nasarawa. It might, however, intensify the crisis in other areas given the histories and the colonial legacies still present in the Middle Belt.

Other regions of the Middle Belt including Southern Kaduna, Southern Gombe, Southern Bauchi, Southern Borno, Southern Kebbi and parts of Niger State could in this regard, benefit from having pre-implementation plans.

The pre implementation plans would identify the gaps that state policing would not fill, possible solutions and special strategies for implementation. An example of such implementation strategies could be the creation of more states in the aforementioned areas before the implementation of state policing apparatus.

However, if state creation is opposed by the other states, and state policing is implemented with the current structure, one can only speculate as to the mayhem that would ensue in a region like Kaduna, where tensions between the areas of Southern Kaduna and the North still exist.

The former President Olusegun Obasanjo had said in 1992 that the problems in Kaduna were attributed to historical and colonial legacies and as such, were complex issues. Many scholars have in light of these considerations advocated for state creation as a solution to the lingering conflict.

Additionally, giving non neutral persons who are state governors such powers could spell disaster in fragile Middle Beltan states.

Already there have been rising tensions between SOKAPU (Southern Kaduna Peoples Union) and El rufai, the Governor of Kaduna State.

SOKAPU and El rufai have traded blames over the causes of the conflict in Kaduna. However, a look at the activities in the state paint a picture as to if the Kaduna State Governor who is currently trying to intervene in the conflict is actually neutral.

The Governor of Kaduna State’s activities include demolishing the only Church in Kaduna State University despite the establishment of six (6) mosques in the area.

He has also reiterated that he used monies from state coffers to pay killers from foreign countries to stop murdering the people of Southern Kaduna while ignoring the possibility of collaborating with security agencies to arrest and detain marauding “foreign killer herdsmen” in his state.

Also, under suspicious circumstances, he has restructured the traditional system in Kaduna leaving people in southern  Kaduna marginalized in their own local governments.

Looking at the larger picture, not only SOKAPU have had issues with El rufai –

 In 2017, the Nigerian Union of Journalists declared Kaduna State “the most lethal state to practice journalism” and warned that “…such attacks( in the state) may not abate soon”.

At least ten journalists and internet commentators have been detained or imprisoned in Kaduna State under Governor Nasir Elrufai, including Jacob Onjewu Dickson, Midat Joseph of Leadership Newspaper, Luka Binniyat of Vanguard, and Steven Kefas an influential internet commentator. 

Abubakar Idris (also known as Dadiyata), a government critic who was kidnapped in August 2019, has not yet been identified either dead or alive. 

It is plausible that the people of Southern Kaduna are not overly hopeful about the prospect of the state policing model being a solution to insecurity in the region.

Gombe State also serves as another case study for the postulation as to why state policing under the current model would serve as a disaster.

It also provides insight as to what the capabilities of having state police might entail for the non-Muslim groups in these areas.

Due to the State Government’s persistent interference with the traditional structures in the State, there have been ongoing accusations from non-Muslim groups in the state regarding the Governor of Gombe, Muhammed Inuwa Yahaya’s authoritarian activities.

Despite coming from a completely different ethnic group, the State Governor Muhammed Inuwa Yahaya attempted to impose a different candidate from the one who had been selected to be the Mai Tangale by King makers in March 2021.

According to reports, members of the Tangale traditional council at the time had either been detained or forced to flee the state as protests sparked crackdowns that resulted in injuries and fatalities

Another individual Alhaji Danladi Sanusi Maishanu whom the Governor tried to impose on the Tangale people had not even ascended the throne when he started making efforts to replace their cherished emblem which previously was (a snake  on a hill – with the moon and star emblem) signifying Islam.

Critics have questioned whether this is the reason why Muhammed Inuwa Yahaya, the governor of the state, had shown such interest in who ascended the throne of the Tangale people.

Another example that illustrates this point would be happenings in Borno State, where we can analyze Kashim Shettima’s actions as former governor.

The Centre for Justice on Religious and Ethnicity in Nigeria had advised Nigerians not to support the All Progressives Congress in the 2023 elections considering the vice presidential nominees activities as the former governor of Borno State. This recommendation was made in an article by Sahara reporters.

The first concerning situation which arose was when Governor Shettima was in charge of Borno State and neglected to enforce the N18,000 minimum wage in the local governments that were predominately Christian.

On the other hand, all the northern and central Borno LGAs, where the Shuwa-Arab and Kanuri tribes are predominately Muslims and there are little to no Christians, he introduced the N18,000 minimum wage.

He refused to enforce the minimum wage in the nine local government areas (LGAs) in southern Borno, where the Kwana, Kibaku, Putai, Bura and others, make up around 85% of the Christians population in the area. 

Even when the Borno State Government sought to hire some judges, all applicants from the Southern region who were of Christian extraction were regrettably ignored.

When a Christian traditional ruler in northern Nigeria passes away, according to Reverend Kallamu Musa Ali Dikwa, “the governor influences, enforces, and appoints a Muslim to take over, attempting to restructure the traditional institution along Islamic lines.”

He increased the scope by mentioning how “Governor Ahmed El-Rufai of Kaduna State implemented same in Kajuru LGA. Mallam Musa Bello, FCT Minister equally did the same in Bwari area council and how now, they’re trying to enforce a Muslim on Eggon people in Akwanga, Nasarawa state.

The kidnapping of more than 200 Chibok schoolgirls, which gained international news, was the most damning indictment on Shettima.

Goodluck Jonathan, a former president, claimed on page 21 of his book “My Transition Hours” that Shettima was in his words, “terribly interested” in the SSCE exam of the secondary school students in Chibok at the time.

In addition, Kashim Shettima was so interested that they remain in the school and complete their final secondary school (high school) exams there that he disregarded the West African Examinations Council’s request to have the students sit in a more secure setting.

The previous president questioned why the former governor would be that interested in a single school’s SSCE exam.

He also questioned why the Governor, who lacked police authority, would guarantee protection, and he thought it would have been far more plausible if the Commissioner of Police had alternatively made such guarantees especially considering the fact that the Governor just serves as the police chief in name.

How a Governor could miss such a call also baffled him.

It should be noted that there has been significant pressure meted out on even independent state policy. For example, even in Middle Beltan states like Benue, which have been largely autonomous and where anti-grazing laws have been adopted, the current PDP presidential candidate Alhaji Atiku Abubakar and other northern elite have disagreed and fought against such policies with belligerence. The current vice Presidential candidate Alhaji Atiku Abubakar even went as far as arguing that such laws were against the freedom of movement of certain sections of people in Nigeria and was therefore unconstitutional.

If resistance to autonomous state policy can be this controversial, how much more could it be in instances where people with different worldviews were being forced to coexist in the same state with their harassers.

It should be stressed that, without the necessary restructuring, giving such aforementioned individuals more authority at state level could spell certain catastrophe for the indigenous nationalities of the Middle Belt.

Restructuring is required to give Middle Belt communities their own leadership, legitimate ownership of their land in areas where they are endangered by roving herders, bandits, militia, and restructuring could even solve the problem of authoritarian and repressive political regimes in these areas.

In conclusion, there needs to be pre implementation plans that provide adequate restructuring – before there can be any talk of state police enactment.

Restructuring groups in Nigeria along regional and civilizational lines could be a preferred solution, and in the case of the Middle Belt, this means adopting previous reports that call for the creation of independent states in Southern Kaduna, Southern Gombe, Southern Kebbi, Southern Borno, and sections of Niger, as well as their inclusion to other parts of the Middle Belt, as was the intention of the minority report in 1958.

The adoption of state policy could then be carried out – and would result in little conflict there after.

2023 – A Continuation of the Middle Belt & Southern Alliance?

By Patrick Anum

The early 50s, produced the greatest generation of Middle Beltan nationalists Nigeria had ever seen. The likes of Joseph Tarka, Akase Dowgo, David Lot, Patrick Dokotri, Solomon Lar and D. Dimka.

They championed the cause of the ethnic minorities in the Middle Belt. The earliest Middle Beltan struggle lead to rise in the consciousness of the Middle belt people and subsequently led to the creation of the Benue-Plateau State which captured some parts of the Middle Belt although excluding major areas that fall outside the North central to this day.

At the time, the Northern Regional Government defined the Middle Belt region in terms of its geography as:

“The whole of Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau Provinces, the Southern parts of Bauchi and Zaria Provinces, the whole of Niger Province except for the area north of Kontagora town and the whole of the Numan Division of Adamawa Province together with the districts of Muri and Wurkun in the Muri division of the same province.

It was an attempt to detach themselves from the core North that led to these early agitations.

Decades later, ideologies and motives that led to the formation of the (Action Group – UMBC Alliance) would be at play in the 2023 Presidential elections where there seems to be a common ground between parts of the South South, South East, Middle Belt and even parts of the South West (despite the popularity of the All Progressives Congress in the region) regarding the candidature of the Labour Party Presidential candidate Peter Obi.

However, before the Peter Obi movement became wide spread, there was another movement calling for reform of the Nigerian police called EndSARS.

EndSARS was a largely decentralized movement calling for the reform of a unit of the Nigerian police force known as the Special Anti Robbery Squad (SARS) with a long record of abuse of Nigerian citizens mostly occurring in the Southern parts of the country.

Despite the Middle Belt regions not having that lived experience of Endsars, large parts of the Middle Belt, most notably Benue, Nassarawa, Taraba, Plateau, the FCT and parts of Southern Kaduna all came out in large numbers in solidary protests along side their counterparts from Southern Nigeria.

This was the first notable instance of Middle Belt – Southern solidarity in the 4th Republic.

The earliest case of Southern/Middle Belt alliance was in the first republic when the Middle Belt movement found solid ground in a political alliance between the UMBC (United Middle Belt Congress) led by Joseph Tarka and the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who led the dominant party in the Western region of Nigeria’s Southern province in the first republic.

According to a scholarly review of the alliance between the two parties by Andrew Barnes, the two factions joined forces because they had similar ideologies at the time. The Middle Belt was at the moment preoccupied with forging an identity distinct from the North and it was said that the AG offered them the perfect ideological platform/coalition to develop their ideologies, culture and goals.

The UMBCs goal were in 3 fold. (i) To fight against political domination and systematic exploitation of the peoples of the Middle Belt in the old Northern region (ii) To fight against forced Islamization of the entire peoples of the Middle Belt due to Ahmadu Bello’s forced conversion policies at the time (iii)To stop socio-economic discrimination of the peoples of the Middle belt.

Ironically, in 2023, the peoples of the Middle Belt and Southern parts of Nigeria would unite again to oppose the infamous “Muslim-Muslim” ticket and “North-North” ticket, much like they did in the 1950s when they opposed Ahmadu Bello’s “One North” policy and forced conversion campaigns.

It was equally as bad back then, probably if not worse because in 1964, when the late Ahmadu Bello spoke at the World Islamic League, he boasted in respect to converting 60,000 infidels. It was a bleak era especially considering how the late premier of the old Northern region enforced crackdowns that resulted in injuries and fatalities of the Middle Belt people in the old Northern region, had repeatedly referred to the 1804 Jihad and emphasized the uniform continuity of the NPC Government and the former caliphate.

On the successes of the UMBC, they would later go on to clinch seats in the federal elections making them a stakeholder at national politics.

The second case of Southern and Middle Belt alliance would be in the second Republic when the Late Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe’s party -Nigeria’s Peoples Party won in the old Plateau State (Now Plateau and Nasarawa States) in the 1979 election, beating the eventual winner Shehu Shagari of the NPN, National Party of Nigeria.

Although Obafemi Awolowo, who also came Second in the election did not win any state in the region, he got a decent 21% in the old Gongola States (Now Adamawa and Taraba States)

Fast-forward to the start of the 4th republic in 1999 and there were no “clear” signs of an alliance. What would change all of this would start following the release of a video purporting to show the murder of a man by the infamous Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS).

This would spark what became known as the #EndSars protests where tens of thousands of young Nigerians in the Southern and the Middle belt parts of the country would take to the streets to protest against police brutality

The demonstrations, which shook the nation for two weeks, forced the government to disband SARS and establish judicial panels of inquiry to look into the numerous claims of police abuse.

The federal government mandated an investigation into the abuses in all 36 of Nigeria’s states including the nation’s capital.

Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara were the seven states that were unwilling to cooperate and to the dismay of many from the Middle Belt and South, neither these areas in the core North held any EndSARS protests. Nonetheless, Middle Belt youths organized demonstrations, particularly in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa, and Southern Kaduna and adequately bridged the gap.

In reality, these actions were sufficient considering the fact that the alliance attracted the attention of respective state governments and raised the stakes for the federal government.

Kenneth Jande, one of the organizers of the Middle Belt protests, spoke to Sahara reporters in Jalingo, Taraba State, and argued for comprehensive police reforms to address the security issues rather than a name change from the Special Anti Robbery Squad to the Special Weapons and Tactics team, as the Nigerian police had attempted to do at the time.

Another Middle Beltan protestor in Benue, Ukan Kurkugh told Vanguard that in solidary with the youths in other parts of the country, they (Middle Beltan youths) in the region had declared to have the police disbanded and to have the police reformed to ensure security of lives and property.
These examples and many more were part of events in the Middle Belt.

Memorable scenes like that created nostalgic feelings in relation to the UMBC (United Middle Belt Movement) in the 1950s with a young Joseph Tarka who at only 25 years of age at the time, led the historic merger and fight for the peoples of the Middle Belt after being elected leader of the party in 1957.

Reading these accounts of the Middle Belt’s struggles brought back vivid recollections of the several young leaders from the old area who were fighting for their rights and achieved emancipation for most parts of the Middle Belt.

These scenes would morph into political agitations as the 2023 elections drew nearer. The EndSARS generation of young Nigerians would play a big role in promoting the candidature of Peter Obi, the presidential candidate of the Labour party as well as him being seen as a renewed hope for the “Sorosoke” generation (a yoruba word meaning to speak up).

Peter Obi would be projected to win most States of the Middle Belt such as Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and the FCT. He is also piped to win 25% in other parts of the Middle Belt like Borno, Kebbi, Niger, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Kogi and Kwara States.

Youths in the Middle Belt are mobilizing and going into their communities to support Peter Obi using their own resources.
There are many office spaces that have been rented and mobilization has begun in all the aforementioned areas.

The question of whether this is the start of an ongoing alliance between both groups and whether future movements can call for the necessary restructuring, resource control, autonomy for each region would be answered in the coming months.

The Middle Belt’s most crucial concern is whether or not they will be able to achieve the much-needed regional restructuring that would include all of the region’s areas in what Dele Ogun calls the “orange union”. The other two issues are the restructuring of lands being grabbed in the area and state police in light of the ongoing genocide happening in the region.